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Herman Melville and the Law
Abstract
Melville could complain after writing Moby-Dick that he swam through libraries in pursuit of the white whale.
The research for the background of this study has led of necessity to libraries and rare book collections, to
musty shelves of digests and almanacs, old law journals and magazines, mouldering diaries, private notes and
correspondence, through tattered pamphlets, tomes of congressional records, census reports, annals of towns
and states, of bar associations and historical societies, and of course to some of the studies by social-
intellectual historians, legal philosophers, and literary critics. The selection of material which appears in the
bibliography appended to this work represents only that portion of the above which I found occasion to cite in
the text, although I have included a few items which I consider indispensable to the context of the study.
Wherever possible the notes follow the style recommended by the Modern Language Association. Exceptions
are the cases cited, all of which are to be found in the Massachusetts Reports. The documentation for these
items follows the practice generally accepted by present day legal historians, of which the model is as follows:
volume number, name of the reporter, (date) page number; e.g. 10 Metcalf (1845) 93.
In presenting my conclusions about the relationship between Melville and the law it was necessary at times to
summarize some very complex matters of law and of legal history. To omit these sections, tedious though they
may be to those readers whose primary interest is literary, would be to suppose a great deal of technical
knowledge on the part of scholars who are not lawyers. Moreover, some explanations---that of "codification"
(Chapter V)---are difficult to come by anywhere else, at least in succinct form. I must therefore beg the
indulgence of the reader for bearing with me through these necessary digressions from our primary concern
with Melville and his work.
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PREFACE 
Melville could complain after writing Moby-Dick that he swam 
through libraries in pursuit of the white whale. The research 
for the background of this study has led of necessity to libraries 
and rare book collections, to musty shelves of digests and alma­
nacs, old law journals and magazines, mouldering diaries, private 
notes and correspondence, through tattered pamphlets, tomes of 
congressional records, census reports, annals of towns and states, 
of bar associations and historical societies, and of course to 
some of the studies by social-intellectual historians, legal 
philosophers, and literary critics. The selection of material 
which appears in the bibliography appended to this work repre­
sents only that portion of the above which I found occasion to 
cite in the text, although I have included a few items which I 
consider indispensable to the context of the study. 
Wherever possible the notes follow the style recommended 
by the Modern Language Association. Exceptions are the cases 
cited, all of which are to be found in the Massachusetts 
Reports. The documentation for these items follows the 
practice generally accepted by present day legal historians, 
of which the model is as follows: volume number, name of the 
reporter, (date) page number; e.g. 10 Metcalf (1845) 93.
xvi 
xvii 
In presenting �y conclusions about the relationship between 
Melville and the law it was necessary at times to summarize some 
very complex matters of law and o� legal history. To omit these 
sections, tedious though they may be to those readers whose primary 
interest is literary, would be to suppose a great deal of technical 
knowledge on the part of scnolars who are not lawyers. Moreover, 
some explanations---that of "codification" (Chapter V)---are diffi­
cult to come by anywhere else, at least in succinct form. I must 
therefore beg the indulgence of the reader for bearing with me 
through these necessary digressions from our primary concern with 
Melville and his work. 
INTRODUCTION
Following his return from the South Seas, Herman Melville
enjoye~ an exciting but haphazard intellectual development. With
an eager but indiscriminate vigor he explored almost every field
of knowledge that appeared on his horizon. Modern scholars have
found that retracing this "chart1ess voyagell may prove to be a
never-ending task. Yet until every island of thought in Melville's
private archipelago has been located, there will remain treacherous
shoals and currents ready to carry criticism aground.
Researchers have already produced full length studies of
such subjects for example as his religious thinking, his use of
Milton, Shakespeare, classical mythology, and the Bible, his
interest in time, the influence of nineteenth century science,
and even his acquaintance with the esoteric field of Assyriology.
Despite the fact, however, that many of his kin and nearly every-
one of importance that Melville knew in his lifetime was a lawyer,
a judge, or a person with a law education, no one until now has
given more than passing interest to what it might mean to have
such extensive contact with the law as a science and a philosophy.
Among the critics, only Herbert F. Smith has come close to
uncovering the depth of legal science in Melville's storehouse o~
information. Smith's 1965 study of Bartleby (IIMelville's Haster
in Chancery and His Recalcitrant C1erk,1I American Quarterl}:, 17
734-41), begins with the assumption that the profession of the
narrator is of vital importance to a correct reading of that story.
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He notes at the outset that "considering his voracious and un-
disciplined reading, we should not be too surprised to find that
Herman Melville had a considerable acquaintance with some of tr.~
more arcane points of law and Anglo-American legal history" (p. 734).
The article demonstrates that Melville did indeed know and use
legal terminology to make puns and other sly jokes in Bartleby.
Smith also argues convincingly that this ex-sailor, gentleman
farmer of the Berkshires was so well-versed in the peculiar evolu-
tion and character of the Court of Chancery as to be able to use
the historic conflict between law and equity as an underlying
metaphor of his story (p. 737). Modest though this piece of criti-
cism may be (7 pages), it presents, nevertheless, undeniable eVidence
that Melville had more than superficial knowledge of the law in
many of its complex and technical details.
If Bartleby were the only work in which Melville relied upon
legal lore for the stuff of his fiction, one might dismiss its
presence as mere illustration. A short survey will confirm, however,
that most of the stories that Melville wrote present matters of
law as an important part of the book. In Omoo the plot turns upon
the legal difficulties of the mutineers; filler material is devoted
to the theme of the.conflict between native mores and the laws
arbitrarily imposed by white men. Mardi's central plot crisis depends
upon whether "Taji" is guilty of murder or of justifiable homicide.
White-Jacket incorporates a brief against flogging and other forms
of cruelty in the martial law. The chief conflict of Pierre involves
the hero's disastrous attempt to make a practical application of the
3principles of absolute justice. lIBenito Cereno" had long puzzled
critics with the legal addenda attached to it. The catalog could
be extended, but it is perhaps pre~erable to conclude by remembering
that Melville"s last work, Billy Budd, remains one of the most
powerful courtroom dramas ever written.
Even this cursory revi~w exhibits at a glance the range and
magnitude of the role given to the legal situation in Melville's
writings. Plots, characters, conflicts, philosophical issues, all
are at times informed by what might be a lawyer's or a jurist's
way of looking at the world. To suggest an inevitable conclusion:
legal material is present in Melville's work to a degree sufficient
to warrant a thorough investigation of the relationship between
Melville and the law.
Therefore, this study constitutes an exploration and demonstra-
tion of three major hypotheses. First, a review of the available
biographical information establishes Melville's early and continued
association with the law through family members and friends who
were lawyers. Second, critical analysis of the internal eVidence
of the works reveals that he made use of a specialized knowledge
of "some of the more arcane points of Anglo-Saxon legal history,"
not only in writing Bartleby, but throughout his career. Third,
Melville found a source for a significant number of his ideas in
the professional work of a man who has been called one of the most
eminent jurists of the century: his father-in-law, Chief Justice
Lemuel Shaw (1830-1860) of Massachusetts.
4The report has peen divided into six essays, the contents of
which are outlined below:
Chapter I, "Background for r.ilennna,"is a survey of Melville's
childhood and adolescence. This period of his life is sketched
against the backdrop of family troubles arising out of a rapidly
expanding and unstable economy. It becomes readily apparent that
his family's characteristic response to crisis involved recourse
to legal solutions. Once the moral implications of these facts
are properly understood it can be seen that early in his life
Melville learned a relativist way of thinking and was led to regard
the world as ambiguous to valuation, a social reality woven out of
many compromised contingencies and points of view. He also learned
by observation the success, in a worldly way, of the lawyer's
approach to problem-solving.
Chapter II, "The Influence of the Legal Mind," elaborates the
premise laid down in the preceeding chapter that Melville shared
many of the habits of thought common to lawyers. His efforts at
writing occurred while he was associating with a group of New Yorkers,
many of whom were lawyers. His brand of humor in puns, satires,
caricatures, and anecdotal burlesques was developed against the
sounding board of his immediate audience in New York City and Boston,
a large part of which was made up of political journalists, lawyers,
and litterateurs who had had a law education. Perhaps because of
the literary tastes of these men, Melville concerned himself with
"verity" and with offering his readers informative, polemical prose,
5His peculiar stand on transcendentalism was identical in many respects
to that approved of by the legal profession. The title of Chapter II
refLect;s the debt owed to work begun by Perry Miller (The Life .2! the
Mind in America, 1965) in delineating the influence of the legal
mind as a broad cultural factor during the first half of the 19th
century in America. However, in the present study some attempt had
been made to separate this common experience from the more specific
and intense contact enjoyed by Herman Melville during the same period.
While Chapter II deals with the influence of legalism in general,
Chapter III, "The Rules of Evidence," demonstrates in detail Melville's
use of a specific field of legal science. This portion of the study
shows that Melville knew the textbook rules for evaluating the
reliability of testimony and evidence and that he consciously employed
these courtroom guidlines when he sat down to construct irresolvable
ambiguities and ambivalences in Moby-Dick, Pierre, and "Benito Cereno."
Chapter IV, "Murder, Malice, and Moby-Dick," explores the
relationship between certain notorious murder cases tried before
Judge Shaw and the author's almost thematic preoccupation with the
difficulty of deducing an intangible fact, such as malice, from
external appearances. This section outlines the similarities between
Melville's problems of epistemology and those debated by jurists
during the first several decades of the 19th century. Two of the
murder cases also suggest medical jurisprudence as a source for
Melville's concepts of monomaniac insanity as it is found in Moby-Dick,
Bartleby, and Billy Budd.
Chapter V, "Codification, or the Ambiguities," is a report on
the activities of legal reformers Melville knew and the ways in
which their activities may have had an impact on the writer's
thinking. In a sense this chapter is a continuation and a develop-
ment of material presented in Chapters III and IV; specifically it
completes the discussion of the connection between Melville's
constant troubling over what is knowable and the branch of legal
science which concerned itself with the problems of deriving from
experience that knowledge which is useful in establishing rules
for ethical decision. There is a positive correlation between the
morals and dilemmas of Melville's stories and the issues involved
in the contemporary debate over codification. The controversy was
over the question of whether it was advisable to reduce the common
law to a code; that is, to a set of abstract principles to be used
in deciding all cases. The alternative to this "codifying" of the
common law required jurists to deduce legal principles from the
precedents as'each principle was needed·again and again as each
new case came before the court. The quarrel which ensued among
Lawyers and jurists over which method was more likely to produce a
better decision is reflected in the pages of Mardi, Moby-Dick, the
Confidence-Man, and. especially, Pierre. The arguments lead to the
problem of whether absolute or relative justice is more appropriate
to temporal existence.
Each of the chapters from I through V deals with the admonitions
and formulas of legal science which underpin Melville's sustained
...
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inquiry into the problems of ethical decision in the circumstances
of an ambiguous and ambivalent reality. However, Chapter VI, "The
Cold Courts of Justice," s""':_ftst.ne focus away from the process of
judging to the role of the judge himself. Billy Budd is reinterpreted
in the light of Melville's long association with Judge Lemuel Shaw,
who was his wife's father and an old family friend. The story is
read under the hypothesis that the stand taken by Shaw on the question
of the police power of the state, especially the part he played in
the fugitive slave cases, provides the prototype for the role played
by Vere in Billy Budd.
In short, the conclusions presented in this report should
indicate accurately the extent to which Melville consciously borrowed
the rationale for many of his most characteristic themes and techniques
from the handbooks and conversations of lawyers and from his intimate
contact with two eminent judges.
Chapter I
Background for Dilemma
During the Industrial Revolution in America individuals a~
well as communities were caught between the values ane mores of
two different worlds. The slow moving and easily understood ways
of eighteenth century commerce, with its plain talk and its plain
dealing, were giving ground rapidly to the problematic and stiffly
competitive practices of the new capitalism. The ethics of the
two systems were often in marked contrast.
Some people were able to endure the strain of the transition
and profited from the conflicts. Others lost heavily. All of
Herman Melville's near relatives were among the latter. They lost
their fortunes in business failures and in the dissolution of their
estates. The wealth and power they had built upon the old tradition
fell before the demands of a new society. As a result, the Melvilles
and Gansvoorts coming of age in the 1830's and 1840's found they
were forced to earn a living, not by the manipulation of real estate
and capital, as had their fathers and grandfathers, but by hard work.
Numerous critics have seen these circumstances to be the origin
of Herman Melville's thematic preoccupation with the loss of Paradise.
However, more far-reaching in effect than the material losses were the
moral crises which plagued Melville family members whenever their
financial affairs brought them face to face with ethical dilemmas
arising out of real ambivalences in the changing times. Moreover,
8
9because of the inadequacy of existing moral guidelines, some of these
proble~s could be resolved only by the momentous expediency of going
t,.law.
Nor were the Melvilles and Gansevoorts alone in these difficulties.
Since the Revolution~ Americans in increasing numbers had been taking
their problems to lawyers. Alexis de Tocqueville thought Americans
of the new republic were especially litigious because legal remedy
was more cheaply available here than elsewhere, and because Americans,
being in charge of their own political destiny, regarded the law as
a possible means to obtain justice.
Chroniclers of the legal profession---Anton Chroust~ for example---
maintain that the promotion efforts of the bar associations had some-
thing to do with the increase of business during the first several
1
decades of the century. However, a more likely motivation behind
all this legal activity was that the political and economic changes
which marked America's emergence into a new world of industrialism
had produced problems in human and business relations to which there
were no traditional or clear-cut answers. Social and economic stability
required that someone lay down the guidelines for the good faith
necessary to business activity, and at this point in history only
lawyers---as counselors, judges, and legislators---had,the know-how
1
to engineer workable solutions.
Anton-Hermann Charles Chroust, The Rise of the Legal Profession
in America (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965), II, 283-87.
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During what is now called the "Formative Period" in American
Law (roughly 1820-1860) American laW",-ershammered out the details
in our system of government. Th~ law had to be adapted to new
situations; and in many cases, new problems had to be posed in such
a way that· they were intelligible to a system of law which was built
up in an older time. To complicate matters~ controversy over what
actually constituted American law would not be fully resolved until
the end of the century. Confusion existed in particular as to
whether the English Common Law was to be accepted here in whole,
in part, or, as some argued, not at all. Although the unsettled
state of our legal condition produced uncertainty and inconsistency
in the short run, in the long run the situation allowed courts and
legislatures the latitude they needed to meet the demands of a
rapidly changing world.
The problems of individuals caught in these changing times were
not always easy for the courts to resolve. Judges were aware that
their decisions necessarily reached beyond the merits of the particular
cases that came before them~ and that the judicial process in which
they were involved was heavily engaged in setting precedents. Even
more: in rendering decisions, these judges were making choices about
the conditions of freedom in the new world, incorporating some values
into our law, while placing others on the shelf. Court decisions
were responsible not just for resolving immediate or local conflicts
of interest, but for channeling energy and resources in ways that
would affect the entire social and economic structure of American life
for generations to come.
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The impact of such decisions upon acceptable standards of ethics
was inevitable. The demands of a dynamic new society often forced
individuals to act in ways that could not be countenanced by tp~
moral values of an older, more sedentary civilization, and in these
cases legal remedy offered arbitration and social sanction for the
compromises that had to be made.
Unfortunately the process also sanctioned in the moral fabric of
the community gaps in which pettifoggers and opportunists were quick
to build their nests. Such abuse played a part in forming public
opinion, teaching Americans to regard the law with mixed feelings.
While the exigiences of the times moved them to embrace the social
authority of legal solutions to their dilemmas, the opportunism of
their contemporaries prompted them to be cynical about the value of
the law and the sincerity of the legal profession. Individuals forced
to resort to the courtroom to settle their affairs did so, perhaps,
with the grim sense that, as Voltaire might have had it, going to
court was the best possible solution in this best of all possible
worlds.
Melville's attitudes toward the law have not gone entirely
unnoticed. Most critics agree that he expressed cynicism and rebellion
in his admiration of renegade heroes and in his frequent association
2
of the law with dislikeable prudence.
2
See for example, Charles Mitchell, "Melvi1le and the Spurious
Truth of Legalism,1I Centennial Review, 12 (1968), 110-26; and Nicholas
Canaday, Jr., Melville and Authority, University ~ Florida Monographs,
Humanities No. ~ (Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Press, 1968).
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These conclusions are valid as far as they go. Melville acquired
a distaste for the legal process when he reacted both emotionally ~nd
intellectually to the stress of his family's affairs. But at ~~e
same time his dislike was modified by a grudging respect for the
3
lawyer's ability to cope, however ignobly, with',otherwiseunmanage-
able situations: in cases of family crisis among the Melvilles and
the Gansevoorts it had been the lawyers in the family who were best
able to take care of their own interests while finding an equitable
solution for the others.
In the mid-forties, after his return from sailing adventures,
Melville had, then, extended contact with members of the legal
MelVille spent a good deal of time in the company of lawyers, his
brothers Allan and Gansevoort included. In addition, many of his
acquaintances were literary men who had had a law education. At
the same time he became closer to Lemuel Shaw.
profession, and on that basis I believe it not unreasonable to infer
that lawyers had a significant impact upon him. The influence of
law and lawyers, I believe, can be shown to have affected Melville's
taste~ philosophy, and characteristic inclusion of some persistent
elements of form and content in his work. His distrust of the legal
profession forms only the negative side of the picture, important
and lasting, but largely a product of his immaturity. As the years
3He.rman Melville, Pierre, or the Ambiguities, ed. Harrison
Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle (Evanston, Ill.:
Northwestern University Press, 1971), pp. 335-36.
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went by, his attitudes changed. In this first chapter, however, we
shall deal only with the lessons of pis youth.
* *
The story begins with the business career of Allan Melvill.
Allan Melvill was defeated not because he lacked ambition to try
for success in the very citadel of the emerging tradition, but because
he was unable to bear the ruthlessness and expedient morality such
success demanded. Some idea of what that jungle of unregulated
enterprize asked of a man comes down to us from New York "robber
baron" Daniel Drew, who said~
Sentiment is all right up in the part of the city
where your home is. But downtown, NO. Down there
the dog that snaps the quickest gets the bone.
Friendship is very nice for a Sunday afternoon when
you're sitting around the dinner table with your
relations, talking about the sermon this morning.
But nine o'clock Monday morning. notions should be
brushed aside like cobwebs from a machine. I never
took any stock in a man who mixed up business with
anything else. He can go into other things outside
of business hours. But when he's in the office,
he ought not to have a relation in the world---
and least of all a poor relation.4
Drew speaks from an era a little later than that of Allan Me1vill,,_
By Drew's time the most successful men had accepted the expediency
of separating the hearth from the shop. But Melvill was full of
4
Leo D. Stone, "The History of Ethics in American Business."
Ethics in Business, ed. Robert Bartels, Bureau of Business Research
Monograph, No. III (Columbus, Ohio: Bureau of Business Research,
College of Commerce and Administration, The Ohio State University,
1963), p . 35.
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the "notions" from an older sense of mora~lty that caused him much
painful anxiety and prevented him from pursuing success wholeheartedly.
In the end he had to let the law measure his conduct as his conscience
could not ..
Allan Melvill was a mon caught between two worlds. Born in
1782, the fourth child of Boston merchant Thomas Melvill, he attained
manhood before the Industrial Revolution had taken root in America.
The Virtues he was taught to admire and idealize belonged to the
18th century; but he was obliged to pursue success in business in
the 19th century, while the distance between the two worlds widened
as industrialism picked up momentum. Three sources give clues as to
the kind of man Allan Melvill became: one is what we know of his
father; another is the impression Allan made on his wife and her
family; and the third is his correspondence with friends, relatives
and business connections.
Biographies of Herman Melville remind us often that his grand-
father, Major Thomas Melvill, was the last man in Boston to wear a
cocked hat, knee breeches, and buckled shoes, garb symbolic of his
refusal to accept change. Although the old hero of the Revolution
was reluctant to move with the times, he could not have been as
ridiculous as he appears in young Oliver Wendell Holmes' poem, "The
5
Last leaf". A man's preference for the styles of his youth may
5
Jay Leyda, The Melville Log: A Documentary Life of Herman
Melville, 1819-1891 (1951; rpt. New York: Gordian Press by arrangement
with Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1969), I, 47; subsequent references
to Leyda appear in the text.
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indicate something about his habit of mind and ideals, without
provid~ng adequate measure of his abilities. From an historical
pc~spective Major Melvill did quite well~ surviving even the notorious
politics of the Custom House, an important and lucrative source
of power in the days of mercantile economy. During the Jacksonian
period immediately following his tenure as Collector of the Port,
the party that dominated Boston politics became known as the Custom
House Party, primarily because it owed its political strength to the
number of offices and revenue privileges controlled by the Collector.
If Thomas Melvill was able to keep an important position in the
Custom House, even in the relatively genteel era of the Adams ad-
ministration, it was not because the White House felt a compelling
respect for the aged veteran, but because Melvill took care of his
own interests and those of the party that placed him there.
Major Melvill's part in dumping the East India Tea Company's
tea into the harbor indicates that he belonged to a radical branch
of the patriot party, that which promoted the interests of American
mercantilism by privateering and other illegal activity, such as
smuggling, vandalism, and tax evasion. For him such sympathies
formed no serious conflict with commonly accepted notions of honor
and integrity. Colonial merchants regarded these acts as legitimate
resistance to a foreign tyranny which left unchecked might erode
what autonomy Americans possessed. In Puritan Boston the possible
consequences of the British policy had been considered sufficiently
alarming to warrant enlisting the support of the churches for
16
revolutionary activity_ The coalition was reminiscent of ecclesi-
astical participation in the formation Cromwell's common~ealth in
seventeenth-century England. In the American !I~evolutionthe luercantile
interest and the Calvinist conscience were united, rather than in
conflict. In the political revolution of 1776, moreover, one's
enemy was an outlander, a British merchant, not, as in the cutthroat
world of nineteenth-century American capitalist enterprize, one's
neighbor, friend, or relative. Whatever conflicts existed potentially
between honor and extra legal activity were resolved in the patriotic
cause and in the dictates of the country's heritage of Puritan
belief. The situation is familiar to the social historian as one
in which integrity and duty are defined and applied within an
individual's group, while unregulated behavior of the grossest sort
is permitted with respect to outsiders. Such a convenient synthesis
was not available to Allan Melvill several decades later when the
necessities of doing business forced him to overstep the bounds of
honor and integrity in dealing with the members of his own community.
If Major Melvill was foolish, it was in the way in which he
raised his sons, Thomas, Jr. and Allan. Both men suffered reverses
due in part to a sentimental attachment to virtues and ideals i11-
suited' to the practical business of life. Thomas evidently had
high-flown notions of himself as a gentleman. In the opinion of
his family these ideas had been the direct cause of his downfall
into debt. Such feelings were probably behind Allan's giving a Pound
of snuff to the impoverished debtor lying in prison. Thomas resented
17
the gesture as a gibe unworthy of a brother. His appearance and
mannerisms as he worked the fields in 1836 caused his imaginative
nephew, Herman, to think of him as a "courtier of.".LouisVVI, +educ ed
as a refugee, to humble employment, in a region far from gilded
Versailles" (Leyda, I, 63-64); and it is probably true that a
sojourn in Paris had done nothing for Thomas but refine sensibilities
which ~ould stand in the way of pecuniary success and prevent him
from being anything but a refugee in his own country.
Allan too was given a gentleman1s education and a Grand Tour
of Europe before he settled down in Boston to import drygoods from
Napoleonic France. In 1811, a British blockade of Boston put Allan
6
and his partner out of business. Shortly thereafter, Allan appeared
in Albany and began making acquaintances. He was one of what amounted
to a horde of Yankees who were descending upon Albany, upsetting
civil and social life alike. Allan managed to create a favorable
impression upon the Gansevoort· family, and upon their daughter
Maria in particular. If we can accept the evidence of a contemporary
portrait, Allan was a handsome young man, and Maria remembered him
as both distinguished and attractive. He liked reading and exercising
his imagination in creating Itelegant compliments and delicate atten-
tions" (Kenney, p. 174). His manners, like those of his brother
Thomas, had been refined by the atmosphere of Paris. In short, Maria
6
Alice P. Kenney, The Gansevoorts of Albany, Dutch Patricians
in the Upper Hudson Valley (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969),
p. 174; subsequent references to this work appear in the text.
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found him sufficiently different from the Albany boys she knew to
want to marry him.
Maria's family~ on th~ other hand, accepted Allan as a businessman.
It was no mean accolade if an Albany Dutch family of more than moderate
fortune were to admire one's business acumen, especially if one
were an outsider. Nevertheless, Allan Melvill succeeded in convincing
the Gansevoorts that he combined in one and the same person the quali-
ties of a gentleman and the sense of a sober man of business. The
era was soon appraoching when this combination might prove self-
contradictory, especially in the jungle of the New York City business
world, where "natural law" was no romantic ideal of truth and justice,
but the basis of survival conditioned upon a gambler's success.
Later, Herman Melville caricatured the conflict that most men
of good families experienced if they were called upon to scramble
for a living along with the rest of the world. The difficulty was
particularly acute if one arrived from the retreats of the country
gentility to the stronghold of modern business, New York City. When
Wellington Redburn or Pierre brought their romantic notions into the
city, they rapidly found themselves doing foolish things; Pierre left
his women in a police station under the care of what chivalry he
supposed a policeman to possess; Wellington Redburn lost his rifle
for a song and narrowly escaped being signed up for a cruise without
pay. The guidebook incident in Redburn shows too that Melville was
aware that the world was changing so rapidly that the wisdom one
got from one's own father might be worse than useless in one's own
19
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time.
Allan, Sr., began his business career with his eye steady upon
thp main chance. His first venture was in Boston where his father
no doubt had a sound reputation and many good contacts as Collector
of the Port. Allan's choice of an import business was a natural
course to follow. His removal to Albany was also governed by the
sound reasoning that trade from the west was likely to increase,
given the success of transportation improvements then being pro-
jected. Marrying into the Gansevoorts was another piece of solid
business, bringing with it not only Maria's inheritance, which would
~accrue sometime in the future, but also Peter Gansevoort's important
banking connections (Kenney, pp. 157-58). The union gave Allan a
line of credit which might have proved handy in years to come.
From another standpoint, however, the Albany marriage was the
first link in the chain of events that seduced Allan into difficulty.
Maria would not inherit her fortune for many years. Meanwhile, she
and the children proved expensive to maintain. Furthermore, Ganse-
voort money, whether in personal loans or in bank resources, tempted
Allan to overextend himself in speculation. In other words, Allan was
the victim of the commercial confidence game that he was eventually
forced to play.
Within a short time Allan found that making money in Albany was
7
Willard Thorp, "Redburn's Prosy Old Guidebook," Publications
of the Modern Language Association, 53 (1968), 1146-56.
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not so sure or easy as the bustling streets seemed to promise.
Competition was stiff: the Yankees w~re shrewd~ and the Dutch burghers
were thrifty and clannish. By 1~15, after another sojourn in Boston,
Allan had settled in New York City where trade seemed even more brisk
than in Albany.
Again Allan's reasoning was sound with respect to the opportunity
available in New York City. He arrived just at the time when that city
had begun stealing supremacy in trade and finance away from her two
closest rivals, Philadelphia and Boston, and Allan was there to profit
as he could. Allan was slow, however, to learn one major paradox:
expansion brought with it a financial instability which the capitalist
entrepreneurs knew better how to exploit than to control. Many who
were highly visible were turning large profits, but were obscuring
in their deliberate conspicuous consumption the great number of men
who were merely scraping along or failing outright. Allan was to
become one of the latter.
Melvill's disappointment was expressed repeatedly in his
correspondence. In 1822 he wrote Shaw that competition in New
York City was "much greater than you can imagine from your ex-
perience among our commercial acquaintance at Boston" (Leyda, I 10-11).
The letter ends with a show of optimism and courage:
---as a place of Business New York stands unrivalled,
& in this respect I prefer it any other, thus far I
have succeeded beyond my expectations, & find my credit
as well established as I could wish; my prospects are
good, & with the favour of Providence, & my usual
prudence and industry, I have no fear of the result.
(Leyda, I, 11)
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Read from til":: perspective of his eventual failure, Allan's invocation
of "P:cudence" and "Industry" and "Providence" strikes one rather
like a man's vain prayers to household gods that will soon be as
fallen and helpless as himself.
Yet Melvill repeatedly expressed his faith in the ultimate
efficacy of the Protestant ethic. He presented the following
summary of it as his last advice to nephew Thomas W. Melville who
was about to embark for the Pacific on board the Brandywine:
• • • Fortune under favour of Providence is at your
own disposal, you may mould it to your will, & render
it subservient to your wishes, but everything depends
on your personal exertions and application, for should
you either be unjust to yourself, or neglect the ad-
vantages acquired through the kindness of friends,
their good offices would be unavailing. • .
perform your Duty 'without fear and without reproach
• • • sooner return no more, than come back to us
disgraced---(Leyda, I, 26)
This letter too holds a shade of irony for those who know the tragedy
which terminated the naval career of Guert Gansevoort, another of
Melvill's nephews. "Duty,1I like "Prudence," was another ideal which
was fast losing the pristine clarity of definition it had enjoyed in
the 18th century when morality was less pluralistic or expedient.
Allan's training in business methods and virtues which had stood his
father well, was to prove inadequate---hampering even---for success
and contentment in the new tradition.
Economic enterprize in New York City was a veritable wheel of
fortune. Both here and abroad the ability to take risks and bear
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the consequences "like a philosopher" was being touted as the peculiar
genius of the American people, in part owing to the conditions of
8
t~~de which characterized our nation's beginning. Such admiration,
joined with the social pressures of a ~~ society, sanctioned
what the new business conditions demanded. The mores of the business
world, formed overnight, as it were, with the changes of the weather,
were nonetheless both real and demanding. Allan Melvill responded to
these demands, and so compromised his older notions of prudence and
honor.
In Allants case, as in the case of China Aster in the Confidence-
9
Man, one might say "the root of all was a friendly loan". Allan's
borrowing started out by way of investments that he was able to talk
friends and relatives into making. As .the years went by~ these Sums
became larger and larger. In 1823 Allan followed through with plans
to adopt the auction method of selling (Kenney, p. 197). Instead of
waiting for the storekeepers to come buy the goods stored in his ware-
house, he sold them to the highest bidder as soon as they came off the
ship. The system depended upon fast trading in large quantities, with
the profit realized over a period of time. If he took temporary
8
Miriam Beard, A History of the Business Man (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1938), pp. 501-18 and 626-32.
9Herman Melville, The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade (1954, rpt.
New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1964),
p. 228; subsequent references in this chapter are to this edition and
will appear in the text.
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losses or was forced to sell goods almost at cost during one period,
he cou::"dexpect to make it up with somewhat larger than usual profits
d'..::.:inganother period. When business was slow, or as Allan express ed
it, "brisk ••• with little profit," credit or loans might be required
to tide the wholesaler through until business picked up.
Constant complaints, plus the evidence of numerous loans from the
Gansevoorts and from Melvill's father, testify to the steady, wearying
pressures of hustling which plagued him over the years. In 1827,
he gave up importing on his own and went to work for another merchant.
The rest of his income was to come from a speculation. This was a
silent partnership in a wine and dry goods store, which Alice Kenney
reports is the scheme into which Melvill invested $10,000 of Ganse-
voort money (Kenney, p. 197).
he climax of the story is summarized by William Gilman with a
terseness and economy difficult to improve upon:
In the summer of 1830 Allan Melvill's fortunes
suddenly collapsed. Three years before, by exerting
scarcely creditable pressure on his brother-in-law,
he had borrowed over ten thousand dollars to supply
the capital of a firm in which he became a secret
partner. He would share half the profits; but in
order to secure ready credit for the firm his personal
interest was concealed so that he could give the en-
dorsement of his own probity and established reputa-
tion to the checks of his two partners. From the
start, the firm was a success, and in three years
Allan Melvill reaped over fifteen thousand dollars.
But as if in moral retribution for the dubious ethics
of the arrangement, disaster fell suddenly upon him.
He found himself unable to meet a particular note,
and a merciless creditor refused an extension. In
a few days his entire credit structure collapsed.
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Gilman continues with this account of tp~ ~esolution to the affair:
Sometime after the firm dis~olved in the spring of
1830, in accordance with the terms of the original
agreement, Allan Melvill went to Albany and con-
fesse~ to the Gansevoorts that he was "utterly
unable to pay" what he owed Peter. Catherine
Gansevoort promptly a~ded a codicil to her will
charging Allan's debts to the share of Maria and
her children in her estate, and Peter secured from
Allan an assignment of his remaining interest in
the unsettled accounts of the partnership. Though
now a bankrupt, Allan attempted to form another
profitable connection, but unable to raise capital
he finally had to accept the management of the
small Albany branch of a New York fur company.IO
According to the older notions of right and wrong, Allan had
indeed overstepped the limits of morality_ His chicanery in con-
cealing his interest in order to further endorse the credit of the
firm, amounted to a misrepresentation of the risks involved for
those who were thus induced to invest. In the days before the con-
cept of corporate liability had been fully worked out, the secret
partnership was sometimes a way for a man to share in the profits
without risking all that he owned. Allan's role in persuading others
to invest money in the business, in borrowing money which he knew he
might not be able to pay back, and in resting the fortunes of his
family upon the result of a speculation, constituted offenses against
three of the cardinal virtues of eighteenth-century business ethics:
lOwilliam H. Gilman, Melville1s Early Life and Redburn (New
York: New York University Press, Washington Square, 1951), p. 41.
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honestYt absolute liability for one's deh~s, and prudence.
Allan's correspondence testLf f.es that honesty in business,
as defined by the older notions of right and wrong, was among
those qualities necessary for his self esteem. In 1823 he wrote
Peter Gansevoort of the co~petition with which he was faced in
his struggle for survival, connnenting at the end: "I must either
turn auctioneer or something else, for my present line will not
give me an honest living & I want no other---" (Leyda,II, 904).
By the standards of Allan's religious background and of his
upbringing in the home of an eighteenth-century merchant with
high demands upon personal honor, the concealment of the risk
involved for investors was a clear breach of honest dealing.
By the standards of behavior accepted among the merchant-entre-
preneurs of the new business world, it remained questionable as
to whether Allan was acting unconscionably.
In The Genius of Lemuel Shaw (Boston, 1962) Elijah Adlow
undertook an analysis of fraud cases to appear in the 1830's and
1840's before the court of Lemuel Shaw, Allan's friend and respected
advisor. It is significant that Adlow began his discussion with
the observation that "just what constituted fraud or misrepresenta-
tion in the consummation of transactions was none too clear in
the Shaw era. ,,11 Shaw himself was not always in agreement with his
llElijah Adlow, The Genius of Lemuel Shaw: Expounder of the
Connnon Law (Boston: Sponsored by the Massachusetts Law Quarterly,
1962), p. 253; subsequent references to this work will appear in
the text.
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colleagues on the bench concerning fraudulent misrepresentation.
His associates were inclined to base a decision on their opinion
as to the intent of the de~~ndao-~, whether he made false statements
designedly to induce an agreement, or innocently out of mistaken
judgment. But Shaw believed that the bench could not always infer
a man's intentions from the facts. Therefore if false statements
led to damages for the plaintiff, Shaw tended to fix liability for
the statements without reference to intention (Adlow, p. 255).
Although some of Shaw's fellow justices and many other tribunals
during this period continued to emphasize intentions in their
decisions, Shaw's opinions won a small but significant amount of
contemporary support. This support has increased as the years
have gone by, and today his estimation of the problem is taken to
be the accepted principle.
Shaw's thinking with respect to the ambiguity of appearances
and the necessity of judging a situation in terms of its pragmatic
result was an anomaly for his time. In a later chapter this line
of thought in Shaw's work will be studied for the possible relation
it bears to Melville's own preoccupation with the inscrutability
of reality, and, as in the case of Billy Budd, the irrelevance
of intention to liability for one's actions.
For the moment, it is enough to note that members of the most
august tribunals were sometimes at a loss how best to adjudicate
cases of misrepresentation. If Shaw were to have judged Allan's
case, one suspects that he would have been inclined to rule that
2;
Allan was indeed responsible for any loss of money which had been
invested by his endorsement of the firm's credit, but that he would
have been slow to condemn Allan, 1f one may j~dge by his decision
in Knowles ~ Parker (Adlow, pp. 239-40), for a misrepresentation
which led to enormous profits for all concerned. While such decisions
did not remove the taint of "sharp" practice from Allan's actions,
they did lend the sanction of the law to this kind of behavior
whenever it produced good results. The means were excused for the
sake of the end.
The "end" which Shaw had in mind, however, was not merely the
individual profit enjoyed by a man like Allan Melvill, but the large
scale marshalling of capital and promoting of investments that the
nation so desparately needed to develop resources. Shaw in these
cases, as in many others, made decisions with their long range
effect firmly in sight. A modern analysis of Shaw's career on the
bench marks him as foremost among those judges who willingly lent the
weight of the law to encouraging enterprise to the limits of what
economic stability could bear, but no farther.12 If this current
in the changing times tended to undermine the moral fiber of men
like Allan Melvill who were induced to compromise their older and
more constricted notions of ethical behavior, the sacrifice was an
12Leonard W. Levy, Chief Justice Shaw and the Law of the Common-
wealth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), passim; see
also James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the
Nineteenth-Century United ~tes-(Madison: The University of-Wisconsin
Press, 1956), p. 19.
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expenditure that Shaw and others like him were willing to make for
the good of the general welfare as they saw it.
Allants "scheme" actually netted him fifteen thousand dollars
over the first three years of its existence. What it made for the
others involved is not recorded, but total pr ofLt for the firm was
appparently satisfactory. He lost a remaining five thousand dollars
of Peter Gansevoort"s money, the original investment of 1828, in a
second venture, a business of his own which commenced during the
summer of 1830 after his secret partnership had dissolved. Any
"moral retribution" which Allan felt was the perception of a con-
science formed for an earlier, simpler world. By the mores of the
emerging tradition in the nineteenth-century business world, there
could be only approval for his successful speculation in the wine
business.
Misrepresentation is not the whole of Allants story. He also
shared his father's distress at the dishonor Thomas, Jr. brought
upon the family by his bankruptcy and imprisonment for debt. It
is true that some of this disgust stemmed from the fact that Thomas'
misfortune had jeopardized his father's position in the Custom House;
but much of it too was real pain that his brother should become
involved in a situation that by eighteenth-century notions of ab-
solute liability for debt was considered downright dishonest.
Alice Kenney offers the following evidence of just how strong
that feeling could be at certain times and places:
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When a man happens to break in Holland they say
of him that he has not kept true.Accompts. This
Phrase~ perhaps, amongst us would appear a soft or
humorous way of speaking~ bu~ with that exact
Nation it r-ears the la.J..ghesl..Reproach; for a Man to
be mistaken in the Calculation of his Expence, in
his Ability to answer future Demands, or to be
impertinently sanguine in putting his Credit to
too great Adventure, are all instances of as much
Infamy, as with gayer Nations to be failing in
Courage or common Honesty. (Kenney, p.lS8)
Although Kenney takes this quotation from the Spectator of 1711,
it expresses nevertheless an ideal of plain dealing reinforced in
America by the maxims of Benjamin Franklin and all the "Dutch
Uncles" who ever waived Father Abraham's Way to Wealth under the
noses of their attentive charges. The feeling was that "common
Honesty" demands that in repaying a loan you be "exact to the tick
of your honor~" as Melville's Franklin tells Israel Potter,13 and
this feeling remained alive in the 19th century~ long enough, in
fact, to prevent the passage of general bankruptcy laws in the
United States until well after the Civil War.
Much of Chief Justice Shaw's work on the bench during this
period of growth and development was to find ways for accommodating
the exigiencies of commercial expansion to existing laws. The
definitions of right and wrong depended upon what was best for the
general welfare. Thus if a law permitting the discharge of in-
13Herman Melville, Israel Potter: His Fifty Years £E. Exile, The
Works of Herman Melville Standard Edition, XI (London: Constable & Co.,
Ltd., 1923), pp 54-55; subsequent references appear in the text.
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solvent debtors were to be a boon for the economy as a whole, such
a law had to be available to the business community. Without g0ing
into the complicated explanation on economic grounds, one may state
that the progressive faction of the business world, wh~ch was made
up of the most influential financiers and merchants, agr\~ed that the
concept of absolute and unconditional liability for debt belonged to
an earlier stage of the economy. Contemporary business conditions
required that some alternatives be made available to the insolvent
debtor and his creditors.
Shaw was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.
This court was the leading state tribunal in the land at a time when
the United States Supreme Court had not yet gained the ascendancy
that it enjoys nowadays. Lemuel Shaw was thus one of the foremost
jurists in the America of his day. His decisions were therefore
instrumental in establishing the validity of state laws to discharge
insolvent debtors in the face of a clause in the United States
Constitution forbidding the states to make laws impairing the
obligation of contracts (Adlow, pp. 261-63). Obviously, to men like
Shaw and to the progressive merchant faction he supported, certain
matters, such as liability for debt, were economic problems first,
and moral problems second. The basic principle underlying this
conclusion is that virtue and vice in a complex society can be
defined only with reference to the sphere of activity in which such
standards are to be operative.
This relativist way of thinking forms another important parallel
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between prevailing legal philosophy of the kind Shaw came to represent
and some of the characteristic, preoccupying themes of Melville's
work. The maxim that honesty is the best policy is at least open to
question. In the Confidence-Man, for example, one of the protagonists
defends the fake soldier for pretending to have been wour.ded in a
glorious, rather than ignominiOUS, fashion in order to beg alms with
better success (p. 105). In Israel Potter Benjamin Franklin cautions
the young patriot to avoid even the appearance of evil. Melville
also cites in that work the example of the patriarch Jacob, whose
chicanery in wresting authority from Esau is presented in the Bible
as all part of God's plan for the Jewish nation (Israel Potter. pp.
59-60).
By the progressive standards of the nineteenth-century business
community, Allan Me1vill's insolvency and need to compound his debts
would not have been seen as an out-and-out disgrace; rather his
situation would have been seen as a necessary and unpleasant adjust-
ment of his affairs in a manner least likely to injure the rest of
society. This attitude was precisely the same as that taken by
Peter Gansevoort and Lemuel Shaw when the time came to disentangle
Allan's affairs from the fortunes of the rest of the family.
Besides honesty and liability, the notion of "prudence"---
and the part it played in Allan's business collapse---needs explana-
tion. The ambivalent meaning of this concept in pre-Civil War America
bears an important relationship to Herman Melville's interest in the
idea of "confidence". There was a double standard for prudence in
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the period of economic transition which we have been describing.
By the system of eighteenth-century plain dealing, "prudence"---
as can be seen from the above quotation from the Spectator---required
that a man not be "impertinently sanguine in putting his Credit to
too great Adventure." But the business world of the 1820's and
1830's was learning to play the game of finance designed to increase
the capital of the nation as a whole, and to amass it in blocks large
enough to meet the demands of western development and the expansion
of industrial power. One of the results of this movement was the
creation of a host of innovations in finance, and these, in the
atmosphere of laissez faire competition. frequently drove the small
man out of business unless he combined with others or won the gamble
of over-extending his credit. His situation differed from that of
his eighteenth-century counterpart in that credit-financing might
determine whether he would survive or fail, not whether he would
get rich beyond his due. Prudence in the new business world de-
manded that one respond to fierce competition on its own terms or'
be driven under.
On September 12, 1826, Allan wrote apologetically to Peter
Gansevoort,
---Business is about as dull and unprofitable as the most
bitter foe to general prosperity, if such a being exists
in human shape, could desire it, & it requires a keener
vision than mine, to discern among the signs of the times,
any real symptoms of future improvement, there is a kind
of Equality in Commerce at home & abroad, the result of
labor saving inventions, which however beautiful it may
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appear in theory, in reducing all to a common level,
or a kind of universal joint st0ck company, has in
my humble opinion, already impaired the general
welfare. • • . (Leyda, I, 27,
Elsewhere Allan complains bitterly. of the auction system 'ofwhole-
saling. Using this merchandising technique he could undersell all
the small businessmen yet make a profit by dealing in large quantities
or by playing a waiting game with price averages over a period of
time. Prudence under these circumstances seemed to say "if you
can't beat 'em, join 'em." Sanguine outlook, or confidence, far
from being impertinent, had become the sine qua non of successful
enterprise.
The new breed of credit manipulators wished to encourage
investors to have confidence in the future. Allan shared their
thinking, which was derived from the visible fluctuations of the
market in response to confidence or the lack of it in the business
community. The notion appears frequently in Allan's correspondence,
as, for example, when he wrote in 1819 to Peter Gansevoort of the
effect of the annual visitation of the cholera (Leyda, I, 13-14).
He express the hope that "with the blessing of GOD confidence
will soon return & Business revive again •• ," (Leyda, I, 4). In
1823 he discussed with Lemuel Shaw the "uncertainty of European
events" and the influence they were having upon business (Leyda, I,
14). That same year he also wrote Shaw expressing his disgust at
men "whose interest it is to cry mad Dog at the appearance of a
puppy" (Leyda, I, 14). Financiers and merchants knew all tOo well
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the effect that panic could have in collap~ing their entire structure
of credit overnight. While to men in an earlier stage of the economy
faith in Providence might have been a religious duty, during Allan
Melvill's ~areer trust, confidence, sanguineness, or whatever the
businessmen chose to call it, became business necessities. Once
credit financing had invaded the structure of the economy, confidence---
the more the better, as it seemed to the businessmen of the time---
became a virtue in maintaining the status guo for all concerned,
including those people who had never risked a penny in speculation.
Personal credit, so vital to a merchant's success in Allan
Melvill's.day, depended upon the confidence that creditors were
willing to place in a man. Concern about possible fluctuations
in this personal credit lay behind much of the ostentation which
has worried many biographers as a sign of imprudence in Allan's
character. New York City was filled with newcomers whose only
character references were their purses. As the New York innkeeper
tells Pierre, "though rogues sometimes be gentlemanly; gentlemen
that are gentlemen never go abroad without their diplomas. Their
diplomas are their friends; and their only friends are their dollars"
(Pierre, p. 243). Likewise in the Confidence-Man Frank Goodman
charms his snake-like adversary by surrounding him with a necro-
mantic circle of ten half-eagles. With this ritual he "magically"
restores confidence (Confidence-Man, p. 188).
In reviewing some of the background and resources for Melville's
Confidence-Man, Johannes Bergmann offers the reaction in the New York
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Herald for July 11, 1849, to the arrest 0': real-life "Confidence
Man,1I swindler William Thompson. 14 The article was titled liThe
Confidence Man on a Large Scale," and its theme is the analogy
between the petty confidence game of the watch thief and~the large
scale finance operations of Wall Street nabobs. The Herald writer
declares that the palazzos of the rich "have been the product of
the same genius in their proprietors which had made the 'Confidence
Man' immortal and a prisoner at the 'Tombs'. His genius has been
employed on a small scale on Broadway. Theirs has been employed on
Wall Street" (Bergmann, p. 566).
Bergmann reminds us that the Herald article was reported widely
and became well-known in important literary circles of New York,
receiving comment, for example, in Lewis Gaylord Clark's Knicker-
bocker. A few weeks later the Duyckincks took up discussion in the
Literary World, but with a different angle on the question. The
author first asks his readers who does not know the "young confidence
man of politics" or the "confidence man of merchandisell among his
acquaintances, but then goes on to eulogize a society in which so
much confidence of man in man remains that "in spite of all the
hardening of civilization and all the warning of newspapers, man
can be swindled" (Bergmann, p. 566).
14Johannes Dietrich Bergmann, "The Original Confidence-Man,"
American guarterly, 21 (1969), 562-64; subsequent references appear
in the text.
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Such philosophizing must have sounded like "double-speak" to
the readers of the Literary Worl~. Melville, however, picked up
both the satire and the aerious wisdom latent in the ambiguity of
the discussion. In his novel he develops the more profound side
of the confidence man as implied by the somewhat infatuous editorial
in the Literary World. Perhaps he was goaded to this perception
by a need to justify his father's career and his genuine admiration
for the mercantile and the legal mind. He must have been sensitive
to such criticism if he recognized "the confidence man of merchandise"
in his father or in his brother Allan's clients. His Uncle Peter
also participated in such schemes from both the mercantile and the
political side. His father-in-law, Lemuel Shaw, was called a
"Cotton Whig," though the charge may have been unjust. Furthermore,
his older brother Gansevoort had been the very image of "the young
confidence man of politics". Allan, Sr. "s, chicanery in promoting
confidence to secure investments in his secret partnership was
indeed a typical "confidence game," and in it Allan played the
double role of endorsing himself to prospective buyers.
When Allan returned to Albany in 1830, he came to Peter
Gansevoort as both an insolvent debtor and a family member. In
conducting his business enterprises in New York City, Allan had
maneuvered himself into the position of a man who stays just within
one step of the law. Even so, he had been trading largely upon
the family loyalty of the Gansevoor ts and of his own father." When
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the day of reckoning finally came, hard as it seemed later to
Maria in her time of distress. Peter Gansevoort, with the counsel
of family friend Lemuel Shaw, firmly resolved to give Allan all
that the law allowed in ~is case, but no more. The settlements
that Peter worked out in buhalf of the other Melvill and Gansevoort
heirs absorbed Allan's losses into the family fortune with the
least possible injury to the interests of other family members or
to the financial resources of the family as a whole.
Nor can these actions be seen as heartless. Peter had a
special appreciation of Allan's difficulties with the treacherous,
mercurial economy. First, he was a lawyer and a politician in
close touch with the working of the state's economy. Second, in
assuming the responsibility of shepherding the Gansevoort fortunes
through the changing times, he had ample opportunity to see that
the same forces which had proved so baffling to Allan were under-
mining the carefully acquired estates and assets of the Hudson Valley
aristocrats.
In her report, The GansevoQrts of Albany, historian Alice
Kenney traces the rise of the family to their position among the
Dutch patroons (Kenney, pp. 21-40). According to this study, the
Gansevoorts owed their success to a way of life which largely
disappeared in the transformation of New York from colony to "Empire
State". Albany had been relatively isolated in the days before
the west was opened. In that earlier stage the local monopolies
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and privileges belonging to the families of the Dutch patriciate
were effective means for acquiring and maintaining ascendancy in
the community. When Albany became an important trading center
for traffic to and from the newly opened west, such local hege-
monies became irrelevant and almost impossible to sustain. The
influx of strangers, immigrant laborers, politicians, and Yankee
businessmen (of whom Allan Melvill was one) still further sub-
verted the internal balance of power in the community, especially
with regard to the traditionally closed Dutch social life. Finally,
the new boom economy of quick losses and quick gains was also at
variance with the patient slow accumulation of wealth typical of
the Dutch methods of money-making.
Peter Gansevoort's political career is in itself a study
in the kind of setback the patriciate was receiving as an aftermath
of change (Kenney, pp. 151-59). Gansevoort began as a member of
DeWitt Clinton's party, and he did quite well in it, receiving
an appointment early in his political career to be Judge Advocate
of the state. The party soon fell from power, however, and
eventually dissolved at Clinton's death in 1828. whereupon Peter
made the switch into Van Buren's party, but found his prospects
diminished. He was useful to the Regency as a lobbyist and a
legislator, but he never held any great personal power in state
politics such as might have been his had the rising democracy not
eclipsed Clinton's authority. After serving three terms in the
state legislature and losing a mayoralty election in 1838, Gansevoort
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was eventually rewarded the office of First Judge of the Albany
Court of Common Pleas.l5 He lost this position in 1846 when a~other
state constitution made the judiciary elective rather than appointive.
The sad truth was that Peter, like his leader DeWitt Clinton before
him, could not win political support from the democratic electorate.
Peter was torn between the patrician tradition, which had sustained
his family in the past, and the new conditions of political power
in New York State.
Besides unbalancing the political situation of the county,
the influx of strangers brought another danger to the old Dutch
way of life: intermarriage. Prior to the revolution, Gansevoorts
had married, with few exceptions, within the Dutch patriciate. They
married Ten Eycks, Van Rensselaers, Cuylers, Van Schaicks, and Van
Vechtens. However, with the exception of Herman, all the children
of General Peter Gansevoort married outside the Hudson Dutch community.
Leonard H. married Marie Chandonette, who had been reared among the
Dutch, but who was of Philadelphia French extraction. Peter married
, 15The New-York State Register for 1843, ed. O. L. Holley
(Albany: J. Disturnell, 1843), p. 357; this same almanac shows
Gansevoort Melville listed as one of the Examiners in Chancery for
the County of New York (p. 387), also marked as a new appointment;
and in the list of attorneys for New York City there appea~. in
addition to Gansevoort Melvill (sic) and his friend Alexander W.
Bradford, the names of J. B. Auld (p. 391), Evert A. Duyckinck
(p. 393), Pierre M. Irving (p. 395), and Cornelius Mathews (p. 396),
all primarily thought of as literary men.
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first a Lansing and then a Sanford, neither of whom were of the
Hudson Valley Dutch, although their families were prominent in the
state. Maria married Allan Melvill, a Yankee of Scottish ancestry.
A fifth child, Wessel, never married. The children of these
marriages in their turn also made marriages outside the Dutch
patriciate. The result was a dissolution of family loyalties
and a breaking away from the old ways of life. Kenney argues
that disparity of values and backgrounds in this generation pro-
duced neuroses in the next. She mentions Henry Gansevoort and
Herman Melville as two specific cases in point (Kenney, p. 214).
Changes in economic conditions between 1790 and 1830
were uncongenial to the slow but sure Dutch process of accumulating
wealth over generations. In fact, during the depression years
which followed the Panic of 1837, the family fortunes came close
to entire collapse. Peter was burdened with obligations he was
finding nearly impossible to meet. He owed over $70,000, part
of which was a joint responsibility with Herman (Kenney, p. 202).
Catherine Gansevoort had died in 1831, and the estate could not
be settled because of various complications preventing the Com-
pletion of the Saratoga County surveys. Peter's wife, Mary Sanford,
was due an inheritance from her father, but that estate wa3 long
in being settled too, and it would be years before Peter would
realize any cash from it. In the fall of 1840 the brothers nearly
lost Stanwix Hall because the creditors refused to allow Peter time
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to find four thousand dollars which was :emanded (Kenney~ p. 202).
Meanwhile, the other heirs of Catherine Gansevoort,
especially the children of Leonard H., were pressing hard for a
settlement of the estate. By 1840 Catherine, Leonard's only daughter,
brought suit against Peter and Herman at the prompting of her husband,
lawyer George Curtis, who felt that money due his wife was better
placed under his control than in the hands of her uncles. Peter
took advantage of all the delays the law would allow, and Gansevoort
~. Gansevoort dragged on for nearly six years before it was finally
settled (Kenney, pp. 208-209). By that time business had improved,
the value of the land was up, and Peter managed to escape the sure
destruction that would have been his had he been forced to settle
the estate any earlier.
When the Court of Chancery ordered Peter and Herman Ganse-
voort to pay their sister and niece sixteen thousand dollars, Peter
escaped having to pay his share because Maria's debt to Peter already
amounted to more than her share of the estate. Herman, on the other
hand, had no such reprieve, and the whole burden of paying Leonard's
insistent heirs fell upon him. When Herman could not raise the
cash to make the settlement, Curtis sued again, secured a judgment,
and sent the sheriff to put Herman's properties and possessions
on the block, an outrage for which Herman's wife Catherine never
forgave the Gansevoorts (Kenney, pp. 209-10).
Thus, as Kenney concludes, "the Gansevoorts flung their
fortune into the gamble of American development and lost the larger
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part of i~" (Kenney, p. 210). The figure who emerges most unscathed
was Herman Melville's Uncle Peter. He, as it turned out, was the
best equipped by his legal training to pilot his own fortunes and
\
)
those of his divided family through the breakwaters of the new
economy and the shoals of the waning tradition which had buoyed
up family success in the past. While Allan Melvill and Herman
Gansevoort were confronted by the law as the necessary limit to
their conduct and their enterprise, Peter was able to assume mastery
of the law as a means for protecting his interests and for engineer-
ing results most equitable for the welfare of the family as a whole.
His shrewd manipulation of legal processes enabled him to act
with regard to future benefit as well as present advantage. The
ethical dilemmas and changing times which had so baffled Allan were
resolved for Peter through his law practice and his legislative
career, both of which gave a broad experience of the 1arger currents
of change. He was able to participate in forming channels which
regulated matters larger than his own interests. It was this
"cosmopolitan" overview which reconciled Peter to expediency in the
face of temporal exigiences and to the law as a time-tested but
fleXible tool for adjusting conduct in situations not adequately
covered by the slow changing mores.
After Allan's death Peter assumed the role of father to
Maria's children. He was assisted occasionally by family friend
Lemuel Shaw. Both men were lawyers and judges; both were success-
ful in contrast to Melville's own father. It is reasonable to
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suppose tOclC the young Herman Melville had as much to learn about
coping with the world from the success of these surrogate parents
as he did from his father's frustrations.
One of the first principles that Melville derived from
the experiences of these men was that the world he lived in was
not the same from one place to another. This perception ~s pre-
cisely the jurist's point of view. One's obligations are condi-
tioned by circumstances and values in force wherever one finds
oneself, as much as by any concepts of the ideal. The idea was
later reinforced by Melville's own experiences as a sailor and
by his fellowship with avant garde New Yorkers who had a strong
sense of ongoing change and development. Melville saw that the
differences in standards of conduct between times and places was
a source of conflict and dilemma. These discrepancies furnished
real ambivalence on the one hand, and on the other hand, oppor-
tunity to further one's own interests---whether they be for selfish
personal gain or for the success of some good cause.
Melville made the juxtaposition of two different worlds,
each valid in its own way, the characteristic setting of his stories.
The values and ethics of these two worlds then conflict with each
other to a greater or a lesser degree. His protagonists find
themselves torn between the claims each world makes upon his heart,
experiencing crises of moral dilemma arising out of real ambivalences
of the betwixt and between position. Melville portrayed characters
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who find their notions of right and wrong challenged by a change
of circumstances. When faced with this kind of dilemma, his heroes
often resort to a legalistic analysis of their predicament as an
expedient-way out of their quandary.
Melville's career began, nominally at least, as a writer
of the fictionalized travelogue. Although he soon outgrew the
genre, he found so much capital to be made out of moving his pro-
tagonists through widely contrasting settings, that the device
became almost a convention of his stories. These multiple settings
usually represented two or more different and somewhat conflicting
worlds. The protagonist typically found much that was equally
valid in each of the microcosms, thus creating for himself a set
of puzzling ambiguities about the nature of the universe, or, still
worse, embroiling himself in ethical dilemma. In these crises,
moreover, the hero seems to lose a sense of security in his own
ethical identity.
In Typee the novel opens with the young sailor's exposi-
tion on his surroundings. He has been at sea for six months and
asks the reader to imagine what it must be like to grow so detached
from his homeland. Within pages the ship enters a tropic lagoon
and comes to rest at the shore of a strange and inviting new world.
While the ship lays in its harbor, the young man has ample opportunity
to compare civilization as he knows it with what he sees of native
life. By the time he is finished with the comparison he is in doubt
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as to which side has come out looking better:
How often :_,j thc term "savages" incorrectly
applied! None really deserving of it were ever
yet discovered by voyagers or by travellers. . • •
-Lt; may be asserted without fear of contradiction,
that in all the cases of outrages committed by
Polynesians, Europeans have at some time or
another been the aggressors, and that the cruel
and bloodthirsty disposition of some of the
iSlanders is mainly to be ascribed to the
influence of such examples.16
After placing the French admiral side by side with the naked old
patriarch-sovereign of Tior, he concludes his reflections by asking
"insensible as he is to a thousand wants, and removed from harrassing
cares, may not the savage be the happier man of the two?" (Typee,
p. 29). These thoughts neatly dovetail with a discussion of his
own miserable condition on board the ship. In short order his own
devotion to industry and the obligation of his contract with the
ship master are called into question. He wants to leave the ship
and see whether the savage life might be happier than his own life
on board the Dolly.
The ethics of his situation are at first unclear. He has
indeed signed the ship's articles, thereby "voluntarily and legally
bindinglf himself to the period of the voyage. He must leave the
16Herman Melville, Typee: ~ Peep at Polynesian Life, ed.
Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle (Evanston,
Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 27; subsequent
references to this edition appear in the text.
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vessel clandestinely. He must become a fugitive, for whom the
captain would surely offer a reward , He is going to "run away. I!
Such conduct will not give him a flattering character. All of
the values of his own civilization seem to condemn his actions.
Yet his life on board ship is unendurable to the point that he
would rather risk his fortune among the happy, carefree but
treacherously undisciplined natives. At the same time, he does
not wish to appear as though he is acting dishonorably.
"Tommo," as he comes to be called, wastes none of the
reader's attention in a portrayal of the actual dilemma. He
rather implies his predicament in the comparison of his 01Yn
condition and that of the natives. presents the reader with
his resolution, and then asks him to judge fairly whether he
acted in bad faith. The resolution itself, we may note at this
point, is couched in the terms of a legal analysis of his obliga-
tions, which he has reduced to the letter of contract in the ship's
articles (Typee, pp. 20-23).
Melville repeats the plot device in ~ and again in
the opening chapters of Mardi. Once more the protagonists are
attracted from the unprofitable confines of their ships, which
prove to be the links to their own world and to their civIlized
identities, to the carefree life of the lush tropic isles. They
dissolve their obligations to the one world and justify their
passage into the other by a series of legalistic maneuvers which
removes guilt and responsibility for their irregular conduct.
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In Mardi, however, Taji is faced with an additional qua~Ja¥y.
Sailing the open sea he encounters the canoe of the priest Alpcma,
who has in custody the white maiden Yillah. Here again the ethics
and values of two different world conflict. By the standards of
Taji's background a crime is being committed. The girl is in white
slavery and is destined to be sacrificed to a heathen god. Far from
seeing his actions as a crime, the priest believes that they are
consecrated by the highest ideals of his society. Taji yields to
the powerful impulse to protect the youn~ woman. After the fight
begins the priest's actions threaten Taji's life, and he reacts
instinctively, killing the priest. He has acted in what he thinks
at the time is a just cause and in self defense. Later, upon further
examination of his copscience, Taji finds cause to suspect that his
real motive in wanting to free the girl was selfish personal desire.
The religious devotion of the avenging sons, coupled with strong
indications that Yillah may not in fact have been of Taji's racial
or national origins at all, undermines justification for his actions.
Throughout the rest of the novel he must debate whether he has been
guilty of murder or a justifiable homicide. The answer seems to
lie with girl herself, but she cannot be found. What is signifi-
cant, however, is that Melville apparently wishes his readers to
entertain the possibility that Aleema and his sons were doing no
wrong to the girl in the first place.
Plot devices in other works also demonstrate Melville's
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perception :.11atvalues and ways of thinking differ widely from
one ~ime and place to another. His fiction depicts the world the
way a lawyer would see it. Redburn finds his way through no less
than four contrasting settings before the novel ends: he comes from
the country to the city; from the shore to the bewildering world
of the ship; from the ship to Liverpool; from Liverpool to London
and back again in reverse order until he returns to New York City.
Ishmael constantly compares the differing values of the shore and
the sea. Pierre is nearly in shock at the differences he finds
between the city and the patriarchal countryside, and poor Israel
Potter! he is shuffled from one country to another, from ship to
ship, from shore to sea, from countryside to city, and before his
story is over, through time as well, from one era to another.
In Bartleby, "Benito Cereno," the Confidence-Man and
Billy ~. Melville is in firm control of the notion of a universe
pluralistically divided into different orders of reality. He
delineates multiple systems of values within one society and
within one man's life. The contrasting settings are absorbed
into the larger idea of several possible worlds existing simul-
taneously in one's mental concepts and in the reality external
to the individual as well. Bartleby and the Master in Chancery,
for example, bring together in conflict two private worlds, each
with an integrity of its own, each existing simultaneously in the
same room. In "Benito Cereno" the operative values of the micro-
cosm in Don Benito's ship are kept alien and hidden from Captain
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Delano, who only gradually suspects 1uality in the world he has
been engaging. In Billy Budd, C~ptain Vere weighs at least three
systems of valuation by which Budd may be judged, as a man, as a
citizen, and as a soldier, choosing the one most expedient to the
situation at hand. He establishes Budd's ethical identity out of
the several alternatives available, according to the end he had
in mind.
If the first lesson that he learned from lawyers he knew
was that the world was not the same from one place or time to
another, the second observation Melville may have gathered from -
watching his elders was that the lawyer is provided better than
other men with a philosophy and a methodology for coping with
such a fragmented and ambivalent reality. The lawyer's outlook
is pragmatic out of necessity. He knows that the world will not
stay suspended in limbo while men dally forever with their scruples.
Yet his solutions are not ~scrupulous (though indeed his ends may
be), because they enjoy the sanction of the law. The legal
approach recognizes the simultaneous existence of separate
systems of valuation, (in the matter of jurisdiction, for example).
The law further provides one with 3 methodology for analyzing
experience so that a practical guide to conduct is available and
so that an "ethical identity" may be established for a particular
situation at hand. The lawyer even has a set of rules for deter-
mining factual truth in a situation.
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Given his Uncle Peter's d~monstrated success in dis-
entangling conflicting interestp and in resolving dilemmas for
the equitable benefit of all concerned, it is little surprising
that Melville should have portrayed his characters as turning to
legal analysis of their situation when faced with an ethical pre-
dicament. In this way they expedite a cho:tce of "ethical identity"
and absolve themselves of obligation to conflicting ambivalences.
Although Melville was not a lawyer, his thinking was
similar to that of a lawyer in some respects. Just as a lawyer
must first establish the legal identities of the various parties
and factors of a case, so Melville establishes an "ethical identity"
for the elements of a situation. The "ethical identity" of a
character refers simply to the role he aSsumes as defined by one
among many possible systems of value. Used this way, the term is
not precisely legal, but philosophical. Further, as long as
Melville can suggest that a man may have several possible alterna-
tive ethical identities, ambiguity about right and wrong will
always remain in his decisions.
In like fashion, the term "system of value" is used
in preference to legal terms like "jurisdiction," or lex fori,
etc., to be able to denote factors as various as the mores of a
culture, the law of a particular place or class of affairs (such
as the maritime law, the mercantile law, the civil and penal
codes, etc.), widely differing schools of philosophy or religion,
: ',. ", ~t. '; .
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the terms of a contract, relationships between persons, the dictates
of a specific activity, such as running a ship, maintaining ma~tial
discipline, or developing capital and resources. Melville handles
these materials with a lawyer's appreciation of their simultaneous
existence as a source of advantage or dilemma. He has a tendency
to allow his protagonists to analyze their dilemmas in a way that
a lawyer would analyze them. He makes an attempt to settle the
precise ethical identity of the character preliminary to making a
decision about his conduct. Thus, in Typee Tommo is first reduced
to one of two parties to a contract made under a specific body of
law; later he is identified as a guest of the natives, and therefore
liable to being pressed into service for the defense of the society
in which he is temporarily claiming shelter. Israel Potter moves
from one navy to another, remaining unsure about what he ought to
do, until circumstances permit him to step boldly forward and declare,
"I am an enemy, a Yankee, look to yourself" (Israel Potter. p. 116).
With his ethical identity secure, swift, decisive action is possible.
Some of Melville's characters are adept at perceiving
alternative systems of value and in exploiting their discrepancies
by making claims under whatever system or jurisdiction best suits
their purposes. At first such characters are shown merely using
their situation for their own selfish interests. In the later
works, however, this type becomes the "cosmopolitan," who seems
:best equipped among men to advise others trapped in a quandary.
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The cosmopolitan's counsel is to rise ab0"e the limited perspective
of the individual's immediate inte~est and seek truth from a
vantage point which can entertain the relationship between the
highest id~als and all the imperfect systems of value which arise
to adjust that truth to thu exigencies of time and place.17
One of Melville's familiar devices was to create a
character who finds himself in a position above the law of a
specific situation. Closer examination of Melville's renegades
and outlaws shows relatively few characters who are "outlaws"
in the sense that they deny responsibility to any law whatsoever.
The more usual case~ including all those characters which Melville
holds up for any share of admiration, are in a position to perceive
even from circumstance to circumstance. Law might not be ignoredt
that the law varies from time to time, from place to place, and
The character's response to this situation is not just
yet it could stand a little jockeying now and then.
the simple "when in Rome do as the Romans do," as practiced by the
young sailor in the Typee valley or by Israel Potter in foreign
navies, but also the more sophisticated reaction of Taji in Mardi,
citizens of each of the islands he visits. Jack Chase, the noble
who declares himself above the petty restrictions imposed upon the
captain of the foretop in White-Jacket, switches navies without
17 -Melvillet The Confidence-Man, p. 164, 197-99, 238-39, 251,
and 257-60.
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troubling his conscience, because he feels his actions are in
accordance with a higher ideal t~lanmere chauvinism. Benjamin
Franklin occupies a somewhat ambiguous position as the envoy of
a revolutionary government. Many of these characters make decisions
to act with prudence towards the laws of the time and place in
which they find themselves, all the while reserving their final
allegiance to their own best interests or ideals.
The character who is best able to achieve this cosmopolitan
relationship to the law may have ends in mind which are either
good or bad in the opinion of the reader. Ahab juggles his actions
to avoid the charge of usurpation and ·still control the ship for
his personal interests. Captain Vere guides the courtmartial to
the verdict he has already determined is necessary for political
reasons. Franklin freely participates in illegal activity for
the sake of his patriot cause. In Omoo the protagonist joins his
rebellious shipmates in resisting the authority of the consular
hearings, feeling justified within the maritime law and the customs
of the sea, which he sees as above the corruption of one remote
judge. These characters have in common a sophistication about the
law which enables them to use it as a means to arbitrate the con-
flicts between one's individual interests and one's duty to the
rest of society. Melville was inclined to allow his characters to
make a "legal" analysis of their situation before making the decisions
that move the action. At times these are also attempts at retro-
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spec t Ive justification for their actions. Further, be began to
de~elop the character who gains enough perspective to see the
necessity for pragmatic relativism. Such characters are able to
make decisions which arbitrate conflicting though equally valid
interests.
From the beginning Melville makes a distinction between the
legal and the moral character of an act. The relationship between
legality and morality changes and develops in his work, yet the
distinction between the two persists. It is necessary then to
attempt some definition of what he thought of each and to make a
few preliminary remarks about their basic relationship to each
other.
Morality is the more difficult of these two terms to define
because it is the less precise, both in common usage and in Melville's
work. In the simplest terms morality refers to the generally accepted
customs of conduct and right living within a society, and to an
individual's practice in relation to these. The qualifying terms
of this definition are in the words "generally accepted". For an
author this standard would apply to the readers he is addressing.
He must play to what they "generally accept" as right conduct. In
Typee , for example, Melville quite consciously defers to his readers'
standards of conduct in making his hero apologize for running away
and in his careful presentation of Fayaway. This process is re-
peated in Omoo and Mardi in which the sailor protagonists go through
,',
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an elaborate justification of their ~ctions for the readers' sake.
This deference to the "gen=ca Ll.v accepted customs" persists to
some degree in his work despite his miscalculation, especially in
Pierre, of the intellectual license he was to be permitted in the
matters of religion or social example.
Melville was anxious to show two things about those customs.
First, they are not entirely consistent within themselves even in
the same society. Second, they are not always adequate to every
situation. When the latter is the case, morality requires assistance
from another quarter, and the rescue is often performed by the
modus operandi of the legal profeSSion, requiring both definition and
dialectical argumentation.
Others, however, wou l.dassign the term "moraLdty " to internal
standards of conduct, those sanctions which arise from the "character"
or the "heart". Morality in this sense refers to what is called
one's private conscience and concerns the inner thoughts and feelings
attached to one's conduct. Because they are internal, these elements
cannot be observed except by inference, inconclusive, from the de-
portment. Legality, when contrasted to this definition of morality,
is an external standard; i.e., one socially, formally agreed upon and
pertaining to an individual's overt, observable behavior. In Mel-
ville's era, the age of sentimentality, jurists debated just how
far the operation of morality taken in this sense ought to intrude
in determining the merits of cases. Melville made this question
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one of the primary issues of Pierre. Bartleby, and 'Billy Budd.
The "LegaLf ty" in Me~·;ille's work manifests itself in two
ways. The first pertains to the meaning of the word in common
usage. Legality in this sense refers to the degree to which a
situation conforms to the letter of the law; and once in a while
Melville outlined the legality of a situation in this way. The
second sense, However, involves the approach that the science of
the law takes in analyzing a set of circumstances. These pro-
cedures take into account alternative systems of valuation and
recognize, from the judicial point of view, the need to choose
among them for the one most appropriate for doing justice to the
individual's interests in conjunction with the broader purposes
of society. Truth under these procedures is always seen as
relative and conditional.
The law itself is limited to a narrow choice of valuing systems,
namely those spelled out as being the special province of the law.
But the legal approach, as an intellectual discipline, may be brought
to bear on other systems of value as well, in philosophy, in religion,
in sociology. It is important to note that Melville was trained
intellectually by lawyers or by men with a legal education and
that he shows a readiness to employ their characteristic approach
to the analysis of ethical problems.
Part of the political sophistication that Americans gained
during this formative period was an appreciation of the distance
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between what was fair or right in a moral way and what the law
allowed. Lawmakers were sensitive to these discrepanci~~ in ~he
relationship of the law to the mores or to commonly accepted re-
ligious teachings, and they came up with a rationalization for the
problem. Controversies which fill the law journals and court
records abound with what lawyers were pleased to call the differ-
ence between what was mala in~, that is, evil in itself, and
what was merely mala prohibita, that is, not evil in itself, but
prohibited by law for reasons of expediency or for the general
welfare. In defining what was mala in~, reference was often made
to common morality and to an established concept of natural law
as a temporal expression of divine law. As the 19th century
wore on, however(and the process continues even more in the 20th
century), item after item of what was considered mala in ~ has
been recognized as being merely mala prohibita after all.
The change was due in part to the pressure of the times,
in part to the increasingly acceptable notion that the law was
less divinely inspired than humanly invented, and as such some-
what arbitrary and malleable. Lawyers and lawmakers, while not
alone in this perception, were certainly at the fore in formulating
and using the principle that the law ought to be flexible enough
to meet the needs of a fast-changing, complex society, and that
law must often take over where mores, which take some time to
develop and become established, are inadequate to meet the pressures
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of th~ situation. The distinction between mala in ~ and mala
p~ohibita was promoted primarily to give jurists room to tinker
with the law without rending the fabric of society.
Melville had first-hand experience of the attempt to engineer
morality by means of the law in his father's struggle to make an
'J.. "honest" living, in his uncle.'s work on legislative committees, in
settling family estates, and later in arbitrating cases as a judge.
The insight was reinforced by his own South Sea experiences among
the missionary infested islands, where it became plain that the law
was an extremely artificial overlay promoted for the ulterior
purposes of one interest group or another. Later, the idea that
the law was malleable was further developed as he came to know
Lemuel Shaw and many others involved prominently in politics,
journalism, and law reform.
The distinction between legality and morality is expressed
frequently in his work, giving evidence that he was familiar with
the principle and used it at times as another source for creating
doubt and conflict. Often the person who resorts to the legal
estimate of a situation is presented as being something of a petti-
fogger, or worse, a sea lawyer. At other times the legal analysis
is presented as being necessary because of the inadequacy of
generally accepted customs. If a situation is genuinely uncertain,
ambiguous, or ambivalent, one is safest in using the approach a
lawyer might make in analyzing the problem and finding a solution.
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The result may never be noble, may never fathom the deepest 1imit~
of reality, but on the other hand it will not be foolis~ and !t
need not be knavish.
In the opening section of Mardi Taji finds his captain has
decided to take the whaling ship to the North Seas for an undetermined
period of time in the cold clime. He goes to the captain and reminds
him that they have a contract which does not include such a voyage
at all. The "sea lawyer" has a point. Technically the ship t s
articles were supposed to include a statement of the ship's destina-
tion, a legal fact that one can infer that Melville knew. The joke
is that while this was the law, no one, least of all a common sailor
on the high seas, would dare ~pproach a whaling captain with such a
challenge. Melville makes the joke more explicit in Redburn.
The law goes on to say that if the destination were changed the
captain has an obligation to release the sailor at the first point
of call. The captain in Mardi agrees, but points out there is no
probable port between them and the arctic regions. He facetiously
extends his permission to the sailor to leave the ship if it is
possible. On this basis the sailor makes his decision to leave the
ship in mid-ocean. Pages later, in mulling over his desire to get
Jarl, another mariner, to go along with him, he reflects, "1 had
many misgivings as to his readiness to unite in an undertaking
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.which apparently savored of a moral dereliction. ,,18 Note that
Melville does not say that it was a moral dereliction, b"'.:on ly
that it "savored" of such. He considers his own resolution "quite
venial". Justified within the law, he is nevertheless still guilty
by the lights of custom, or generally accepted standards of conduct.
In Redburn, the boy hero finds that there is a difference
between what morality would seem to require in treating the immi-
grants or in rescuing the starving mother in Liverpool and what the
law required. In the latter case, local custom actually condemned
the people to starve. In the former, both law and custom failed
to protect the poor while they were crossing the ocean. Evidently
Melville also perceived a higher morality, an absolute or ideal
morality above whatever local formula held sway in actual practice.
Other instances in Melville's work demonstrate his awareness
of this distinction between law and morality. In Omoo the narrator
shows how the missionaries work mischief by making statutes which
run counter to the native mores. 19 Ahab is careful to keep his
actions within the letter of the law, yet he is violating common
18Herman Melville, Mardi, and ~ Voyage Thither, ed. Harrison
Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle (Evanston, T11.:
Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 16.
19 , Omoo: A Narrative of Adventures in the South
Seas, ed. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968), pp. 172-92.
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morality in endangering his ship and crew and, if Starbuck is right,
i..seeking "vengeance against a dumb brute". In each of these
situations Melville shows characters exploiting the power of the
law for private advantage.
At other times, and I believe, ultimately, Melville had real
admiration for the man whose "cosmopolitan" outlook enables him to
take care of himself in a complex and baffling world. In the
minister Falsgrave and the philosopher Plotinus Plinlimmon, in
Benjamin Franklin and those he says are of the same type, Jacob,
Hobbes, and Machiavelli, one finds the forerunner of the Confidence
Man, a point to be discussed in more detail in a later chapter.
Such masters of reality may use their powers for good or bad, and
they can do so on a level unavailable to the man trapped by con-
vention or to the man who tries to disregard convention altogether.
The ability to rise above rules yet know their value in arbitrating
the conflict in temporal conditions is the kind of tricky and
dangerous game only great men attempt with impunity. Such is the
position in which the judge finds himself when he must try to find
a just or equitable solution in a world where good and bad are
relative values hedged by opposing interests and real'ambivalence.
Moreover, Melville "calls all of these characters "practical
philosophersll(Israel Potter, p. 60), a phrase which describes
equally well the legal thinker. Such men have a healthy respect for
the law, and most are lawgivers themselves, Franklin, for example,
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with his maxims, Plinlimmon with the rules of his society. All
seem devoted to the notion that though anyone temporal I"':~preeo..;ion
of the law is as imperfect as anything else in this world, yet it
is truet as legal philosophers throughout the 18th and 19th centuries
were fond of arguing, that "there is no equity without law". These
wise men were not so much governed by the law as governing with it,
and the ideal man in Melville's workt despite the author's own
inability to accept him fully, is he who possesses the attributes
admired in the greatest judges.
The next chapter explores in more detail the hypothesis that
Melville learned certain habits of thought from men he knew and
respected among the lawyer class. Further review of biographical
details clearly demonstrates that Melville's intellectual and social
life was indeed dominated by lawyers, judgest political journalists,
and literary men who had had a legal education. The subculture of
the law that he shared with these men dictated certain characteristic
selections of theme and form. It is also possible that it was the
basis f or much of his adaptation of contemporary philosophy.
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Chapter II
The Influence of the Legal Mind
While Melville was growing up burgeoning economic complexity
made the lawyer indispensable. In a former age merchants had been
able to draw up their own contracts. They avoided lawyers except
in extraordinary cases. In time, however, the Industrial Revolu-
tion introduced intricate methods of financing which made trading
more difficult than it had been for the sedentary merchant of
the 18th century with his over the counter transactions of goods
or hard money. Businessmen in the new era had to write contracts
which not only conformed to the general usages of the lex merca-
toria but which were also standardized in form and phrasing in
order to prevent litigation over "loopholes". In a short time
a lawyer was needed to keep business both legal and profitable.
The merchant princes then acquired their "chancellors," but the
average man of business, whose funds for legal aid were more
limited, had all he could do to keep up with the legal technicali-
ties.
Allan Melville was among these smaller businessmen who had
to provide themselves with at least a working knowledge of the
law. He displayed familiarity with its jargon as well as a dis-
r
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trust of its artifices in this letter to his brother-in-law
Peter:
Dear Gansevoort: Your letters of the 15th &
16th inst are on file unanswered, the first, however,
being a severe tirade or phillip against two of the
gentler sex, both prodigious favorites of mine &
one of them in my eyes at least "a seeming Paragon,"
• • • you will permit me in comity to glance over
with dry acknowledgement, which must not however
be construed into a tacit acquiescence in its pro-
priety, for nothing legal in the whole course of
your practice, in fact or argument, could have been
more manifestly improper as it regards the aforesaid
fair Ladies, & in this case as Counsellor, silence
must in no wise be tortured by law logic or pro-
fessional ingenuity into consent, which it by no
means implies, and I do here most solemnly protest,
& beg you would enter the plea on your official record,
against the injustice & indecorousness of a most out-
rageous1fulmination, which nothing could extenuate,. . . .
It is important to note the disapproval reflected in these caustic
references to Peter Gansevoort's "law logic" because less than
ten years later Allan himself was forced to resort to a similar
code of ethics when business failures drove him from New York
City. By then Allan was glad to use Peter's legal competence
to aid him in making an orderly retreat. On the eve of disaster
he wrote Peter frantically inquiring whether he might be sued
in more than one place for the same debt, or whether he might
lEleanor Melville Metcalf, Herman Melville: Cycle and Epicycle
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 6-7.
65
retain use of furniture ~hich ~as to be delivered up to another
creditor. 2
Although Allan's knowledge of the law evidently had its limits,
he was probably as much at ease with its language as every other
man of his milieu. Familiarity with legal parlance was as popular
in early Victorian times as, say, the jargon of Freudian psychology
is in our own. The man who spouted law terms at the drop of a hat
had been a source of caricature for novelists such as Fielding
a vulgar tongue, Most popular magazines throughout the
and Smollet and a host of their imitators throughout the latter
half of the 18th century. In the 19th century, however, legal
phrases had become so much a part of "modern" times that its use
waS a commonplace not only in the homes of the prominent bourgeoisie,
but in humble dwellings as well. Alexis de Tocqueville noted about
American speech, "the language of the law becomes in some measure
1840's and 1850's contained frequent articles explaining aspects
of the law. Charles Dickens was able to chat freely with his
reading public about all manner of legal chicanery and to include
essays on the subject in his periodical Household Words. Newspapers
2Jay Leyda, The Melville Log: ! Documentary Life of Herman
Melville, 1819-1891 (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1951), I, 44.
3Alexis de Tocqueville, "Democracy in America, ed. Phillips
Bradley (New York: Vintage Books, 1945), I, 290.
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sometime during the late 1830's bega~l to run minutely detailed
accounts of trials, curious civj: decisions of no particular
importance, as well as the understandably more sensational criminal
cases. These accounts often included the entire speech of the
defense or the judge's charge to the jury, besides a legal analysis
of any controversy over obscure points of law. Finally to fill
a real need in public education, the home library of the middle
class was supplied with numerous handbooks purporting to explain
4the law to the lay public. Usually these popular textbooks
carried a vocabulary of legal terms in the back.
How much of this legal lore wore off on the children growing
up in such an environment we can only guess; but in 1849, even
Allan's youngest, Augusta, could facetiously pen a "legal letter"
to her grandfather Shaw:
And these few lines are to certify that the
debt to which the Chief Justice stands creditor,
has been canceled by the payment of thirty five
good and substantial kisses, satisfied, imposed
upon, and delivered to one Malcolm Melville, at
such time, place, and'manner as the mother of said
Malcolm did appoint, permit and direct. Also the
usurious interest demanded and insisted upon, by
the payment of thirty five more, of a gentle and
very delicate nature, which were impressed and
given to one Maria Melville, the youngest of that
name, at the time, place, and manner, the mother
4For example, Asa Kinne's Questions and Answers ~ Law, alpha-
betically arranged; with reference to the most approved authorities
(New York: n.p., 1843-1855); at least ten handbooks of this kind
may be found listed in the Library of Congress Catalogue for 1861.
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of said Maria did permit and direct. And this, is
in full satisfaction of all p~cuniary debt due to
the Chief Justice of the Co~~onwealth, from me, the
said Augusta from the beginning of the world to this
day. (Leyda, I, 314)
Herman was among the witne~ses signing this instrument before it
was forwarded to Judge Shaw.
Apparently it was difficult to remain unaffected by the legal
atmosphere that crept into the households from the professional
men themselves, despite protests that they wished to separate the
home and the office. Like the playful Augusta, MelVille's wife,
Lizzie, also worked this vein of wit, writing to her stepmother,
for example, in December, 1847, "Thank you, dear Mother, for your
nice long letter. I was beginning to be afraid you had forgotten
your part of the contract for that week, but Saturday brought me
evidence to the contrary and made us even" (Metcalf, p. 48). Among
those of the upper middle class the rudiments of law and of legal
terminology was common enough to be considered part of a gentleman's
or a lady's social equipment.
Herman Melville himself is known to have engaged in the kind
of picayune and equivocating debates whf.ch the popular mind con-
ceived to be a display of "law logictl• During his well known
quarrel as "Philologos," he was accused by the opposition of being
"like a wary pettifogger". It 'Was alleged that Melville liked to
equivocate or to espouse, as was politically desirable, either
side of an argument (Leyda, I, 69-79). Apparently he was more than
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able t~ compete within this debating society in Albany, made up
of drtists, teachers, young merchants, and lawyers.
Melville's youthful inclinations, as recorded by his father,
object in mind. Nowhere has it been found that a course in
were for commerce (Leyda, I, 43). In school he studied with this
business law was included in any of his formal curricula, but during
his tenure as a clerk in the Albany State Bank, his mother, Maria,
wrote her brother an interesting note in which she asks if her
son has kept up with his reading and whether he has made himself
useful by writing (Leyda, I, 56). Was Herman working as his Uncle
Peter's law clerk? Herman's undergraduate studies were no doubt
continued under the supervision of Judge Peter Gansevoort, and there
is every reason to suspect that the elementary principles of law
would 'have been among the suhjects this'''Dutch Uncle" felt it.neeessary
't.o:.teach a young businessman.
Melville's ability to handle legal terminology has been amply
demonstrated by Herbert F. Smith in "Melville's Master in Chancery
and His Recalcitrant Clerk'l.5 In that article Smith shows how
Melville made use of the historical development of the Chancery
Court in his symbolism and how he used legal terms to ~ake puns
on the action in the story. Melville used law jargon frequently
5Herbert F. Smith, "Melville's Master in Chancery and His
Recalcitrant Clerk," American Quarterly, 17 (1965), 734-41.
69
in his work, for example, the tale in Mardi of the awful P1ujii,
and in Pierre's reflection at the end of the novel upon Isabel's
unreliability. Further examples are in chapters of Moby-Dick such
as litheAdvocate" or liTheAffidavitll and in sections like "Heads
or Tails" and "Fast Fish and Loose Fish". Other instances to be
found in his work are too numerous to list here.
Despite this demonstrated fluency in the language of Wall
Street and the courtroom, Melville never followed through with a
career in business. His inclinations for commerce must have been
considerably dampened after he viewed the crushing experiences cf
his father and older brother, Gansevoort. His mother's loss .of
capital in the fur cap business and the pressing nature of family
finances precluded everything from Herman's prospects but a long,
arduous rise as a junior officer in one of his Uncle Peter's or
Uncle Herman's enterprizes. Both men had been retracting their
business empires, as we have seen (Chapter I), starting with the
Panic of 1837 to the settlement of Gansevoort v. Gansevoort in
1846. During this time Peter was acquiring heirs of his own and
desperately trying to preserve his crumbling estates. He may
have grown less willing, considering too his unfortunate experiences
with other Gansevoort heirs, to extend unwarranted generosities
to Maria's children. One indication that this was the case comes,
down to us in Allan, Jr.'s remarks in 1839 that he had quarreled
with his uncle because Peter did not wish to be burdened with his
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sister'a children any longer (Leyda, I, 85). Herman's choices
Both Allan, Jr. and Gansevoort did become members of the New
in ~839-40 were, like those of his brothers, either to follow
a self-made career in the law or to find something else to do to
make an honest living.
York City bar; but Herman, like the romantic Pierre he was later
to describe, never yielded to the temptation to become a law
clerk. His exasperation with the politicking and "utilitarian
transcendentals" of young lawyers comes out more or less explicitly
in Pierre. He satirizes the legal profession more than once---
"Sorcerers of Minda" in Mardi, for example---and in his reference
to the brown shark as a sea-attorney in the same work. In Moby-Dick,
"The Advocate" is a take off on the public relations job the members
lawyer. (There was one published in the Literary World during the
6spring of 1850 while Melville was writing the whaling novel.) In
of the bar were constantly publishing to promote the image of the
lawyer is really anything but flattering to the profession. But
Bartleby his portrait of the well-meaning but somewhat foolish
the lawyer in propria persona does not appear often in Melville's
sophies, and methodology that we must look in order to find the
work; and it is to other broader elements, such as outlook, philo-
significant influence of the law in his writings. It is, in other
6"The Bar of New York," The Literary World, 7, No.4 (1850), 65.
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words, the influence of the legal mind that is the focus of our
stu~y.
For his brothers, Gansevoort and Allan, the return to New
York City was like the return of the avenging sons. Both were
determined to meet head on and conquer the forces that had under-
mined their family prosperity in the past. From the evidence of
his journal, Gansevoort seemed to have inherited much of his
father's romantic nature (Leyda, I, 60-62, 114, 132-33, and 213-14)
and had been badly scarred by his own youthful gamble on the wheel
of fortune. As a result, he rapidly succumbed to the demands of
this idealism. Having studied law with his friend Alexander Bradford
and having passed the bar exams. Gansevoort turned from practice
to Tammany politics. He had received an appointment as an assistant
in Chancery in 1843, evidently on the coattails of his Uncle Peter's
apPointment as First Judge of Albany County in the same year.
Shortly thereafter, he became more and more involved in a barnstorm-
ing campaign for Polk. The Polk campaign, it should be remembered,
was conducted in the teeth of Van Buren's last bid for power. Be-
cause of Polk's position, Gansevoort's activities in his behalf were
in the way of biting the hand that fed him, in as much as Peter's
connections were at the time with the Albany Regency. Gansevoort's
hopes came to quick disillusionment when he received for his efforts
a less than satisfactory appointment as attache to the London embassy.
Possibly because of his youth at the time, Allan escaped his
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older brother's problems of emotional instability no doubt brought
on by the agitation of familv aff~irs. More cautious and prudent, he
settled into being a Wall Street lawyer and spent his days preventing
and solving'for merchants and financiers the kind of problems that
caused his father's collapse. More nearly a product of his uncle's
upbringing, Allan was able to accept the smooth rationale of business
ethics aggressively promoted in New York City. Like his father he
made a good marriage and like his uncle he made a lawyer-like
acceptance of the world.
Standing between them in age, Herman occupied a position between
the extremes of their philosophies. Touched with Gansevoort's
idealism, he was never able to throw himself wholeheartedly into
its pursuit. Yet unlike Allan he was unable to accept a glib ex-
planation for the world. Although he was never pressured as Ganse-
vooert was to be eminent, he could never accept the plodding path
most congenial to Allan. Yearning after a romantic vision, Herman
Melville was nevertheless vulnerable to the claims of a bustling
secular reality which he did his best to keep at a safe distance.
Rather than make one more in a great roost of law clerks in
New York City, such as one he described in Pierre (pp. 266-67).
Melville signed on for a short cruise before the mast to Liverpool
and back. When he returned he made a trip to the midwest with his
friend, James Eli Murdock Fly, who later used his connection with
Melville to become a law clerk himself. After visiting his Melville
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cousins and seeing his Uncle Thomas trying to scratch out a living
as a justice of the peace in Ga1en~, Ohio, Herman returned to New
York apparently in less of & mood than ever to follow his brothars)
footsteps. ·After another brief try at teaching school, he signed on
board the Acushnet in search of a simpler more romantic life in the
South Seas, thus following the nautical tradition also present in
his family.
Melville to our knowledge never had any formal training in the
law. What information he had, especially before living in New York
City and marrying into Judge Shaw's family, was probably no greater
than one might expect to find in one surrounded his whole life by
lawyers and businessmen daily concerned with the laws pertaining to
commerce. In the early works he reconstructed his adventures as a
sailor with legalistic overlays. These appear to have been added
after his return, perhaps with the help of lay manuals of the law.
Charles R. Anderson's review of Melville's activiites in the Pacific7
7Charles R. Anderson, Melville in the South Seas, 2nd ed., rev.
(New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966).
was a detailed study which turned up no record that Melville brought
a specialized knowledge of the law to these experiences while they
were in fact occurring. In fact, the evidence points the other way.
Melville recounted his South Sea adventures with a good deal of hind-
sight and with a view to exonerate himself in the eyes of his immediate
friends and relatives, many, if not most of whom, were lawyers. A
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fe~ points will suffice to map out hir..career as a "sea-lawyer".
Anderson verifies the encoun~er with the Acting British Consul
Wilson in Tahiti as Melville described it in Omoo. However, he
points out that the incident had greater significance for Melville,
quite naturally, than it did for Wilson. Reviewing surviving corre-
spondence from the Acting Consul during the exact period of the
Lucy Ann mutiny, Anderson found no mention of the affair in Wilson's
personal account of his activities (Anderson, p. 214). Although
Anderson failed to turn up the affidavits and depositions which
Melville said were taken and enacted in the course of a "kangeroo
courtll proceeding, these papers were unearthed by Ida Leeson, a
later researcher, who published the material in the Philological
Quarterly (October, 1940).8 One interesting feature about this
official account of events is that it makes no mention of the "Round
Robin". Melville reported that the mutineers had supposedly gotten
up this curious document, in which all the signatures were arranged
in a Circle, in order to share the responsibility of presenting
their grievances to the consul, a "legal" maneuver if ever there
was one, and possibly one which never existed except in Melville's
fertile imagination. In all other respects the records are filled
with the minutest detail of the story essentially as he retold it,
8Ida Leeson, "Mutiny on Board the Lucy Ann,"
Quarterly, 19, No.4 (1940), 370-79.
Philological•
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with the exception that the grievances as recorded by Wilson and
his court do not include the abominable condition of the ~~ip.
Melville represents this outrageous dilapidation as the chief Cause
of unrest among the crew, but the fact is that the Lucy Ann saw
a full ten years more of service before it was finally scrapped
(Anderson, p. 202).
One possible source for Melville's innovation in the story,
if such it was, is lawyer-sailor Richard Henry Dana, Jr.'s Seaman's
Friend, which contains a section on the authority of consuls in
foreign ports.9 In that handbook, Dana explains that the unseaworthy
condition of the vessel is a just cause for permitting the mates and
the crew to force the captain to take the ship into port for inspec-
tion and repairs (Dana, Seaman's Friend, pp. 204-205). If Melville
wished to retell his story and at the same time whitewash his actions
in the eyes of his parlor audiences, the condition of the ship would
have provided a plausible argument.
All of these circumstances suggest that Melville's reconstruction
of the mutiny was colored and organized, perhaps with the help of Dana's
law manual for sailors, to foster the idea that the crew was not
acting illegally or unjustifiably in rebelling. The case he con-
structs for himself and his fellow crew members is not unworthy a
"sea-brother" (as he called Dana) turned lawyer for the occnsion.
9Richard Henry Dana, Jr., The Seaman's Friend (Boston: Charles C.
Little, James Brown and Benjamin Loring & Co., 1841), pp. 205 and 209.
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In like fashion, Melville dressed up the motives of his romantic
young heroes in Typee and Mardi to conform to a legal excuse for
quitting the vessel. Ordinarily, in order to maintain discipline at
sea, and particularly in foreign ports, the ship's articles were
considered binding upon sailors (Dana, Seaman's Friend, pp. 201-203).
In the case of a whaling voyage legal technicalities regarding specified
destinations were admittedly qualified by the exigiencies of the
whale fishery's notoriously lengthy, roving cruise. Melville's glib
justifications of his sailor heroes' actions might have done very
well for a parlor audience of Wall Street lawyers, but they must have
seemed rather specious and artificial to anyone familiar with the
usages of the sea.
Again, Dana's Seaman's Friend, written and published after
Melville had shipped on his whaling voyage, contained specific advice
for the sailor concerning his legal status under the ship's articles.
It must be remembered that Dana wrote the book having in mind the need
to educate sailors to their rights and responsibilities, many of
10Dana knew that men before the mast needed information about their
rights. The existing popular work, Joseph Blunt's Merchant's and Ship-
master1s Assistant, was exactly what its title suggested, a handbook
for the owner's and officers, not for the forecastle hands. Its
language was dry and technical, and any common sailor would have had a
hard time deciphering it. Dana1s book was written in simple language.
It became popular in both America and in England. It went through more
than ten printings in several editions. Following the success of this
handbook, Blunt1s manual appeared with whole sections lifted from Dana's
work, even to exact citations of legal precedents listed at the bottom
of the pages.
10
which had been established by that time in court but not in custom.
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There is no reason to assume that Melville knew much more than his
shipmates about the laws covering their condition. Such legal
expertise as had been available to him through his uncle or his
education was relevant to commercial pursuits on dry land, an en-
tirely different body of 1a\1. The legal excuses offered in Melville's
first three books bear the stamp of the layman conjecturing unknow-
1edgeably and wishfully on the basis of manual or handbook instructions.
Since other evidence in Melville's work indicates a reliance upon
Dana's work,ll it is probable that his legal reconstructions of his
actions in the South Seas were shaped by the advice in the Seaman's
Friend at a period after his return and during the hindsight of com-
As Anderson has noted, Melville's analysis of Polynesian life
position.
concentrated upon its state of semi-civilization (Anderson, p. 238).
He presented many ludicrous anecdotes of hypocrisy and sham that
went on as a result of the missionary blue laws imposed upon the
that Melville's overall indictment of the situation was directed
islanders without reference to native custom. Some of these observa-
tions have been traced to his sources, especially the accounts of one
Quaker Wheeler (Anderson, p. 268-69). Nevertheless, it is significant
against the peculiarly Christian aspect of western civilization
llRobert F. Lucid, "The Influence of Two Years Before the Mast on
Herman Melville," American Literature. 31"(1959), 243-56;see also
William H. Gilman, Melville's Early Life and Redburn (New York: New
York University Press, Washington Square, 1951), pp. 132-33.
(Anderson, pp. 237-283 and p. 309) and against the authoritarian
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abuses of theocracy, rather than .against any specific failure of
adequate jurisprudence in the islands.
On the other hand, Melville's thinking appears fully developed
concerning the error of imposing laws externally or from above
without reference to custom and mores. Proponents of th~ English
Common Law in America, a system of jurisprudence which was under
severe attack during the composition of Typee, Omoo, and Mardi, were
fond of pointing out that the English law drew its strength from its
historical growth out of custom and familiar usage. Such talk
formed much lively debate in New York in 1846-47 because David
Dudley Field was busy pushing his codification reform proposals
through a newly elected, liberal state legislature. The idea that
artificial codes of rules would replace their great historical body
of precedents caused frantic dismay among members of the established
legal profession. It is possible that the fomentation over this
issue in New York State may have flavored the peculiar cast of
Melville's South Pacific chronicles (see Chapter V).
With respect to legal technicalities, Melville's accuracy is
erratic. In Redburn, for example, another work bearing signs of
Dana's influence, there are several errors in point of law which
argue carelessness or ignorance on Melville's part. It is true
that runaway sailors forfeited their pay for the voyage, but not
if they returned to duty voluntarily within a specified time limit.
The captain, moreover, had no choice but to take them back if they
--.
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presen~ed themselves in fit condition. Thus the captain's actions
at the end of Redburn only half conform to the law of the matter.
White-Jacket provides another notable instance of Melville's
suffusing his narrative of "true" experiences with legalistic re-
interpretations. A major influence·upon this novel was again
Richard Henry Dana, Jr., by that time a prominent attorney in
Boston. Melville had been in that city for nearly three months
immediately before his hurried composition of Redburn and White-
Jacket. During that time he is known to have met Dana on at least
two specific occasions and no telling how many more besides (Leyda,
I, 293). Both novels display a kind of legal humanitarianism for
which Dana had already become famous. White-Jacket, as we now
know, drew most of its legal information and its material against
flogging from two articles in Blackwood's, a British review, and
from one article published in the Democratic Review. Although
Melville is known to have borrowed the volumes of Blackwood's from
Duyckinck's library, the writer for the Democratic Review criticized
him shortly after White-Jacket's publication for using so many
references to British·law. Thus it is somewhat unlikely that any
of th~ nationalist lawyers of the "Young America" group, which means
most of Melville's New York acquaintance, were responsible for the
encouraging him to use that material. The implication is, of course,
that at least on this occasion Dana helped Melville do his homework
in preparing the case against flogging.
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In conclusion, it is safe to say that Melville brought less of
a legal eye to bear upon his experiences at the time of their
happening than he did later in recalling them for his public.
While he was writing his first book he faced an intelligent audi-
ence in an immediate circle of friends which was made up, as we
shall see, of a good number of lawyers and of litterateurs who
had a legal education, many of whom were contributing their liter-
ary talents to the cause for legal reform. All of these men were
involved in the bustling commercialism of New York City, some in
politics and some in creating a "Knickerbocker" center for the arts
in opposition to New England's transcendentalist hegemony. Their
healthy respect for legal philosophy, despite a penchant for satir-
izing the foibles of the profession, most certainly encouraged
Melville's manner of retelling his adventures, what Anderson has
called his "brief against civilization".
Although Melville had little or no specialized training in the
law, he dwelt close among people who were merchants and lawyers.
For these men the law held a consuming interest. It waS part of
the spirit of their times and for them a medium for interpreting
the world. Unay stema tLc as well as systematic knowledge of the
law and of legal terminology was shared among them. They used it
casually in conversation, correspondence, and all forms of social
intercourse; and one may assume that Melville too shared in such a
cultural commonplace.
If this casual acquaintance with the law were the extent of his
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involvement, there would be little le~t to do but review a cata-
log of curious and unrelated exam~les of legal jargon or metaphors
in his work. But Melville was a man of great intellectual curi-
osity. His education, especially in his mature years, though
undeniably of the haphazard variety that his father-in-law Judge
Shaw was known to have deplored (Metcalf, p. 32), was nevertheless
apt to be profoundly investigative of whatever subject seemed im-
portant to him. His introduction to intellectual life was through
men conversant with the law and with legal philosophy. Their
political interests, their habits of mind, their approaches to
solving the riddles of life, of conceiving problems and producing
a workable methodology for analyzing them, these all became part
of Melville's intellectual equipment. For this reason it is diffi-
cult to understand the terms of some of the problems dramatized
in MelVille's work unless one is acquainted with the outlines of
contemporary legal issues and with the legal philosophy which formed
an entire matrix for thought in America during the pre-Civil War
decades.
Melville's re-entry into the big city and to the cultural life
available there was through young lawyers. Though evading law as
a career, Melville found it difficult to escape the company of the
legal fraternity. His brothers lodged him and introduced him to
their friends. He renewed an acquaintance with Alexander W. Bradford,
who had gained enough social and professional prominence to help
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12organize the "Boz Ball" in 1842 when Dickens came to town. he
became familiar with the Duyckinck brothers avd in due t~ille~lew
the young William Allen Butler, later famed as an expert in ad-
miralty law,13 David Dudley Field, then engaged in the opening stages
of his effort to codify the laws of the state, and political journal-
ists Cornelius Mathews and William Cullen Bryant, both of whom
were originally lawyers. The Duyckinck brothers themselves had
studied law and passed bar examinations, although they declined
to practice. Most of the Duyckinck coterie, dubbed "Young America"
because of its nationalist politics, operated as the literary arm of
the radical Democratic party. It was not out of place, in what
Van Wyck Brooks has called "Gulian C. Verplanck's New York", for
the men of letters to concern themselves with such mundane affairs
as politics and law reform.
Melville's literary and intellectual companionship during his
most productive years was dominated by the "legal mind,tt as Perry
Miller has dubbed it. If we were to search, however, for the
presence of legal philosophy in his works entirely in the form of
subjects specifically identifiable as problems of law or under the
12New York Evening Post, 11 (February 2, 1842), 2 and New York
Evening Postz 11 (February 3, 1842).
13william Allen Butler, A Retrospect of Forty Years (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911), pp. 215-16.
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trappings of legal procedure, we would miss a great part of its
significance as a prevailing authorial attitude or point of v;cw.
An important influence of the law upon Melville was the shape
which the characteristics of the legal mind gave to his thought
and literary style. The influence was general and pronounced in
New York City and particularly prevalent among Melville's connections.
The men identified as his social and literary mentors, with the
exceptions of Hawthorne and Dr. Augustus Kinsley Gardner, were
either lawyers or men who had a law education. Their influence
upon Melville was threefold. First, they insisted upon a certain
amount of realism of a particular kind in the writings they respected,
and they appreciated a brand of humor characterized by the pun and
by satire. Second, they rejected transcendentalism primarily be-
cause it conflicted with their notions of common sense and with
their training as lawyers to stick to the facts and nothing but the
facts. Third, they provided Melville with the methodology of equi-
vocation and the open-ended dialectic so characteristic of his work.
Melvillets decision to become a "philosophical novelist" was a
reasonable reaction to the tastes of the successful men around him.
It is appropriate,. therefore, to pause here to give some background
information about Melville's social and intellectual milieu.
The growth of New York City during the twenty year period from 1830
to 1850 can only be described as a physical and financial explosion.
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Popula~ion grew from 202,589 in 1830 to 515,547 in 1850.14 'Volume
of ousiness in trade, real:estate, and financing as measured by
capital gain for those years increased in equally dramatic fashion.15
Despite several severe panics and depressions, the biggest of which
was the crash of 1837, New York City had enjoyed an unrivaled growth
and prosperity in which one man's loss was a necessary sacrifice to
a mushrooming financial power.
Under these conditions, New York offered ample opportunity for
young lawyers, especially those interested in real estate and cor-
poration law. The rate of increase in the membership of the New
York bar outdid the phenomenal growth of the city as a whole. The
New York Annual Register for 1835 shows that the 1,248 attorneys and
counsellors in New York State in 1820 had nearly doubled to 2,052
claim 303 of these. In 1843, only eight years later, the number
over the fifteen year period. In 1835 New York City alone could
of attorneys and counsellors in New York City had increased to 1106,
or approximately one-third of the 3041 for the state. By 1858 the
14United States, House of Representatives, Abstract of the
Returns of the Fifth Census 1830, Doc. No. 263 (Washingto~D. c.:
Duff Green, 1832), p. 9; and United States, Census Office, 7th Census
of the United States: 1850 (Washington, D. C.: Robert Armstrong
Public Printer, 1853),~210.
15Jean Gottmann, Megalopolis: The Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard
of the United States (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961),
pp. 136-46; and Jane Jacobs, The Economy Qi Cities (New York: Random
House, 1969), pp. 142-79.
85
16
the total for New York City was 2,052, ror the state, 4607. The
size of the New York City bar in :858 equalled that of the entire
state only two decades previous, and it included some of the most
distinguished members of the profession then alive, among them
Benjamin F. Butler, Daniel DeForest Lord, the Kents, the Hoffmans,
the Sedgwicks and others too numerous to list.
The New York lawyer was basically a businessman. He took care
of the paperwork involved in making leases, contracts, and otherwise
manipulating capital. He also performed the more important task of
expanding the legal framework in which business could operate. A
New York lawyer would have viewed criminal prosecution as the least
important part of his caseload. Unlike the Boston bar, which could
boast a galaxy of stars like Webster and Choate, master rhetoricians,
the New York bar was made up of lawyers devoted to the dry and
arcane intricacies of insurance, real estate, and banking.
One observer among Melville's acquaintance, William Allen Butler
who started his law practice in New York City in 1848, memorialized
the New York bar fifty years later in the following terms:
When I commenced practice the chief business of the
profession in the City of New York was collecting
debts for dry goods merchants and other commercial
houses. We had our share of this business, which
was largely carried on in the local Court of Common
16Edwin Williams, The New York Annual Register for the Year £f
Our Lord, 1835 (New York: Edwin Williams, 1835); and Disturnell's
New York State Register for 1858 (New York: John Disturnell, 1858).
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Pl~as and in the New York City Superior Court. • • •
~s business increased we found new connections in
banking, insurance and other corporations formed
by our clients and opening large fields for pro-
fessional activity, while the enlarged foreign
commerce of the country greatly multiplied the
cases coming within the Federal jurisdiction.
(Butler, Retrospect, ~.215)
An anonymous article, titled simply "The New York Bar, II appeared
in the Literary World for July 27, 1850.17 The author complains that
lithe intellectual characteristics of the Bar of New York are, • • •
good sense, business talent, considerable tact, but no genius, no
wit (or little), some humor and drollery, fluency, but not often
eloquence, very little or no imagination. Power over the feelings---
pathos---is exceedingly rare." Such was virtue among men whose
main business was to protect their clients from the embarrassment
and expense of an open court scrutiny into their affairs, or whose
major contribution was to introduce new practical operations and oil
the machinery of big business.
There is another aspect of the lawyer, however, which their
critic in the Literary World neglected to mention. As de Tocqueville
pointed out and Perry Miller reaffirmed,18 the lawyer was America's
17I1H.," "The Bar of New York," The Literary World~ 7, No.4
(1850), 65; see also an anonymous article in the New York Review,
8 (1841), 375-83.
18Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Phillips
Bradley (New York: Vintage Books, 1945), I, 282-90; and Perry Miller,
The Life of the Mind in America from the Revolution to the Civil War
(New York:Harcourt, Brace & Wor~Inc., 1965), p. 121 and passim-:-
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self-pr~claimed intellectual. Nowhere was this phenomenon than in
the ear ~ society of New York City~ comprised chiefly of the
"merchant princes and their chancellors"; 1.e., the attorneys they
engaged. The presence of the businessman-lawyer in New York's
cultural establishment contributed an important element to the
"Knickerbocker" flavor of New York's literary products.
First, these lawyers were above all paragons of the practical
bourgeoisie. Their interests were primarily in the secular world
of everyday reality. They tolerated fancy, absurdity, even the
grotesque, so long as it remained relevant to the passing scene
with its problems of controlling the commercial-political empire.
In his essay "Melville the New Yorker" Alfred Kazin brought to our
attention a remark by diarist George Templeton Strong which reveals
the literary spirit of New York. Strong wrote, "Literature pur-
sued as an end, for its own sake, not for the truths of which it
may be made the vehicle~ is a worthless affair.,,19 Strong was a
lawyer as well as a patron of the arts. To what then are we to
attribute Strong's utilitarian opinions? It would seem likely that
his attitude was more a product of the law office than the library.
The profession and its conservative clientele generally dis-
approved of the lawyer who openly dallied with the Muse. In his
19A1fred Kazin~ "Melvi.lle the New Yorker~1I New York Review of
Books, 20, No.5 (1973), 4.
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memoirs~ !Retrospect of Forty Years, 1825-1865, Butler mentions
the need for lawyers who would be poets or novelists to ~oncp~l
their avocation from the public:
Nothing to Wear appeared anonymously, as was very
generally the custom at that time in respect to
articles in magazines and periodicals, except in cases
of writers whose names were exceptionally well-known.
I feared that if I were known to be'a writer of verses,
it might injure my standing as a lawyer. Members of
my profession were permitted to make politics an
,adjunct of their practice at the bar, but dalliance
with the Muse and dabbling in verses were apt to come
under the ban of a commercial clientage. . • • A case
closely resembling mine was that of Henry MacKenzie,
author of 'The Man of Feeling,' a popular English
novel published in 1771. He was a barrister devoted
to his profession; and, activated by the same dread
of injuring his prospects as a lawyer that prevailed
with me, he gave his book to the world anonymously.
(Butler, Retrospect, p. 279)
Professionally, at leatt~ the lawyer was expected to keep his mind
on business, and avoiding even the appearance of evil, to display
only his best prose. Under these conditions and in the pinched
times of a young Industrial Revolution, young men often found
themselves forced to make a choice. Many turned irrevocably to
a legal career; still others quit law practice to become some of
America's best writers in the first half of the 19th century.
Within the new business ethic, however, which was nowhere more
potent than in New York City, virtue coincided with acquisitive
materialism. The merchant-lawyer class was close to popular senti-
ment and popular literature in a way that religious, transcendentalist
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New England could not be. The prosaic, business-minded character
of the New York lawyers did not p~event them from appreciating
modern popular literature and in some cases helping to produce it.
They censured, on the other hand, literature which was escapist
or purely fantastic. They did not well tolerate any of their
number writing literature which had no utilitarian purpose. They
deplored the novel in its sentimental character; they rejected
poetry of an inspired kind. Those members of their own class
who were inclined to write that way were often ushered by the
kindly patronage of their fellow bar members into pursuits for
which they were deemed more fitted; i. e,, journalism and editorial
work. Charles Fenno Hoffman had been among those who practiced
law intermittently but had been deemed by his distinguished
relatives to be more suited for a life of literary endeavor.
Cornelius Mathews and William Cullen Bryant suffered the same
fate. The Sedgwicks, prominent New York lawyers, were resposible
for Bryant's editorial position on the Evening Post.20
Those who did retain the respect and favor of the New York
intelligentsia wrote works which had relevance to the visible
world of business and society. William Allen Butler's "society
verse," such as "The General Average" and "Nothing to Wear" or
20Henry M. Field, The Life of David Dudley Field (New York:
Charles Scribner's Son~1898),-P. 37.
---.
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even his novel satirizing the illegality of the common church
raffle were acceptable because they combined common sensp and,
real issues with entertainment and humor. Other lawyers wrote
biography, history, law treatises and political pamphlets.
Alexander Bradford was among several who wrote on scientific
subjects, including a work on American Indian archaeology, a
popular topic in the 1840's and 1850's which inspired among
other things, Cornelius Mathews' grotesque novel, Behemoth: A
Legend of the Mound-Builders.
Local history and politics were approved topics for New
York writers. These provided the material for much of Irving's
"Knickerbocker" histories, a tradition of writing followed by
his nephew, John Treat Irving, Jr., and by Hoffman and Mathews.
Even Washington Irving's romances, "The Legend of Sleepy Hollow"
and "Rip Van Winkle,u gained some of their contemporary popularity
because they contained satires on current politics. The former
dramatized the conflict between the established Dutch patroons
and the influx of restless, hungry Yankees from the north. The
latter alluded to the political reforms which had rocked the
foundations of power in New York State. Irving's lesser known
works were history, biography, and travel sketches. Responding to
the same audience, Cooper exploited the "ways of the hour," volume
after volume of his novels yielding up pithy discussions of
America's political destiny and containing much explicit discussion
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of law as well---the scrape that fiy.st sends Natty Bumpo into the
wilderness, for example~ ~~ thp essays and discussions contained
in A Lette~ to His Countrymen (1834), The Monikins (1835), The
American Democrat (1838) and The Ways of the Hour: A Tale (1850).
Some lawyers who had stood at a crossroad of a law career
versus a literary life made the law their final choice. Among
those who had had to make such a decision was Melville's own father-
in-law, Lemuel Shaw. After Shaw completed his education at
Harvard, he taught school in Boston. He became assistant editor
on the Boston Gazette, a newspaper newly founded at the turn of
the century with commerCial, political, and literary contents.
The paper was staunchly Federalist. Shaw continued to waver in
his choice of professions between law and literature. A letter
written to the young man by his mother in February, 1801, advises
Shaw to follow his conscience, but also to consult with his uncle,
the distinguished Dr. Hayward of Harvard. He was eventually con-
vinced by Hayward that his writing was too ponderous and lacking
in brilliance of wit for real success in a literary career, and
21he was persuaded to be a lawyer.
Nevertheless Shaw persisted in his literary projects over the
next few years with a translation in 1802 of A Political and
21Frederic Hathaway Chase, Lemuel Shaw: Chief Justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts:-!830-1860 (Boston-;n~
New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, The Riverside Press, Cambridge,
1918), pp. 31-35.
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Historical view of the Civil and Military Transactions of Bonaparte,
Fir~c Consul of France by J. Charles (Shaw's translation was never
published) and with occasional poems contributed to The Farmer's
Cabinet, another short-lived periodical. In November, 1803, the
poem "Dancing" appeared in this paper, for which Shaw was admired
by a host of excited young ladies at a ball the following evening
(Chase, p. 43). Shaw's early desire to be a writer no doubt accounts
for the substantial help he was willing to extend Melville over
two decades of financial difficulty.
Shaw was not the only member of Melville's Boston acquaintance
who was a lawyer with a demonstrated interest in literature.
Richard Henry Dana, Jr. professed a wish to be known primarily
as a lawyer, and, like Butler, often expressed annoyance that his
fame as the author of Two Years Before the Mast seemed to outrun
his legal reputation. Melville knew socially other lawyers in
New York who were interested in literature. Theodore Sedgwick, Jr.,
brother of the fairly well-known writer Catherine Sedgwick, was
a practicing lawyer, but he also wrote histories and legal treatises.
David Dudley Field patronized literature, especially if it could
be pressed into service for his great cause, the procedural reform
of the law.
Melville's free and casual social intercourse with many of these
figures is a matter of undoubted record. He knew Charles Fenno
Hoffman at Evert Duyckinck's on Saturday nights. Hoffman has been
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22described as Melville's personal friend. Through association
in the Duyckinck circle Melville also knew Field, Sedgwi-:k,B·..tler,
Mathews~ George Duyckinck, Richard Henry Dana, Sr., and Parke
in Pittsfield. All had at least a law education and in some cases
Godwin. Field, Sedgwick, and Mathews lived close by to his home
as practice as well. He also could have met Evert Duyckinck's
old tutor, John Anthon, and the illustrious James Kent. He met
Washington Irving and William Cullen Bryant, and he was acquainted
with Pierre M. Irving. Of all these men, Duyckinck and Mathews
appear to have been Melville's most intimate acquaintances and
most frequent companions from 1847 to his removal to the Berk-
shires in 1850. These men formed an immediate audience for Melville's
early work. Their interests, their sense of humor, their politics
and their ways of thinking created the intellectual atmosphere
which surrounded him when he began his career in the 1840's; and
it is significant that everyone of them had been trained in the law.
In the first place, the "no-nonsense" attitude of the lawyer
set seems to have worn off on Melville. Certainly he was pressured
by their literary taste. Critics have complained that Melville
lacked inventive ability where the story line was concerned. Yet
if one were to measure his efforts against the demands of his
22Luther Stearns Mansfield, "Herman Melville: Author and New
Yorker: 1844-1851," Diss. University of Chicago 1936, p. 79.
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intellectual environment, one would perceive that he was encourag~d
at the beginning of his career to play up fact and trut~~uln~~s of
event and to play down fantasy and fiction. It waS under Dana's
influence that Melville returned to realistic descriptions in
Redburn and White-Jacket after his brief excursion into the fan-
tasia of Mardi. Melville's writing ability waS developed along
the lines of a utilitarian ethic and taste that preferred the
wonders of the visible world to those of the invisible. Reacting
to his reviewers' skepticism about the veracity of Typee, Melville
prepared an anonymous article in its defense which he sent to
Alexander Bradford for publication in the Morning Courier and
New York Enquirer. Although the Duyckinck brothers puffed Mardi
in the Literary World, their private correspondence shows they
ha~ many misgivings about the fantastic sections of the book.
One might also recall that Richard Henry Dana, Jr., was particularly
concerned that writers of sea literature who came to him for advice
should realize that it was important for them to give accurate,
responsible descriptions of the life they sought to portray.
Melville also responded to the interest in politics and current
events. We have already noted the possibility that controversy
over the English Common Law in America might have flavored his
emphasis in the South Sea stories. Court procedure reforms being
pushed by Field, Mathews, and Bryant during 1846-47 may have prompted
a satire in Omoo in which Melville included a hilarious description
95
23of a native court with almost no procedure at all. Although hiF
report and commentary upon the state of affairs in the islandp
were limited by his knowledge of international politics, still he
responded to the notion that the enthusiasm for such material
existed in his audience. His perceptions were no doubt strengthened
bY h15 GI1~lc-t~iend1 Evert Duyckin?k, who was well aware of what
shared in common the "legal mind," as Perry Miller has dubbed it,
they would have found their intellectual meat and drink in Melville's
display of the political conditions in the islands as they could
not have done with any purely romantic gilding of the scene.
It is significant too that during his New York years Melville
developed his penchant for satire and allegory, which eventually
became a basis for his skill with symbolism. This brand of humor
refers constantly to the events and the characteristics of the real,
cals current in Melville's day will find that humorous anecdotes
ongoing world. Anyone who pages through a number of legal periodi-
of act.uaI occurences and satire are most prevalent. Cornelius
Mathews was noted for his satiric sallies in behalf of legal reform.
A writer signing himself simply. "H." published articles of the same
1.'" .
23Herman Melville, Omoo, ed. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker,
and G. Thomas Tanselle (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University
Press and the Newberry Library, 1968), pp. 299-300.
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24nature in the Literary World.
Although the inclination to ~njoy the vignettes of concrete,
mundane reality was general among those with the "legal mind," there
was a special motivation within the "Young America" group to
encourage the American writer to draw his materials from the world
around him. The rationale was developed in a review of Theodore
Sedgwick's collection of the Political Writings of William Leggett
which David Dudley Field published in the New York Review for April~
1841.25 In this article Field asserted, "We are a new nation with
old opinions; our facts have outrun our ideas" (Field, review of
Leggett, p. 389). This is the observation upon which he built
his nationalism. It is also the principle underlying "Young Ameri-
cars doctrine that the American must reject the prejudices of
European opinion and mere theorizing in favor of a fresh observation
of the current scene. Although Melville had been caught up for a
short time in the activities of this group. he quickly lost his
enthusiasm, and the movement itself subsided. One suspects after
close scrutiny of the way he presented the operation of a "code" in
24"H.," "The Ghost of Nisi Prius," The Literary World, 6, No.
14 (1850), 341-42 and "The Young Attorney Who Could Have Saved
Webster," The Literary World, 6, No. 16 (1850), 389-90.
25David Dudley Field, review of A Collection of the Political
Writings of William Leggett, in The New York Review,-S-(1841);
Perry Miller identifies Field as the author of this unsigned review.
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the South Sea islands and his satire on 8 court with too little
pro~edure (see above) that he was never really in agreement with
their views anyway. Eventually in Mardi he inserted a denunciation
of these disestabl1shmentarian notions, chiding the radicals for
wanting to discard the past altogether.
Nevertheless, his friends hoped that the American writer would
draw his material from the scenes around him did visibly influence
Melville's work. Besides the political comment. in Mardi, he
"covered ," as one says in journalism, the New York to Liverpool
traffic (Redburn). the U. S. Navy (White-Jacket), the American
whaling industry (Mob_y-Dick), the rent wars of upstate New York
(Pierre), life 1n an American metropolis (Pierre), the law offic s
of Wall Street (Pierre, Bartlcby), the Bunker Hill l-lcmor1al eel brn-
tion (Israel Potter), a Mississippi river-boat (Confidence-lolan'........~ ;;..;;.=;:,;;;,-,.
and scenes from the Civil War (Battle-Pieces). Aft~r his experience
with Mardi, he also followed for the most part the advice of hiR
friends to abjure the training of books, which had to be foreign
because no American literature as yet eXisted, for the training
available "f rorn the life which he sees nround him" (1"i lde, rev!c,""
of Leggett, pp. 393-94).
There is morc~ however, to the influence of the "lngo1..., 11\1nI1"
than its impact upon aesthetics. A most Ail~sscnt n churncterfstic
of the legal process ~as its forensic rcquiremAnt. th'" . o rigorous
dialectic of the trial. Whether n case was to be nrp,ued by way
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of writs and replies or whether eviGence was to be presented to
a jury with argumentation j-ro e:id con, a court of law arrived at
the truth by means of a debate between at least two points of view,
neither necessarily correct in itself, or both possibly true at
one time.
In Silas Jones' Introduction to Legal Science (New York, 1842),
this explanation of the dialectic is offered to the layman:
After all it is but truth to say, that different
individuals will come to different results, as to
the relations of the terms of a proposition to each
other, and yet there shall be no actual fallacy in the
statements or reasonings of either •..• When this
is the case, one asks how shall we establish the
truth? To this I only reply that, those who have
what we term the best balanced minds, and are most
free from the influences which tend to warp opinions, 26
are, other things being equal, most likely to be right.
Although Jones hedges the problem considerably, he illustrates the
lawyer's preoccupation with establishing the "truth" in a conflict
of opposing views. Further, he proposes the "balanced mind" as a
solution to the poser, a concept somewhat suggestive of the "equal
eye" which a critic has told us is Ishmael's narrative position and
the source of balance in Moby-Dick.27
265i1as Jones, An Introduction to Legal. Science (New York:
J. S. Voorhies, 1842), pp. 54-55.
27Beoncheong Yu, "Ishmael's Equal Eye: The Source of Balance
in Moby-Dick," Journal of English Literary History, 32 (1965), 110-25.
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In the review of Leggett's Writfngs cited above, Field also
makes an apologia for diaJ~ctic In his analysis of the American
party system one can see the "legal mind" at work:
Parties are, nevertheless, inseparable atten-
dants upon free governments. It is vain to expect
uniformity of opinion. Human minds are too vari-
ous, and subject to too many different influences.
Scarcely any two minds will come to the same con-
clusions upon the same facts---some are not ascer-
tained, or are imperfectly understood. So that what
with honest mistakes, as to facts, and honest mis-
takes of reasoning, and the perverse influences,
more powerful still, of interest and passion, it
is not strange that the world presents an infinite
diversity of opinion and is split into parties,
sects, and factions. (Field, review of Leggett,
pp. 396-409)
Field saw the salvation of this situation in the dialectic which
is created whenever two or more parties enter into the struggle of
debate. In the conflict of opposing views, unexpected truths will
emerge, wrote Field. Further, upon the field of political activity
ideas may be tested in actual contest. If they remain only refined
abstractions of the armchair philosopher, it may never be known
what relationship they actually bear to reality.
In his faith in the dialectical process, Field displays an
essential characteristic of the "legal mind". Even those lawyers
who opposed Field in his codification efforts nevertheless invoked
the dialectics of the common law procedure as its most valuable
contribution in the search for truth and justice. In The Law Student,
a work published primarily, one suspects, as anti-reform propaganda,
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John Anthon, Duyckinck's old tutor, 0xtols the science of special
pleading as "the most refLned stv.:ciesof logic applied to the
ordinary transactions of life," wh:i.chwas, moreover, "reducible
to the strictest rules of pure dialectic.1I28 In that same work
Anthon also pointed out that it was deemed indispensable to the
process of justice in England that the lawyer be able to advocate
ind1s~rimin~tQlythe defense Of the I15ht and the wr~ns side of
a case, for it is in the debate between ~he cwo that the truth ~ay
emerge (Anthon. p. 208). Thus by surrounding the problem with
multiple perspectives, the lawyer can make identifications in an
elusive and often inscrutable reality. The whole truth was often
Such reasoning presupposes that facts of themselves do not cohere
to be found by the court somewhere between the opposite poles of
argumentation.
into Simple, convenient meanings. Before they may serve as usable
information, they may require the shaping of human construction.
Those who most distrusted "law logic" were men who wished the world
to be a place of simple, unequivocal truth. The study of Allan
Melvill in the preceding chapter showed him to be a man of this
to fit the definitions. They wished to act as though the name of
sort; and, as we have seen, Allan did complain to Peter Gansevoort
about his law logic. Men who felt as Allan did wanted their facts
28John Anthon, The Law Student, Or Guides to the Study of Law
in Its·Principles (New York: D. Appleton & Co.;-Philadelphia:~S.
Appleton, 1850), pp. 85 and 95-96.
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a thing were the thing itself. The "outhful debater who complained
of Melville's character in the uP:lilologos" quarrel disparaged him
precisely because "like a wary pettifogger, he never considers
'this side- right, and that stark naught,' or in other words, has
no fixed principles, but can hear as the wind blows without gripings
of conscience" (Leyda, I, 79).
Years later Melville was to assert the methodology of equivoca-
tion in writing Moby-Dick, Pierre, and the Confidence-Man as an
essential part of the "great Art of telling the Truth". In doing
so, he merely demonstrated the fruits of his schooling among the
intellectuals of the legal fraternity.
For this reason, however, point of view in Melville's work has
always been something of a problem. From the time of his first
publication to the present Melville has been provoking his readers
by his inclination to indulge in exploratory, speculative thinking.
Mardi, the first of his works to raise literary censure on this
score, upset readers by its voyage into the obscurities of incon-
clusive debate among five wandering philosophers. The sailor-hero
who begins the journey evolves into a demigod. This transformation
was in itself a way of gaining detached observation for the voice
of the story teller. The narrative point of view then disintegrates
as the narrator multiplies into five different characters, increased
now and again, by various philosophers encountered along the way.
Melville splits the narrative point of view in this fashion in
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order to debate metaphysical and polltical questions. Without an
authoritative narrator, however. the issues remain in dialectical
exposition and the reader must provide the answers for himself.
Unlike Moby-Dick, not even the action in Mardi provides the reader
with a conclusion. Although the others put their doubts to rest,
if not to resolution, by choosing to become members of a religious
community, Taji refuses to abandon his quest. As the book closes
he repudiates all solutions, and plunging across the reef, exits
into the open seas---"Mardi behind, an ocean before."
Fragmented point of view in Moby-Dick is commonly complained
about. Again, the first person narration breaks down, and the
authority which belongs to a participating main character is re-
placed by an equivocating voice which seems determined to present
all possible sides of any question that arises. After the trans-
formation of the narrative voice the reader must assume a role not
unlike that of a juror in the case. Ishmael then parades before
the public his "separate citation of items" and leaves judgment
to his empaneled readers.
At least one reviewer of Mardi criticized that work for its
over-abundance of "anti-thesis," a Carlylean manner which he found
wearing (Leyda, I, 299). In Mardi, however, Melville not only
placed his philosophers into situations of lively debate, but had
them take up the value of the dialectic itself. After a spirited
argument between Moh! and Yoomy over the importance of their re-
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spective callings, Babbalanja interferes with the advice, "Peace,
rivals. As Bardianna has it, like all who dispute upon ;.retp':,sions
of their own, you are each nearest the right, when you speak of
the other; and furtherest therefrom, when you speak of yourselves.,,29
In the chapter "Faith and Knowledge" Melville counsels us "Let us
not turn round upon friends, confounding them with foes. For
dissenters only assent to more than we" (Mardi, p. 296). More than
once the philosophers point out that we will sooner know the secrets
of another than those of our own, that it is because we cannot be
detached (i.e., leave Mardi, or the world) that we do not have the
perspective for the whole truth.
Chapter V of this study elaborates more fully upon the value of
the dialectic in Melville's work and the influence that legalism
may have had upon his metaphysics and ethics. It may not be out of
place here, however, to say a word or two about the impact of the
lawyer's attitude toward transcendentalism may have had upon Mel-
ville's thinking.
Lawyers as a class were opposed to transcendentalism. They
were accustomed to dealing with reality on the basis of evidence
and pragmatic result. The lawyer could not bring phenomena or
Suppositions into the courtroom which could not be demonstrated
29Herman Melville, Mardi and ~ Voyage Thither, ed. Harrison
Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle (Evanston and
Chicago: The Northwestern University Press and the Newberry
Library, 1970), p. 281.
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~ posteriori from the facts to the rational satisfaction of judge
and jury. The transcendentalist was concerned, first of all, ~.ith
that which goes on beyond the natural, or visible world. The
lawyer had to deal with the natural order as sufficient. He was
always ready to admit that there are some things we can never know;
yet because society must be able to deal with every phenomenon, the
law had evolved a procedure for dealing with these unknowables in
a practical, if not a rational manner. The law of cause and effect
was accepted as being true; evidence was presented only according
to time-tested rules of empricism; witnesses were corroborated, etc.;
and where all else failed, the law had evolved certain presumptions,
which were said to derive from "common sense" experience, about the
way in which facts were to be regarded by the court. Truth, for
the "legal mind," was not a private chimera spun out of the self,
for the self, but a public agreement as to the meaning of facts
which could be established in the courtroom in the manner described.
Developing this last point further, one might say that the
"self-reliance" advocated by the transcendentalist thinker was
inimical to the idea of a community governed by the laws and
institutions to which all must give consent. Law was an external
standard, bearing a certain relationship to internal standards of
morality, but not the same as these at all. Transcendentalism
cleared the way, in fact, -for placing the will of the individual
above his social obligations. While emphasizing the worth of the
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indivjdual, not even the radical Democrats of the short-lived
"YJung America" group endorsed transcendentalist "self-reliance".
Their notion of self-reliance was not metaphysical, but nationalist.
Shortly after the publication of Mardi, Duyckinck wrote Melville
to ask him whether he was basking in Emerson's rainbow. Melville
replied by denying that he had adopted transcendentalism, at least
Emerson's brand of it, saying he preferred to "swing in his own
halter.,,30 Duyckinck was right, though, in finding traces of
Emerson's mysticism in Mardi, particularly in Babbalanja's declara-
tions that he felt an affinity between his own deepest self and
all that is (Mardi, pp. 488-90). Any transcendentalist would have
delighted in the pursuit of the ideal personified in Yillah, ending
as it does with loss of self in a drowning whirlpool or an infinite
ocean. Though the others disapprove of Taji's persistence in this
path, their objections are more intellectual than emotional, leaving
the reader in the end constrained to admire the young man for his
heroic posturing in the hopeless quest.
Melville may have taken the hint from Duyckinck that toying with
such ideas was a dubious venture for a promising writer of the
"Knickerbocker" set. Works written after Mardi display a marked
anti-transcendental attitude. In Moby-Dick, for example, Ahab, a
30Herman Melville, The Letters of Herman Melville, Merrell R.
Davis and William H. Gilman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960),
p. 78.
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trans~endental hero, is portrayed as a monomaniac who led himself
p:Ld his crew into senseless destruction. Pierre and Isabel, hope-
lessly deluded by their willful surmises, rush headlong into a
fatal career. Isabel is a transcendentalist heroine whose story,
Melville reminds us, would never stand up in the "cold courts of
justice" 31
Melville's position on transcendentalism is not so easily
assessed, however, primarily because he did not completely reject
all of its doctrines or insights, and because he used transcendental
literary techniques. His criticism of that philosophy is signifi-
cantly qualified by his perception that basic irrationality lay
at the root of the doctrines of its "common senselt opponents.
In Pierre, for example, he openly flays the self-complacency of
the "very plain, plodding, humane sort of world" which "scorns all
ambiguities, all transcendentals, and all manner of juggling"
(Pierre, pp. 261-62). He called such men "utilitarian transcendenta-
lists," and in Melville's eyes, they differed from the philosophical
transcendentalists only in their version of the nature of reality.
They possessed no more grounds for their beliefs about the nature
of the world, the data they claimed to receive from their "common
sense," than Emerson had for his apprehension of the nature of the
31Herman Melville, Pierre, or the Ambiguities, ed. Harrison
Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G.-rhomas Tanselle (Evanston and
Chicago: Northwestern University Press and the Newberry Library,
1971), p. 71.
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univerF:e. In Mardi Babbalanja mocked the claims of "common sense"
Whp.ilhe explained to the others, tongue in cheek, "Thus. • • does
Mardi, blind though it may be in many things, collectively behold
the marvels which one pair of eyes sees not" (Mardi, p. 363).
Idealists postulating an essential rationality in the creation
probably had less ground for this belief than either the tran-
scendentalists or the utilitarians had for theirs.
Melville explains the matter in Pierre:
Now some imaginatively heterodoxical men are often
surprisingly twitted upon their willful inverting
of all common sense notions, their absurd and all
displaCing transcendentals, which say three is four,
and two and two make ten. But if the eminent Jug-
glarius himself ever advocated in mere words a
doctrine one thousandth part so ridiculous and
subversive of all practical sense, as that doctrine
which the world actually and eternally practices,
of giving unto him who already hath more than
enough, still more of the superfluous article, and
taking away from him who hath nothing at all, even
that which he hath,---then is the truest book in
the world a lie.
This passage continues:
Wherefore we see that the so-called Transcendenta-
lists are not the only people who deal in Transcendentals.
On the contrary, we seem to see that the Utilitarians,---
the every-day world's people themselves, far transcend
those inferior Transcendentalists by their own incom-
prehensible worldly maxims. 'And---what is vastly more---
with the one party, their Transcendentals are but
theoretic and inactive, and therefore harmless; whereas
with the other, they are actually clothed in living
deeds. (Pierre, p. 262)
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Such, we learn is the "operative opinion of this world'! (Pd.erre,
p. ~6l).
In the Confidence-Man Melville caricatured Emerson in the
person of Mark Winsome.32 Winsome begins by warning the cosmopoli-
tan, Frank Goodman, away from Charlie Noble~ whom he calls a
"Mississippi operator". A discussion ensues~ during which the
mystic assures Frank Goodman that the former's philosophy tends
to the same formation of character with the experiences of the
world, adding that "any philosophy that being in operation (italics
mine) contradictory to the ways of the world, tends to produce
a character at odds with it, such a philsosophy must necessarily
be but a cheat and a dream.,,33 Then the cosmopolitan meets Egbert,
Winsome's disciple. By no strange coincidence Egbert is a business-
man who has reduced the mystic's philosophy to practical use, put
it, in other words, into an "operative system". The comparison
of Egbert, a "utilitarian transcendentalist," with the "Mississippi
operator" is completed when the cosmopolitan asks him to assume the
name "Charlie" for the purposes of their discussion. By now the
32Egbert S. Oliver, "Melville's Picture of Emerson and Thoreau
in The Confidence-Man," College English, 8 (1946), 61-72.
33Herman Melville, The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade, ed. Hershel
Parker (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971), p. 170.
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"boon companions" of the earlier conversation between Frank GoodlIwn
and Charles Arnold Noble have become the "hypothetical ::J..·ien~s"of
the exchange between the cosmopolitan and Winsome's disciple
(Confidence-Man, pp. 172-78) Frank the cosmopolitan gets no more
boon out of his second companion, however, than he did out of his
first.
The cosmopolitan will not allow Egbert to state his first
principle in an abstract form; that principle, in fact, is left
for the reader to guess. Those who have read the above quoted
passage from Pierre will have their hint. The cosmopolitan will
only deal with actual test cases to see how Egbert "operates".
The disciple has developed a set of rules which he claims to
have deduced from the nature of friendship and loans. His rules
anticipate every possible case proposed by the cosmopolitan, each
time with an identical result: he can give only to the man who
already has, while he can only take away from the man who has
nothing. At last the cosmopolitan dismisses him in disgust, ex-
claiming that what Egbert's illustrious magian has taught him
"any poor, old, broken-down, heart-shrunken dandy might have
lispedtl (Confidenc~-Man, p. 192). Winsome's philosophy, moonshiny
though it may be, had turned out very practical in effect. Melville
deliberately placed the conversation with Charlie Noble back-to-back
with the exchange with Egbert ("Charlie") in order to show how
like were the "Mississippi operator" and the "utilitarian tran-
llO
scendent.aIf.st;"after all.
A priori principles of any sort, when held rigid without respect
to contingency or actual event, make a man a fool or a knave. The
story of Charlemont (note again the similarity of names) illustrates
the same moral. It is conveniently sandwiched between the Charles
Noble and Mark Winsome episodes. Charlemont was a fool for assuming
that his friends would cut him when they had found he had lost his
fortune (Confidence-Man, pp. 158-60).
Rational abstractions disembodied from the hard core evidence
out of which they arose can only produce ambiguity and inconsistency.
Of course Winsome, like his original, Emerson, declares he is not
afraid of inconsistency. Beyond the inconsistency, however, there
is something still more perverting about inflexible idealism. The
cosmopolitan and Mark Winsome engaged in the following exchange:
IIWhowill pity the charmer that is bitten with
a aerpen t ?"
"I would pity him,1I said the cosmopolitan. a
little bluntly perhaps.
"But don't you think," rejoined the other,
still maintaining his passionless air, "don't you
think, that for a man to pity where nature is piti-
less, is a little presuming?"
"Let casuists decide casuistry, but the com-
passion the heart decides for itself." (Confidence-Man,
p , 163)
The truth must not be obscured by idealist principles of what it
ought to be. The heart and the mind should be left open to the
facts of experience,'neither should be hedged by rigid, unchanging
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ideals and principles. This demand was at the root of Melville's
~ommon sensical anti-transcendentalism. It was the same demand
~e legal mind influenced significantly the way in which
that the rules of evidence, as a methodology, were designed to
achieve.
Melville approached the intellectual life of his times. What
systematic thought was available to him came from lawyers, not
from theologians or professors of the liberal arts~ as had been
the case with many writers. The lawyer, and more so the judge)
concerned himself with metaphysics and epistemology for the most -practical reasons. In subsequent chapters, therefore, this study
-will focus upon what use Melville was able to make of the lawyer's
1Iscience" of evidence and what influence he received from con-
temporary quarrels over the need to reform legal procedures for
determining "truth"." The last' chapter summarizes and Jsyothesizes "
these elements in an exploration of the importance Judge Lemuel
Shaw's career may have had in Melville's thought.
Chapter III
Oaths and Holy Writ Proofs
Modern critics have accused Melville of setting up polarities
in his works and so carefully tending both extremes, that the
for example, for the reader to see the whale as both the Leviathan
of Job and the agent of God's vengeance in the story of Jonah.2
reader has little choice but to assume that he meant these opposite
aspects to be taken for the equally valid halves of the complete
1"sphericity of things." Melville discussed the concept of an
essential ambiguity in reality in a critical article about Hawthorne
written during the summer of 1850. Shortly thereafter he demon-
strated his notion by trying to create a real-life white whale in
all its positive and negative physical and metaphysical dimensions.
Recent studies of the imagery in Moby-Dick show that it is possible,
If one accepts the idea that Melville consciously created
1Herman Melville, "Hawthorne and His Mosses," in Moby-Dick:
An Authoritative Text ... , ed. Harrison Hayford and Hershel
Parker (New York:--W:-W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1967),'pp. 535-51;
this essay was already published in Duyckinck's Literary World,
August 17 and 24, 1850; subsequent references to Moby-Dick are to
this edition and will appear in the text.
2Natalia Wright, "Moby-Dick: Jonah's or Job's Whale?,tI American
Literature, 37 (1965), 190-95; and Daniel G. Hoffman, "Moby-Dick:
Jonah's Whale or Job's?," Sewanee Review, 69 (1961),205-24.
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ambivalent imagery, then one might ~easonably assume that re-
examination of his wd.tin,: woul,: uncover other carefully planned
efforts to prevent the reader from satisfying the urge, so
characteristic of that age in which Melville wrote, to pronounce
quick moral judgment.
Part of the methodology he was able to learn from lawyers was
the "science" of evidence. Jurists of the late 18th and early
19th centuries had carefully evaluated the sources of knowledge
and of what. ultimately. could be relied upon when life, liberty,
and property hung in the balance. Their conclusions were summaries
of all the ways in which appearance might be deceptive and what
steps might be taken to gain the greatest surety of truth. Within
the Conunon Law there had evolved a set of rules for evidence, some
of which had become law, some not, which sorted the reliable from
the unreliable. These rules were an elementary part of every
lawyer's training, and in that age of great public interest in law,
they had even diffused to a certain extent into popular knowledge.
Melville's proximity to men of the legal profession argues that
he had even more opportunity than most to digest the information
which amounted to a guide to practical epistemology. The present
chapter demonstrates Melville at work systematically constructing
ambiguities which the reader, as well as the protagonist, is pre-
vented from solving because he is provided only with the kind of
evidence that the most careful and practical thinkers on the
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subjecc, the legal philosophers, had declared to be either un-
If Melville had wanted to study the science of evidence thoroughly
r~~iable or inconclusive.
instead of merely gleaning the conversations of his friends, he could
have found in the law libraries available to him several treatises
on the subject which had been published since the turn of the 19th
century. Most of these works were intended as practical guides for
the lawyer, and, as such, they are dry and technical, filled with
the minute cavils of common law pleading. Starkie's, Phillipps', and
Taylor's books on evidence are of this nature.3 Judge Shaw's
4
of these manuals in 1842. Jeremy Bentham's five volume Principles
Boston acquaintance, Simon Greenleaf, published an American version
of Judicial Evidence (1827) is, however, a somewhat controversial'-
3Thomas Starkie, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Evidence and
Digest of Proofs in civil and Criminal Cases (London:]. & W. T. --
Clarke, 1824); s [amuel J M [arch) Phillipps, A Treatise E!l the Law .2!.
Evidence (London: J. Butterworth and Son, 1814); and John Pitt Taylor,
A Treatise on the Law of Evidence ~ Administered in England and
Ireland with Illustrations from the American and Other Foreign Laws
(London: A. Maxwell and Son, 1848). All of these works went through
many editions, both English and American, throughout the 19th
century, until they were superseded by the judicature acts of the
early 1880's.
4Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence (London: A.
Maxwell and Boston: Chas. C. Little & James Brown, 1842).
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philosophical evaluation of the system, in which he investigated its
met~physical basis as well as the soundness of its methods. But
Bentham's style is so obscure and abstract as to make reading all
five volumes tedious; and Bentham, too, became so technical in
places that only a lawyer could have appreciated his point. Best's
Treatise of the Principles of Evidence is the most handy work on
the subject for one who wished to acquaint himself with the major
characteristics of the system and at the same time gain familiarity
with the general practice of the common law courts in presenting
evidence and dealing with testimony. Best also provided the
reader with philosophical discussions of his material, including
critical summaries of Bentham's ideas about credibility and human
5
understanding, especially with regard to "psychological facts",
Since all of these books are about the common law system, it
is not surprising that they all follow more or less the same plan
of organization. It is easiest, therefore, to use that same plan
here in providing a thumbnail sketch of the English rules for
evidence as they were available in Melville's day. He himself, to
judge from their use in Pierre, was following that exposition rather
closely. Most of the references will be to Best's volume as the
most contemporary (1849) and the most convenient summary.
SJeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence Specially
Applied ~ English Practice (London: Hunt and Clarke, 1827), I,
45-47, 145-46 and III, 6-11; for a concise presentation of Bentham's
point, see W. M. Best, ~ Treatise ~ the Principles of Evidence ••.
(London: S. Sweet, 1849), p. 9; subsequent references appear in text.
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Th~re were two main divisions of evidence with which the Melville
s~~dent need concern himself. The first is direct and indirect, or
circumstantial evidence; the second is the distinction between the
original and unoriginal, or hearsay, evidence. In each of these
categories there were kinds of evidence considered reliable and
kinds considered infirm or unreliable.
Proof may be either direct or indirect, according to whether it
offers the principal fact to be established or merely presents
facts from which the principle matter may be inferred. Sometimes
direct proof may be furnished by bringing objects or persons in
question into court to be shown to the jury. A question as to
whether something is black or white, one foot long or two feet
long, etc., can be demonstrated simply by its appearance at the
bar. In all cases where such "real evidence" can be produced, it
must be presented before the court will hear any testimony about
it. Not every matter to be proved is a simple physical fact, however;
and in judicial procedure, whenever witnesses or documents attest
to the principle fact, the evidence, when acceptable, is considered
to be direct proof. In this category comes an eyewitness account
or certified documents such as wills or deeds, depositions under
oath, and the like. What remains in such cases is to establish
the credibility of the witnesses or the genuineness of the documents.
The competency of witnesses, or the reliability of their testi-
mony, was a matter for determination by the court. In legal termino-
cause the courts came to regard the reliability of their testimony
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logy, t~e competency of a witness must be distinguished from his
~e~ibility. There were well-defined cases in Melville's day in
which the court, i.e., the judge, would not allow the witness to
testify because of his mental condition or his interest in the
case. In these categories fell children under seven years old,
persons found ~ compos mentis, persons for whom an oath was not
considered binding, as a convicted perjurer or one of no religious
persuasion, and any persons having a legal interest in the principle
matter of the case. In time much of the practice of barring
witnesses from testifying because of incompetency was dropped be-
as questions of credibility which could be left to the jury to
determine.
Indirect evidence, also known as circumstantial, may be con-
elusive, in which case it is taken as reliable. Best offers the
a female was found dead in a room, with every sign
of having met a violent end, the presence of another
person at the scene of action was demonstrated by the
bloody mark of a left hand visible on her left arm; • . •
a man was found killed by a bullet, with a discharged
pistol beside him, the hypothesis of suicide from that
pistol was negatived by proof that the bullet which
caused his death was too large to fit it. (Best, p. 224)
following instances of circumstantial evidence which is conclusive
in that necessary inferences can be drawn:
Circumstantial evidence is more often of a presumptive nature,
however, and must then be handled with caution by the court. At
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times such evidence furnishes a strong presumption; at other timef it
is so weak as merely to add weight to one side of the argumenr. or
the other. In a chain of evidence, each link must be examined as
to whether it is conclusive or merely presumptive, and whether if
the latter, whether the force of it weak or strong. In the case of
burglary, for example, the thief opened the window with a penknife
which was broken in the attempt, one piece of the blade being left
behind, the other piece being found in the pocket of the prisoner;
in another case, a man was killed by a pistol, the wadding found
in the wound consisted of part of a printed paper the other half
of which was found in the prisoner's pocket. In some cases, where
the crime had to have been committed by a left-handed person, the
fact that the accused is left-handed is taken as a presumption in
favor of his guilt (Best, pp. 225-26). In each of these cases,
the proof is not conclusive as other hypotheses could explain the
circumstances. The inference drawn are not necessary, but only
probable to some degree. The corresponding halves of penknife or
the wadding might have been thrown away by the real culprit and
picked up for some reason by the defendant; and, of course, there
are many left-handed persons in the world. In cases of presumptive
circumstantial evidence, the facts to be established are left to
the judgment and conscience of the jury, who, however, are instructed
by the court that they must decide the guilt of the accused beyond
a reasonable doubt. Often such presumptive evidence is offered
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along 'Jith other evidence of the same kind, and it is the weight
of the total which causes the jury to risk inferences which are
not necessary.
Most of these treatises on evidence divide the world of fact
into two categories, the physical and the psychological. Physical
facts are those properties derived from the inanimate nature of
things. Psychological facts, on the other hand, are properties
derived from the animate nature of beings. Motion, for example,
is a physical fact because inanimate things, as well as animate, can
have motion. But voluntary motion belongs only to animate beings
and is therefore a psychological fact. Motives, intentions,
feelings, persuasions, and beliefs are all psychological facts.
The only direct proof available for establishing psychological
fact is the testimony of the person who has experienced them. All
too often that person is unavailable as a witness, either because
he is deceased or because he has a barring interest. Most of the
time psychological fact can be established only through circumstantial
evidence, actions, words, deportment, interest, or premeditation,
for example. Malice is one such fact which must be established
through presumptive circumstantial evidence.
Proof could also be original or unoriginal. If it is original
it was taken as reliable evidence, depending again upon the relia-
bility of the witness of the genuineness of the document. But if
it was unoriginal, derivative, or second-hand, it was considered
--
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unreliable and in most cases, not even admissible. Original evid£nce
was produced when a witness saw or experienced the fact ~.~avcr s by
personal observation. Even so, he was not permitted to give an
opinion on what he witnessed, but merely to report the facts them-
selves. For example, a witness delivers original eVidence if having
read a certain letter, he can tell the court what it said. He may
not testify as to the contents of the letter if he did not read it
himself, and he may not speculate on the truth of what the letter
said. Moreover, if the letter can be produced in court it must be
read for its contents before the testimony of a witness is accepted
instead. Again, a witness may testify that someone said something
to him and what the words were, but the only evidence admissible
is the fact of the words having been said at such and such a time.
The words themselves, i.e., their meaning or any information con-
tained in them is not admissible as testimony. For example, a wit-
ness may testify that A said she had a child by B, but this is not
to be taken as proof that she in fact had a child, but merely that
she said so on a certain occasion.
All unoriginal or second-hand evidence was considered unreliable,
and Best declares this fact to be a peculiar characteristic of the
English system (Best, pp. 120-21). In this category comes evidence
by hearsay of which there were five types defined by the textbooks:
supposed oral evidence delivered orally; supposed written evidence
delivered orally; supposed written evidence delivered in writing;
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suppos~d oral evidence delivered in writing; and reported real
ev+dence (Best, pp. 23 and 369). The last of these occurs when a
witness reports a piece of real evidence to exist, but it cannot.
or is not produced in court. Best quotes Bentham on this subject:
To the reporting witness indeed, if his report be true,
it was so much immediate, so much pure real evidence;
but to the judge it is but reported real evidence. The
difference is far from being a purely speculative one:
practice requires to be directed by it. • • • The lights
afforded, or said to have been afforded, are likely to
be weakened in intensity and altered in colour by the
medium through which it is transmitted. (Best, pp. 223-24;
cf. Bentham, Judicial Evidence, III, 34)
Melville's first expression of interest in the problem of
Common law practice allowed several exceptions to the admissibility
of derivative evidence, which, however, need not be discussed here
as they involve technicalities not necessary to an understanding
of the general rules.
establishing facts by means of sound evidence comes in Typee when
the young sailor hero finds he is unable to establish the truth about
which of the tribes on the island were ferocious cannibals, because
the only available witnesses are all interested parties given to
accusing each other of the same thing. In the same volume he
tantalizes the reader about whether his hosts were in fact cannibals
by making sure that all such rituals were always kept out of his
hero's personal observation. The bones that Tammo finds are pre-
sumptive circumstantial evidence, but it is only reported real
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evidence, and it is only his opinion that they are human bones
rather than the pig bones as the natives claimed. Tomro~1s o~~nion
here is not reliable testimony~ according to the rule that a witness
may not speculate on what he saw, and the sailor was admittedly no
expert on human anatomy. Concerning the validity of his narrative
as a whole, Melville felt called upon to procure from his friend
Toby an affidavit of corroborative testimony for publication with
the assistance of lawyer Alexander W. Bradford.
In Mardi, Donjalolo, condemned to stay in his valley forever,
is in the pOSition of a court which must establish the truth not
by immediate experience but by the eVidence provided by others.
The process is unsatisfactory and fraught with difficulties. He
wishes to know what manner of reef lies around his island. He sends
out two men to be his eyes. One returns bearing a piece of red
coral, declaring this to be the color of the reef. The other returns
with a piece of white coral declaring that this is the color of the
reef. In this case there are two eyewitnesses, each offering a
piece of real evidence. Both forms of evidence are of the kind
designated as most reliable by the best rules of evidence. Babbalanja
immediately credits both accounts and draws the necessary inference
that the reef must therefore be both white and red.
There is a similar situation in the dilemma of the nine blind
men who set out to see the world. Each of them, in examining the
banyan tree, ought to have accepted the original evidence of the
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others. If each averred that he had hold of the trunk of the tre~t
then the necessary conclusion, in the face of this reli~~le cJidence,
is that the tree had at least nine separate trunks. Both of these
examples illustrate the principle that once the witness is credited
and the evidence accepted as true, no conclusion or hypothesis
ought to be drawn which leaves out any part of the evidence, no
matter how inviting such an inference may be.
Mystery is preserved in the end of Mardi too because Taji can
get no reliable evidence as to Yillah's fate. Hautia is his only
eye-witness, and she is interested in the effect that the information
has on his mind. When he peers into the whirlpool he thinks he
sees a vague white shape in the water. This evidence forms only
a weak presumption of Yillah's having thrown herself into the
current as Hautia would have him suppose.
In Pierre Melville makes full use of the rules of evidence to
create his primary ambiguity. Isabel's pedigree is the principle
fact to be established. On that point hinges the entire plot. All
of the evidence available to Pierre is unreliable as furnishing only
weak presumption or coming from witnesses whose testimony cannot
be credited, or as being unoriginal, second-hand evidence. The
quality of this proof does not daunt Pierre, however, and Melville's
comment upon his making momentous decisions under such conditions
is significant for its details of imagery:
-6Herman Melville, Pierre, or the Ambiguities, ed. Harrison
Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle (Evanston, 111.:
Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 71.
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In the cold courts of justice the dull head
demands oaths, and holy writ proofs; but in the
warm halls of the heart one single, untestified
memory's spark shall suffice to enkindle such a
blaze of evidence, that all the corners of con-
viction are as suddenly lighted up as a midnight
city by a burning building, which on every side
whirls its reddened brands.6
If Melville had witnessed any of New York City's terrible fires or
its aftermath, he knew from experience what awful destruction such
a burning building could wreak. Furthermore, the comment clearly
shows Melville aware that the evidence with which he had provided
Pierre was exactly the kind that was not accepted in the "cold
courts of justicell•
The first information that Pierre has that' Isabel is his sister
is the letter she sends him (Pierre, pp. 61-65). The letter itself
is no evidence, however; it is a mere declaration or accusation,
and serves as the opening indictment.
The first piece of evidence that comes up for consideration are
the death-bed words of Pierre's father. Ordinarily a person's
dying words are supposed to have more weight than other statements
taken under oath, because it was held that a person dying is not
likely to trifle with the truth when eternity is near (Best, p. 377).
The words were not hearsay evidence for Pierre because he heard them
125
himself. In this case, however, it was clear that Glendinning was
not of sound mind, non compos mentis, being in a raving delirium.
His words, therefore, were unreliable, and in a court of law, would
not have been admissible as evidence.
The second proof Pierre has is his aunt's story about the
chair-portrait taken of Glendinning when he was a young an eligible
bachelor. Again, Pierre heard the words from his Aunt Dorothea's
lips, but she reports hearsay. Her statement, in fact, is filled
with phrases such as "some said ••• , others declared •. . ,
rumor began to hint .•• some who shook their heads ••• (Pierre,
p. 76). All of the story came to his aunt through the painter
Ralph's speculations. The portrait itself, though a piece of real
evidence, is proof only of Ralph's notions. The aunt's testimony
would fall into the category of supposed oral evidence delivered
orally. The painting itself is supposed oral delivered through
"written". Melville calls the painting a "shadowy testification"
of the fact in the countenance of the original" (Pierre, p. 82),
thus indicating that he is aware that it is unsound, because un-
original, evidence.
The third piece of evidence 1s circumstantial. It,is the
aversion Pierre's mother has to the chair-portrait. This evidence
too is merely evidentiary of the principle fact. It is certainly
not conclusive of anything except that Mrs. Glendinning did not,
as she averred, think the painting was a good likeness of her
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husband. If Ralph the painter had been carried away with his own
romanticisms---those shared by the spinster aunt---Mrs. Glend:hning
may very well have been right in her estimate of the portrait.
Isabel's story is specious in many respects. First, she is
the principal in the case and, as such, her testimony is unreliable.
Whatever she says against herself would be acceptable, but not what.....
she says for herself (Best, p. 393). None of her story can be
7corroborated by witnesses or attested by any acceptable evidence.
Much of her recollection was from experience dating back to when
she had been a mere infant, and for that reason, unreliable and
inadmissible (Best. pp. 172-81). Futhermore, parts of the story
suggest that she had been confined in a madhouse at one time,
raising the question as to whether she had been of sound mind
during the time she was recalling (Best, pp. 166-71). In addition,
she tells Pierre that she was raised without religion. As a ir-
religious person, she would be judged an incompetent witness on
the grounds that she lacked an important sanction for veracity and
that no oath would be binding upon her. Her story is suspiciously
vague and indistinct throughout (Best, p. 498). Finally, her
reputation and thus her credibility is impugned by her association
7Best, p. 65; Best offers the opinion that supporting witnesses
are optional but desirable in English law (cf. pp. 425-26); Bentham,
however, insists corroborating witnesses are required (I, 63 and
II, 337).
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Melville's art is brough to bear more than once in handling
with uelly Ulver, a fact that she herself points out to Pierre
(~ierre, p. 157).
Isabel's story •. During the interval between his two interviews with
Isabel, Pierre visits the Mernnon Stone. Graven on the rock are
the initials "S. ye W.". Pierre laughs when his whitehaired city
kinsman pronounces the author of these letters to be "Solomon the
Wise," but his merriment might not have been so careless had he
remembered the substance of the story which gained Solomon his
reputation for wisdom. Best's treatise on evidence recounted
the tale of Solomon acting as judge in a case of disputed parentage.
He orders the child cut in two and half given to each of the two
harlots claiming to be its mother. When the order was given, one
mother showed by her deportment that she had deep maternal feelings
for the child (a psychological fact); the other, that she had none.
Solomon considered their behavior to be strong presumptive evidence
in favor of the first, and decided that the child was hers. The
story is given by the books on evidence as an example of a case
decided by the judge without direct proof or corroborating witnesses.
The decision was regarded by commentators of the English common law
system of jurisprudence to be a precarious mode of dealing justice.8
The Memnon Stone is in precarious balance, and Melville waggishly
8 4'Best, p. 29fn, cf. Pierre, p , 133.
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tells ~s that the aged kinsman reached his conclusion about the
au~hor of the initials only after solemn deliberation on the stone's
angle of inclination and upon several verses from Eccesiastes, the
theme of which most likely was the vanity of man's wisdom. At any
rate, the Memnon Stone ought to remind Pierre that one should have
the wisdom of Solomon to decide a case without witnesses.
Another instance of Melville's using literary skill to point
up the unreliability in Isabel's testimony lies in his treatment
of the handkerchief incident. Isabel states that she knew her
father's name to be Glendinning because the man referred to as
"the gentlemanll or IIfather" (she is vague about this too) dropped
his handkerchief while visiting her one day, and the farm wife
gave it to Isabel without noticing that his name had been embroider-
ed upon it. Pierre does not ask to see the handkerchief, nor does
Isabel produce it. Here too is a piece of derivative evidence of
the kind designated "reported real evidencell• The textbooks on
evidence felt called upon to give extra explanation, as we have
seen in the case of Bentham's work (Bentham, Judicial Evidence, III,
513-21) to the problems of reported real evidence, probably because
such accounts have a ring of truth about them. Lest the reader
give Isabel's story too much credit because of her claims about
the handkerchief, Melville provides him with a similar but much
more extravagant claim. Isabel tells Pierre that she knows her name
is Isabel because she found it graven inside a guitar which came from
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Saddle :1eadows. This conceit demonstrates her ability to spin
fac~ out of the most tenuous presumptions. Advice on cross-examina-
tion given the young attorney in Best's hmok on evidence suggests
that the enthusiastic witness be permitted to continue his testi-
Near the end of the book, while making a chance visit to an
mony until he makes the mistake of making some unbelievable claim
that reveals his unreliability as an informant (Best, pp. 492-93
and 500-50l).
art gallery, Pierre comes across a portrait of the foreigner. The
resemblance between this second anonymous painting and Isabel suggests
to Pierre his foolishness in not seeing how little weight he ought
to have attached to the similarities between Isabel and the chair-
This latter incident causes Pierre to review the entire basis
portrait of his father. His coming across the second portrait
points up the nature of the first as being only presumptive, and
far from conclusive, circumstantial evidence,'
for his decision about Isabel's pedigree. This passage is significant
evidence in Pierre's excoriation of himself for jumping to un-
because here Melville uses the terminology of the textbooks on
warranted conclusions:
How did he know that Isabel was his sister?
Setting aside Aunt Dorthea's nebulous legend, to
which in some shaowy points, here and there Isabel's
still more nebulous story seemed to fit on,---
though but uncertainly enough---and both of which
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t~us blurredly conjoining narrations, regarded in
the unscrupulous light of real naked reason~ were
anything but legitimately conclusive [italics mine];
and setting aside his own dim reminiscences of his
wandering father's death-bed; (for though, in one
point of view, those reminiscences might have af-
forded ~ degree £f presumption as to his father's
having been the parent of an unacknowledged daughter,
yet they were entirely inconclusive [italics mine)
as to that presumed daughter's identity; and the
grand point with Pierre was, not the general ques-
tion whether his father had had a daughter, but
whether, assuming that he had had, Isabel, rather
than any other living being, was that daughter;)---
The passage continues to these conclusions:
and setting aside all his own manifold and inter-en-
folding mystic and transcendental persuasions, . • •
and coming to the plain palpable facts,---how did he
know that Isabel was his sister? • . . The chair-
portrait, that was the entire sum and substance of
all possible, rakable, downright presumptive evidence
italics mine , which peculiarly appealed to his own
separate self. Yet here was another portrait of a
complete stranger---a European; a portrait imported
from across the seas, and to be sold at public auction,
which was just as strong an evidence as the other.
Then the original of this second portrait was as much
the father of Isabel as the original of the chair-
portrait. But perhaps there was no original at all
to this second portrait; it might have been a pure
fancy piece; to which conceit, indeed, the uncharacter-
izing style of the filling up seemed to furnish no
small testimony. (Pierre, p. 353).
Melville demonstrates in this passage his lawyer-like knowledge of
the science of evidence. This section, along with his earlier
comment that the proofs would not have been accepted in "the cold
courts of justice" and his references to the judgment of Solomon,
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shows chat Melville was well aware from the start that he had been
fl'cnishing his hero with what the rules of evidence rejected as
unreliable.
Prompted by fresh doubts Pierre is led to cross-examine Isabel.
He finds her lacking in knowledge of details she ought to have
known if her story were true. She does not know, for example,
that the sea was salt, rendering improbable her account of having
crossed the ocean at one time. Pierre concludes that Isabel's
story, taken in aggregate was really an "innnense staring marvel"
(Pierre, p. 354). There is no way for the reader to settle the
question any more than there is for Pierre. But Pierre has un-
wisely acted upon his faulty evidence and is accused by the staring
face of Plinlimmon of being a fool (Pierre, p. 293), an epithet
which Bentham defined as the following:
• • • to credit, on no better ground than because this
or that person or persons have asserted it, a fact, the
superior incredibility of which is attested by experience.
This is, in other words, to throw off the character of
Corrspondent to the believing of improbable things, is
the doing of foolish ones: what the one is in theory,
the other is in practice. Foolish belief, if there
be any such thing, what is it? It is neither more nor
less than the belief of improbable things. (Bentham,
Judicial Evidence, I, 135-36)
Elsewhere Bentham discourses upon the foundation of all our know-
ledge, which he says is experience. The following comment seems
particularly applicable to Melville's treatment of Pierre:
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vat tona l. beings, and in cold blood to resolve to act
the part of madmen.9
Pierre, who calls himself the "Fool of Truth" (Pierre, p. 358),
causes Isabel to think him slightly mad (Pierre, p. 273); his
friend Charlie Millthorpe worries about his state of mind, and
Pierre himself comes to doubt his own sanity. Melville tells us
that he is afflicted by a "dark, mad mystery in some human hearts,
which, sometimes, during the tyranny of a usurper mood, leads
them to be all eagerness to cast off the most intense beloved
bond, as a hindrance to whatever transcendental object that usurper
mood so tyrannically suggest" (Pierre, p. 180). Then whoever
yields to such forces within himself becomes guilty of a IIsense-
less madness" (Pierre, p. 181).
In discoursing upon the foundations for belief in the veracity
of witnesses' testimony, Bentham, like other commentators on the
science of evidence, reviews the force of the moral sanction against
perjury (Bentham, Judicial Evidence, I, 209-21). What is particular-
ly noteworthy in his rambling discussion is the comment,
Of the degree of force with which the moral. or
popular sanction acts in support of the law or the rule
of veracity, a more striking or satisfactory exemplification
9Bentham, I, 131-32; this section in Bentham's Judicial Evidence
is a disqUisition on the innate propensity in mankind to believe what
is said by others, parts of which sound like a description of the
plot of Pierre (I, 126-36; esp. pp. 127 and 134-35).
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cannot be given, than the Lnf auy which so universal-
ly attaches upon the charact~rof liar, and the violent
and frequently unsup~0rta~~e provocation given by any- ~
one who, in speaking to, or in the presence of, an-
other, applies to him that epithet. (Bentham, Judicial
Evidence~ I~ 210)
He goes on to say that this provocation is rather more than less if
the person to whom such an epithet is applied knows he deserves it.
Bentham lists four reasons when popular morality allows lying,
Pierre's course of action demanded that he be a liar from the very
start, in representing Isabel as his wife. He is accused at the
end of the novel of being a "villainous and perjured liar.
a liar;---liar~ because that in itself is the scornful lest and
most loathsome title for a man; which in itself is the compend of
all infamous things" (Pierre, pp. 356-57).
in fact, prescribes it: falsehoods of humanity, to spare pain of
mind; falsehoods of urbanity, to avoid discouraging young artists;
falsehoods of prudence, to keep information to which another has no
right; and falsehoods to prevent evil, to conceal a persons where-
abouts from a would-be assassin (Bentham, Judicial Evidence~ I,
219-20). All four species of sanctioned lying are to be found in
Isabel is his sister is to spare them pain of mind. Ralph, the
Pierre. The hero's resolve not to tell his mother or Lucy that
painter of the chair-portrait, withholds information from Mr.
Glendinning as to whether he has painted such a picture. He does
so out of prudence, lest it be destroyed, and he uses the excuse
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that Glendinning had no right to th~ information. Pierre himself
is the victim of falsehoods to]~ a young poet so as to encourage
him in his work (Pierre, pp. 244-46). Glen Stanly lies when he
denies knowing Pierre, prudently wishing to avoid entanglement in
Pierre's disgrace. Finally Pierre lies in saying that Isabel is
tion or that of Lucy, who has come to live with them. At the end
his wife in order to avert the greater evil of ruining her reputa-
of his discussion on moral sanctions for mendaCity Bentham makes
the following comment:
A disquisition of no small length and intricacy
might be employed on the subject of the exceptions
to be made to the general rule of veracity: a dis-
quisition, curious and interesting at any rate; but,
whether subservient or not upon the whole to the
interests of morality and happiness, would depend upon
the manner in which it was conducted. (Bentham, Judicial
Evidence, I, 221)
Before leaving Pierre, it is appropriate to say a word about
If Melville took this hint from Bentham as a wonderful idea for
a novel, he would have done better to have heeded its warning as
well. Bentham won continuing censure for daring to explore the
frontiers of morality in so dry and technical a work as a treatise
on judicial evidence. To attempt a "disquisition" on such a
subject using the form of a romantic and "supersensuous" novel
would have seemed to a less rebellious author than Melville a
mode little calculated to keep the work "subservient to the
interests of morality and happiness" as Bentham advised.
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the characterizations of women in the novel. It is true that both
Lucy and Isabel owe a gr~at deal to stereotypical romantic heroines,
and to Melville's own predilections, as had been suggested; he,
after all, was raised in that romantic atmosphere himself. Books
on the science of evidence, however, all include a section on the
testimony of women (Best, pp. 63-64 and 171-72), much to their
prejudice as witnesses. Women, the attorney is warned, are notori-
ous for their predisposition to exaggerating and for being devious
in general. The history of the rules of evidence shows that until
comparatively recent times, women were not even permitted to
testify under the civil law of the continent for this reason.
Isabel's ability to build merest shreds of suggestion into an
"immense staring marvel" are not at variance with this view of
women. Aunt Dorothea's fond romanticizing, the Misses Penniman's
penchant for gossip, the devious practices of Lucy's match-making
mother also fit the type. It is probably no accident that Lucy,
who becomes distinguished for practical sense in getting her way,
has the Scottish name Tartan, which suggests the source of this
strength. Mrs. Glendinning, who Pierre imagines will be a for-
midable foe in a court of l~w, has, as Melville made a point of
telling us, "a reserved strength and masculinessll in her character
(Pierre, p. 180).
Although IImotive," a kind of psychological fact, also comes
into question in Pierre, the central ambiguity which Melville con-
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structs by making a perverted use of the rules of evidence is a
physical fact (Isabel's pedLgrer.), In Moby-Dick, however, the
principle fact to be established is psychological: is the whale
guilty of intentional homicide and malice aforethought. Since
the whale is a dumb brute he can offer no testimony at all. Thus
no direct evidence of the main fact is possible. Only indirect,
or circumstantial, evidence can be brought to bear. Even so,
Melville apparently took care that all the evidence he presents
for the case against the whale is in one way or the other deemed
unreliable or inadmissible by "the cold courts of justice".
At times Melville conducts the narration of Moby-Dick as
though he would have us believe that Ishmael were a lawyer rather
than a schoolmaster. In such chapters as "The Affidavit" or
"Moby-Dick," for example, in "Fast Fish and Loose Fish" or "Heads
or Tails," in liTheAdvocate" or "Ambergris," in "The Decanter" or
"A Bower in the Arsacides," as well as many others, the narrator
presents his material as though he were unfolding a brief at the
bar. Even so, all of the evidence offered is circumstantial, in-
conclusive, or downright unreliable.
Let us first consider Ishmael as a witness. So far as his per-
sonal experience goes he is competent to testify to most matters
in the book. However, he is not a competent witness concerning
the principle fact to be established, the whale's malice. because
he is an interested party by virtue of his pact with Ahab. He is
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an accrillplicein the vindictive hunt. He may testify against him-
se'.L and Ahab t as to the captain's madness or whatever incriminat-
ing actions may be attributed to the crew of the Peguod, but what-
ever he says for himself or the others and against the whale must
be taken as unreliable testimony. Ishmael admits that he had
become afflicted with Ahab's "quenchless feud" (Moby-Dick, p. 155).
Starbuck too is overheard to say that for the men of the hunt "the
whale is their demogorgon" (Moby-Dick, p. 148). Obviously, Ishmael's
eye-witness account had to be flavored by his sympathetic involve-
ment as a participant.
Ishmael is not merely an eye-witness, however. It has been
noticed frequently that the narrative voice changes, or splits, after
the book has begun. Most critics have judged the incompleteness of
the change an artisitic flaw; without, however, contradicting the
aesthetic judgment of such commentators, some glimpse of Melville's
purposes might be afforded here. After the revisions he began in
the fall of 1850, he appeared to be putting the whale and Ahab on
trial. The narrator assumes an attorney-like air in prosecuting his
case, but also becomes a series of "expert" witnesses, a geologist,
a cetologist, an archeaologist, a professor of whale anatomy, a
phrenologist, and so forth, as the subject demands. In the role
of the geologist, he is even careful to present his credentials to
the "court". In the chapter "A Bower in the Arsacides" he becomes
the judge, questioning himself viva voce for his competency before
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allow'/_ngtestimony to proceed (Moby-Dick, p. 373). In liThe
ly "Surmisesft) and the whale's normal docility, domestic life, and
A~vocate," "The Affidavit," "Moby-Dick," and others in which the
case against the whale is offered, Ishmael acts as the prosecuting
attorney. In the sections which present Ahab's monomania (especial-
ordinary good nature, he appears to switch sides and play counsel
for defense. Thus "Ishmael" plays not just a dual, but a multiple
role in as many poses as Melville's trying of the case requires.
In addition to all these Eshmae L's there is still the authorial
The question then arises here as to how original is the
intrusion which presents soliloquies by Ahab, Starbuck, Stubb, Pip,
and Flask, besides certain transactions in the cabin which it is
not reasonable to assume that Ishmael could have overheard.
evidence which Melville offers in Moby-Dick. Because of the
nature of any book as a written instrument per se, whatever is
written in it is the author's testimony. Melville offered his
oath as to the veracity of Typee and Omoo, plus the affidavit
of a corroborating witness. He was at pains to disclaim strict
adherence to the truth in Mardi, and then concerned himself little
with public controversy over the validity of his experience in
10Redburn or White-Jacket. But Melville, or the Ishmael-narrator of
10Jay Leyda, The Melville Log: A Documentary Life of Herman
Melville, 1819-1891 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951), I, 214, 221,
226, and 233.
131:1
this particular chapter "The Affidavit," takes care to present hf.s
testimony in quasi-legal form and to distinguish the tv·,:itf"".$in
his account which are of personal observation (Moby-Dick, pp. 175-
76). That Melville was aware he could offer only two pieces on
his personal recognizance and felt called upon to say so indicates
that he was conscious that the rest of the information in the
chapter is hearsay, or unoriginal, evidence, and, as such, to be
taken as unreliable. The self-interrogation in "A Bower in the
Arsacides" is another demonstration of Melville's knowledge of
the important difference between first-hand and second-hand
information.
Ishmael is competent to testify to every matter of which he
has first-hand knowledge, except the fact of the whale's malice.
Whatever he offers as either protagonist or omniscient narrator
which comes from the experience of others, whatever he offers
by way of surmises, whatever is presented that Ishmael could not
reasonably have seen or heard himself, whatever he reports about
real evidence (such as paintings and artifacts) is not by definition
reliable or in some cases even admissible testimony.
There is other indication, besides the problem of Ishmael as
a witness, that Melville kept in mind the rules of evidence while
composing Moby-Dick. The first inkling that Ishmael receives of
the feud between Ahab and the whale is in his conversation with
Captain Peleg prior to signing aboard the Pequod. The confronta-
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tion involves a dual cross-examination between Peleg and Ishmael.
The former questions Ishmael on his whaling experience and will not
allow Ishmael to assert that he knows about whaling simply because
he has been in the merchant marine. Ishmael returns the point,
chiding Peleg for his surprise that the inexperienced sailor does
not know about the fierceness of the white whale:
"What you say is no doubt true enough, sir:
but how could I know there was any peculiar ferocity
in that particular whale, though indeed I might have
inferred as much from the simple fact of the
accident. "
"Look ye now, young man, thy lungs are a sort
of soft, d'ye see; thou dost not talk shark a bit.
Sure, ye've been to sea before now; sure of that?"
(Moby-Dick, pp. 69-70)
The next bit of evidence concerning the nature of the voyage
The entire interview between Ishmael and Peleg emphasizes the
important difference between first-hand and second-hand information.
on which he is about to embark comes by way of the mad Elijah. All
of Elijah's "knowledge" is mystical. He knows nothing by experience,
and, because he is of unsound mind, his testimony is worthless
anyway. Ishmael himself declares Elijah's ravings are just so
the book must be discredited for the same reason. The prophecies
much humbug. Whatever is offered by other mad persons throughout
of the insane Gabriel are discounted on the spot by the narrator
as being hut generalizations come true only because of the common-
ness of the predicted accidents in the whale fishery.
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Testimony offered by infidel~ and pagans is equally unaccept-
able because it comes from irreligious persons. Those who are
fireworsh~ppers might be said to believe in a god, yet that god
(the Satanic) is the greatest liar of all and gives no sanction
to veracity when it is not to his purposes. Queequeg's religion
is questioned by Peleg and Bildad when it come time for the savage
to bind himself under oath to the ship's articles. Ishmael jollies
the captains out of their scruples; but in giving more elaborate
consideration to the Polynesian's island religion, he takes care to
point out the peculiarly casual and fearless relationship the
cannibal has with his idol. Whatever any of these infidels has
to testify is not creditable information.
The chapter "Moby Dick" has been analyzed as Melville's ex-
ploration of the process of myth-making, and indeed it is an
exercise in reviewing the sources of credibility. He asserts
that men have been known to credit many strange ideas about the
whale. Looking into Bentham's discussion of the problems of
credibility, a section titled "Of Improbability and Impossibility"
(Bentham, Judicial Evidence, III, 258-384), one finds the forms
of improbable information used by Melville.
Bentham theorized that the foundation of all knowledge was
experience. Likewise our belief in something which we have not
experienced is conditioned upon what experience we do have (to
which we can compare the new fact) and also upon our powers of
142
faith. What one man thinks impossible, another may credit. He
gives several examples of foreign travelers finding that even !dghly
educated persons of a warm climate would not believe that water
may be.turned into a hard, brittle substance we call Ice. Yet,
they had never seen. Melville remarks upon this idea in Pierre
having a simple faith in flying carpets or similar witchcraft
which could counteract the power of gravity, other men found no
difficulty at all in believing in the great ascension balloons
in explaining how it was that his hero could not comprehend the
meaning of Plotinus Plin1immon's pamphlet upon the first reading:
If a man be told a thing wholly new, then---during the
time of its first announcement to him---it is entirely
impossible for him to comprehend it. For---absurd as
it may seem---men are only made to comprehend things
which they comprehended before. • .
(Pierre, p. 209)
Thus, what a man believes or does not believe, comprehends or does
not comprehend, depends upon his previous experience. Melville
explains in "Moby Dick" and "The Affidavit" how lands men or
even sailors not acquainted with the whale fishery are incredulous
of the prodigious size and fierceness of the animal and will not
credit the reports of those who have first-hand knowledge. Bentham
also asserted that one can never declare any fact to be impossibleJ
but only highly improbable enough not to warrant credit. The
degree of probability one assigns to a particular fact may also
be a function of his willingness to credit marvels or from p~r-
1/3
~6nal interest to credit that particular fact. Bentham warned
that the danger men face in this matter of belief is twofold: one
may discredit true facts (such as ice) merely from ignorance o~
lack of experiencet or one may be too willing to credit false facts
out of a susceptible disposition to believe or out of wishful think-
ing. Melville's essay on "Faith and Knowledge" in Mard!. plays
with the problems of credibility in a similar fashion, and of
course the whole career of Pierre is a demonstration of what fools
men can be about believing improhable things. If a judge is to
err, it is better that he err on the side of skepticism than
gullibility, and the chances of his making such error in the first
place are reduced if he follows some of the simple rules of
evidence as developed by legal science.
In "Moby Dick" Melville tells us that some men believe the
whale to be ubiquitous. This notion falls into a class of facts
which Bentham says are not impossible, yet are to be regarded as so
highly improbable as not to he credited because they are against
all the known laws of nature. But Bentham is careful to add that
mankind has not yet nor may never attain to complete, perfect
knowledge of the laws of nature. Such facts, therfore, must be
rejected as improbable, but not utterly impossible. The same
applies to immortality, and Bentham sarcastically alludeE to
Christianity as a modern faith which, in at least one instance,
assented to the notions of both ubiquity and immortality in a
man.
•
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Bentham also discusses the report of exaggerated size or
unusual characteristics in one of a species '. In know..spec...I.es
man has an experience of the range of size one might expect to
find (Bentham, Judicial Evidence, III, 299-301 and 310). One
could sooner give assent to prodigious size or bizarre character-
istics in an unknown sort of animal (if one accepts the existence
of such an animal at all) than to such gross deviation in a kind
with which one has fairly Common experience. One might give
assent to a 30 foot unicorn, for example, more readily than to
a 30 foot rabbit. Melville warns the reader against accepting the
doubts of whalemen as to the enormous size and intelligent ferocity
of the sperm whale, if they are not experienced in hunting this
particular species, but have chased only the right whale or some
lesser variety.
Bentham is known for one other peculiarity in his theories
about the problems of credibility which are rejected wholesale by
other legal philosophers probably for the reason that it tended
to undermine faith in rational judication. Bentham suggested that
men cannot fix the point at which credibility begins and ends,
that the point of'decision is lost in the shadows of a gradual
transition (Bentham, Judicial Evidence, III, 296-97 and I, 74).
Melville frequently uses twilight or shadowy gray imagery when
creating an atmosphere of doubt, distrust, or ambiguity; long
passages of "Benito Cereno," the opening pages, for example, is
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one such instance. In Billy Budd he compares the problem to
t~latof analyzing our perceptions about the rainbow. We know
one side is orange and the other violet, but we cannot distinguish
11
just where one becomes the other.
Bentham gives two simple examples of when this aspect of
our perception creates a problem of credibility. He says that one
might agree that a man could be eight feet tall; but then if eight
feet, why not eight feet, one inch; and if eight feet one inch,
why not eight feet, two inches; etc.? No one knows where assent
might stop if conducted in this fashion. Moreover, for each man,
the critical point might fallout a little differently depending
upon his own disposition to credit great height in a man or to
resist crediting it. Again, the same might be true of age. If
one credits the fact that a man lived to be 149 years old, why
not believe 150; if 150, why not 151, etc., and who knows where
one would be willing to draw the line. Bentham leaves the question
a mystery which he says every judge must solve for himself when
the time comes; yet in doing so, the judge may be guilty of some
irrational decision arising out of his mood or particular sensi-
.bilities. The problem remains when one is dealing with more
subtle qualities or quantities than inches or years. Having
11Herman Melville, Billy Budd, Sailor (An Inside Narrative),
ed. Harrison Hayford and Merton Sealts, Jr. (Chicago and London:
The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 102.
1
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presented his reader with other instances of cunning, size, malignity,
dnd ferocity of the sperm whale, Melville then invites him to believe
in Moby Dick, who is just a little bit larger, a bit more ferocious,
a bit more intelligent, and perhaps a bit more malicious than any
other whale, being, as Captain Peleg would have it, "the monstrousest
parmacetty that ever chipped a boat" (Moby-Dick, p. 69). There is
in fact no reason why he should not if he believes the other stories.
One real problem with which the reader is confronted is where to
mark the point at which natural ferocity and instinctive self-
preservation become so terrific as to constitute the kind of excess
one might be justified in calling malice, or demonism. The decision,
if Bentham is correct, may have to be essentially irrational.
Seen in these terms, parts of Moby-Dick are an essay, or
"philosophical novel" about the problem of belief, utilizing the
grounds of ultimate uncertainty suggested by legal thinkers on the
subject, especially Bentham. Belief in the truth or falsehood of
a fact, as we shall see in "Benito Cereno" and as we have seen in
Pierre, is a matter of personal liability to giving assent, since
nothing may be said to be impossible, but merely more or less
probable. Since in many types of problems in credibility no point
of decision may be rationally fixed, Bentham's ideas tended to
make mockery out of the cherished judicial convention, that in
cases where proof is not conclusive, especially in cases woven
purely out of presumptive circumstantial evidence, the jury and the
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court mus~ deliver its verdict beyond ~ reasonable doubt. Faith,
bplief, doubt, in Bentham's opinion were not rational, or reasonable,
operations of the mind.
At the end of the chapter "Mohy Dick" Ishmael laments that
to explain just how it was that the crew so "aboundingly responded"
to the old man's ire, so that "his hate seemed almost theirs" would
be to dive deeper than Ishmael can go" (Mohy-Dick, p. 162). Belief
is inexplicable, and as all knowledge is but hearty belief, there
is no teacher but experience to help men separate truth from false-
hood.
The notion that knowledge, especially of the ideal, has its
source in the irrational operations of the mind did not originate
with Bentham. Philosophers such as Origen and the neop1atonist
P10tinus had pointed out the mystical element in Plato's theories
of the way the mind apprehends the "forms". Since Melville named
the author of the pamphlet in Pierre Plotinus Plinlimmon, one
might be justified in assuming that he was aware of this philo-
sophers theories and perceived that they were what moderns would
call transcendental. His practical methodology on the subject
though was far more likely to have come from the widely read and
contemporary Bentham than from tediOUS, metaphysical, latin essays.
In "Benito Cereno" Melville systematically employs the method
of presenting Delano with presumptive, but not conclusive, circum-
stantial evidence. All of the proofs the captain receives are
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original, being either real or the testimony of persons present
and able to be cross-exa~:ned dnd observed while delivering their
story. Of course, all the witnesses are lying, either from ul-
terior motive or coercion; they construct what Bentham would call
a highly improbable, but not impossible, situation. Delano's positi-
tion resembles the situation to which every court is liable in
its attempt to establish the truth. Even employing acceptable
precautions, such as cross-examination and attempts to get corro-
borative testimony, Delano fails to see the real situation, until
he is told the truth by Don Benito himself, and even then his
good nature remains incredulous.
Delano's benevolence makes him predisposed to find innocent
alternatives to every piece of circumstantial evidence that comes
under his nose. At first mere lack of suspicion prompts him to
adopt pleasant explanations for each equivocal fact. As matters
progress and the weight of so many of these details begins to
accumulate, he is forced more and smore to fall back upon his
good nature to supply the benefit of the doubt. The trouble is,
Delano's temperament makes him more liable to believe good than
bad.
As Bentham suggested, nothing is impossible, only more or
less probable to man as his experience or his disposition dictates.
Delano refuses to credit stories of ships lured to destruction by
pirates affecting distress (although the suggestion deepens his
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apprehension). So much more then he finds it an "incredible
inference that every soul on board ••• was a carefully dri~led
recruit in the plot."12 Delano is correct in finding this in-
ference so highly improbable as not to be credited, but far from
being impossible, this explanation, as the reader learns, was
the most nearly correct.
At another time the crashing of the hatchets, the knelling
of the ship's bell, the environment of the cabin, all seem por-
tents of evil to Delano, but then some cheering incident of more
than equal sway with his good nature, such as the beautiful
breezes, the arrival of his familiar longboat, his compassion
for Don Benito's suffering or admiration for Babo's apparent
devotedness, move him to dismiss such forbodings. Melville implies
that it is Delano's charity which causes him to retain his con-
fidence in Benito Cereno.
The reason behind the demand for original and the rejection
of hearsay, according to nineteenth century treatises on evidence,
is not simply the sanctioning power of an oath or the element of
personal responsibility in giving testimony. The best evidence
will come from a witness who is actually present, because he can
then be cross-examined and the jury can observe his deportment in
12Herman Melville, "Benito Cereno," The Piazza Tales, in The
Works of Herman Melville; Standard Edition:-X (New York: Russell &
Russell, Inc., 1963), p. 99; subsequent refernces to this edition
appear in the text.
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giving testimony (Best, pp. 107 and 373). For this reason, de-
positions under oath are a~ceptable only if the witness cannot be
present, but not acceptable if the witness can be called into
court to make his declarations in person. Similarly, the testimony
given at a previous trial is acceptable, but not worth as much as
if the witness were called in to a new trial (Best, p. 373). The
deportment of the witness could have furnished an important source
of evidence for Delano if only his good nature had permitted him
to read the signs correctly. As it is he can only find illness,
lunacy, or 'wicked imposture (to him incredible) as explanations
("Benito Cereno," p. 92. Don Benito's furtiveness, nervousness,
or alteration of good and bad manners furnished the clues as to
the falseness of his testimony. Delano dismisses this as the
result of his foreignness or illness. Likewise the sneaky aspect
of the "whiskerando" sailor he attribute to sheepishness at being
caught not paying strict attention to duty ("Benito Cereno," pp.
104-105). Babo's devotion to being near the Spaniard is explained
as the act of a faithful servant. Melville supplies Delano and
the reader with plenty of incongruous deportment he could make
use of if he were able to sustain suspicion.
At a certain point in the story Delano pauses to adu up un-
explained incidents. Two of these argue the Spaniard's absolute
control of the ship: his demand for an apology from the enormous
Atufal, and the cringing submission of all in the ship. Two
lJl
suggest that the Spaniard has no control at all: the affair of tr.e
Spanish lad assailed with a knife, and the trampling of the ~ailor
by two negroes. Rightly these seem contradictory to Delano, who,
had he been as familiar with the rules of evidence as Melville
appears to have been, should never have dismissed the discrepancy
without getting to the bottom of the matter. Once again Captain
Delano's good nature intrudes; he concludes that the captain is the
most capricious he has ever seen, but he excuses him in the light
of his prejudiced notion that Spaniards all seem odd and "Guy-
Fawkish" to him, but are probably "as good as any folks in Duxbury,
13Massachusetts," just the same. His familiar longboat arrives
and puts an end to his reverie by its heartening appearance.
When Delano seeks corroborative testimony from the sailors
he must interview them while they are surrounded by the blacks.
The sailors, fearing for their lives, and Delano's as well, can
make no reply except those rehearsed in Babo's supervision. Their
deportment, as noted, is important eVidence for Delano, but he
manages to explain this too in terms of pleasant alternatives.
13"Benito Cereno ;" p , 113; the contradictions outlined above
are also in Delano's account of the incident; it is Delano's
motive for dismissing them which is the subject of Melville's
elaborations; for further comparison of Melville's story with
its source, see David D. Galloway, "Herman Melville's Benito
Cereno: An Anatomy," Texas Studies in Language and Literature,
9 (Summer 1967), 239-52.
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He finally gets to cross-examine Benito Cereno on some of the
de cad.Ls of his voyage. The Spaniard contradicts himself on the
subject of the gales off Cape Horn; but before Delano can properly
follow up this brief intelligence, Babo intervenes with the shaving
ritual, thus forcing the Spanish captain to resume testimony with
a razor at his throat. Don Benito does not permit Delano to
cross-examine him really, but continues by rehearsing his story
once more and making mere repetitions, some less qualified than
before. Thus Delano's unskillful attempt at cross-examination is
easily thwarted by Babo.
Melville changed the name of Delano's ship from the Persever-
ance, which it is called in Delano's Voyages, to Bachelor's
Delight. Since one of the meanings of "bachelor" in 1856 (NED)
was novice or apprentice, specifically with reference to the bachelor
of law degree handed out to the new graduates of the inns, the new
name of the ship is obviously a token of Delano's naivete and
pleasant, optimistic disposition. Both of these elements in the
American's character are critical factors in determining the course
of his judgments throughout the story.
At the end of the account in the Voyages, Captain Delano
attached various documents from the legal proceedings in Lima
which investigated for him the affair of the slave revolt. He
includes these papers partly in the interest of demonstrating the
truth of his account. Melville also ends his version of Don
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Benito's story by appending depositions from the trial of Babo
p.ildhis cohorts. He does so, however, with a view to contrasting
the true events with the appearances the events had for Delano.
Among the alterations Melville makes in the documents as found
originally in Delano's book, it is significant that many are made
with no other purpose in mind than to bring the testimony into
conformity with the English rules of evidence. In such fashion
Melville once more displays knowledge of these rules. A few of
the modifications he made are noted below.
First, the Spanish court in Delano's version did not question
the veracity of Don Benito's account for any reason. Melville, on
the other hand, says that the court at~first rejected Don Benito's
story tlfor natural and learned reasons" ("Benito Cereno," p. 149).
The Spaniard's probity, according to Melville, was doubted on the
grounds that illness might have affected his mental competency. The
court concluded that he had thus "raved of some things which could
never have happened" ("Benito Cereno," p. 149). On the strength
of corroborative testimony, the tribunal finally gave credence to
Don Benito's statements. Thus even the court decided some things
impossible which were only highly improbable and which were never-
theless true.
Second, the Spanish deposition, as tendered by Delano, contains
only one instance in which a reported "fact" was verified by the
phrase "and that this was known, because the negroes ha.ve said
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it,,14 In contrast, Melville uses this verification five times
~ltogether, with one wording or another, so that every detail of
the story presented in the deposition is given as good evidence.
Other small changes in the text of the deposition bear out the
Furthermore, in "Benito Cereno" the original phrase is expanded
to read" that this is known and believed (italics mine), because
the negroes have said itu (Benito Cereno," p. 162-63).
notion that Melville was carefully regarding the rules of evidence
in rewriting Delanots material. The Spanish version of the state-
ment reads at one point, "two negroes went down to the birth [sic J
of Don Alexandra, and stabbed him in his bed; ••• 11 (Delano, p. 336).
Melville deletes the second detail, rendering the line, "those two --
went down with hatchets to the berth of Don Alexandra; that yet
h If I" t 11 (liB lt C 170)a a l.ve.•• e c. ern,0 ereno, p , . No one saw these
men injure Don Alexandro in his berth, so Melville omits this
assertion from the testimony. According to English rules of evi-
dence, testimony as to what was done in the cabin would be mere
speculation and as such, unacceptable in courts of law.
Finally, Melville adds to the account Benito Cereno's aversion
to the sight of his former tormentor, Babo. The Spanish captain
14Amasa Delano, A Narrative of Voyages and Travels in the
Northern and Southern Hemispheres •••• (Boston: Amasa Delano,
1817), p .340.
could not even be made to look at the culprit, and true to his
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careful design of correct and incorrect presentation of evidence;
Melville is quick to add that Babo's legal identity, therefo~e,
rested upon the testimony of the sailors alone ("Benito Cereno ;"
p. 170).
At the end of the story the two captains discuss what has
happened. Melville adds another dimension to the irony of his
story by reminding the reader that it was in fact fortunate that
Captain Delano did not apprehend the truth any sooner than he
did. Further, Don Benito comforts him saying that the best of
men would have made the same mistake. He is, of course, precisely
right, for, as we have seen, all of Delano's misjudgments were due
to his benevolent disposition, the fond charity of his heart.
Contemporary as well as modern critics of this story have
speculated about Melville's reasons for appending the deposition
to the end of the story. Some have felt that he actually projected
a longer work, but wanted some guarantee of a publisher before
he went ahead with his plans. It seems equally valid, however,
to assume that Melville was making yet another comparison, like
the one to be found implicitly in Pierre, between what takes effect
in lithewarm halls of the heart" and the oaths and holy writ proofs
demanded by the dull head in lithe cold courts of justicett•
The above explication of tlBenito Cereno" concludes the study
of the general influence of the science of evidence upon Melville's
resources for exploring the epistemology of ambiguity. In the
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next chapter, "Murder, Malice, and Moby-Dick,1I the particular
problem of "psychological fact" will be exami.ned in a "~nte'Y'_
of legal proofs and some contemporary murder trials in which
Melville's father-in-law, Judge Shaw, became publicly, sensationally,
(one might stop just short of notoriously) involved.
Chapter IV
Murder, Malice, and Mobl-Dick
The influence of legal science upon the craft of Helville's
prose is not limited to his used of the rules of evidence to con-
trive ambiguities in Moby-Dick or to dramatize devilish tricks
upon credulity in Pierre and "Benito Cereno", It is also likely
that some of his interest in the difficulty of establishing a
"psychological truth," specifically malice, from the evidence of
undoubted deeds stems from the jurist's preoccupation with this
problem in homicide cases. As Judge Lemuel Shaw himself wrote:
"crimes. • . consist not merely in an act done, but in the motive
secret of the heart, which can only be directly known to the
Searcher of all hearts. • 1 Shaw believed that such secret
motives might be inferred safely from a man's conduct and external
acts, but Melville appears to have disagreed. The son-in-law of
the judge wrote stories in which appearances, and external mani-
festations on the whole, represented ambiguously at best the
springs of conscience.
Between 1843 and 1855 several important and well-publicized
1George Bemis, Report of the Case of John W. Webster (Boston:
Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1850)-,-pp:-466-67; cf. 462.
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murder trial came before Chief Justice Shaw as he presided over the
Sv~reme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. In a number of these
cases, perhaps due to the sentimentality of the times, the issue
most debated was whether the defendant had done the killing with
malice aforethought. Some members of the legal profession, in-
cluding Melville's acquaintance, Richard Henry Dana, Jr., contended
that by no trick of logic could one deduce a moral or psychological
truth (malice) from a physical truth (the fact of the deed itself).
In the most notorious murder case to come before the Shaw Court,
the Webster-Parkman trial of 1850, the entire reliability of circum-
stantial evidence was brought into doubt.
Melville raised the question of whether malice lay behind
acts of homicide and violence in Mardi, Moby-Dick, and Billy Budd.
In Pierre and "Benito Cereno" he dramatized the problems of trying
to deduce moral truths from physical facts. If Melville's interest
in these problems is examined in the light of contemporary homicide
cases, it becomes increasingly eVident that the "philosophical
novelist" focused upon many of the same issues debated in his day
by jurists.
In this chapter, therefore, four capital cases,.antiques of
legal history, are brought down off the shelf and dusted off for
study as possible sources and influences upon Melville's work. The
first of these is the case of Abner Rogers (1843), which raised a
question about the relationship between monomania and criminal
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responsibility. The case is important Lv Melville scholarship be-
cause it suggests a source for concepts of insanity in Moby-Dick,
Bartleby, and Billy Budj_. Second is the Peter York case (1844),
which introduced into Am~rican courts the epistemological problem
involved in'trying to deduce malice from appearances. Third, the
Hawkins case (1855) is mentioned briefly as an epilogue on the
ultimate disposition of the issue by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court. Finally, the details, issues, and chronology of
the infamous Webster-Parkman case (1849-1850) are set against the
corresponding aspects of Moby-Dick.
The first of these murder trials to rouse public interest
2was that of the lunatic Abner Rogers. Rogers was an inmate of
the Massachusetts state prison when he killed the warden in full
sight of a half a dozen men, slitting his throat from ear to ear
with a curved knife used for leather work. Rogers was adjudged
a monomaniac in a jury trial before Judge Shaw, acquitted of the
2Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Mete. 500 (1844).
crime, and remanded to an asylum where he committed suicide a short
time later. Shortly after the trial, public opinion ran against
the IIleniency" of the verdict. To quiet the outcry, counsel for
defense, George Bemis, collaborated with Judge Shaw in producing
a careful account of the trial in explanation and justification
of its outcome. The book was Report of the Trial of Abner Rogers
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. . . (1844) •
In the Rogers case, the qu~stion before the court was not
whether the defendant h~d committed the deed, but whether he did so
with malice aforethought; for a homicide. to nineteenth century
jurists was not a murder unless it was done with malice. In
those days, however, the English Common Law, then in force in America,
directed the court to presume malice in the absence of any evidence
to the contrary, if an intentional homicide were proved. At this
point it may be noticed that this way of thinking about murder
bears significant resemblance to the question of guilt or innocence
debated in Mardi about Taji's role in the death of Aleema. The
question became one of the mainsprings of the plot. As we shall
see, however, the details of the homicide in Mardi correspond more
clearly to those of the York case than they do to those of Rogers'.
In defending Rogers, Bemis did not dispute the right of the
court to presume malice. Instead, his strategy was to try to rebut
the presumption by offering proof of insanity. He contended that
Rogersl~as what was known in those days as a paranoid monomaniac.
Rogers imagined that evil forces were at work against him; he thought
the warden was trying to kill him; and he felt justified, therefore,
in taking the warden's life. Bemis' case was hampered because
Rogers behavior prior to the murder was such that to untrained eyes
he had not appeared insane.
It is likely that Melville took notice of the Rogers case, not
Hi
only because he had known Shaw all his life and might naturally bp
expected to pay some attention to a sensational event in Shaw'~
career, but also because the Rogers case is a landmark in American
jurisprudence, one which would have figured in the conversation of
lawyers who filled Melville's social life. The case established
a controversial theory of insanity in American precedents because
Judge Shaw permitted Bemis to introduce theories of psychology
which were not yet accepted in other courts.
According to the theory of "partial insanity" generally
received as correct by British and American courts in 1843, a
man could be normal in every respect yet have delusions about one
particular subject. These monomaniacs appeared normal to any but
trained eyes, until an outbreak of violent or bizarre behavior
occurred. The mental aberration of a monomaniac appeared to be
"partial"; i.e., with reference to one subject only. The courts
therefore held that such persons were in general able to distinguish
right from wrong. Jurists reasoned that the evidence of the
monmaniac's daily life argued that he did in fact make judgments
many times each day founded upon that ability.
In a triumph.of logic the courts had concluded that delusions
alone about one particular subject could not exempt one from moral
responsibility. The McNaughten case, famous in early nineteenth
century British jurisprudence, had elaborated this notion into a
curious rule, as follows: the delusions a man suffered would not
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excuse him from criminal responsibility for his acts unless the
delusion offered the same legal excuse for an act that real circum-
stances would offer. The concept is best made clear hy example.
If a man suffered the delusion that another were making an attempt
upon his life, h~ would be excused for a homicide, because if the
other were really trying to kill him, he would be le,gally justified
in retaliating. If, on the other hand, he hallucinated that
another were slandering him, he would not be excused, since it is
not legally justifiable to kill another for taunts and slander
alone were they in fact occurring. Using this guideline the
courts conceded the deluSions of a monomaniac, but still regarded
him as a morally responsible agent.
The new theories which Bemis brought into the Rogers trial
claimed that monomaniacs were not "partially insane," but totally
insane, and hence the term was grossly misleading. The evidence
of the most advanced psychology known in Bemis' day suggested
that paranoid delusions, even if limited to one subject, are
manifestations of a generally disordered personality. The patient's
normal appearance is the result of the enormous effort he makes
to conceal the dLaordezed workings of his mind out of fear that
he will be caught and punished or thwarted in his plans to defend
himself. Sooner or later the illness, known then as monomania,
causes the sufferer to focus upon one subject toward which behavior
becomes uncontrollable.
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In most cases monomaniacs become obsessed with a single idea.
FApert witnesses at the Rogers trial insisted that patients suffer-
ing this kind of illness often cunningly conceal their disease,
(
making every effort to appear normal in order to bend all means
toward their one obssessive end.3 After a time they no longer
worry so much about being caught and punished, as being detected
and thwarted.
Melville dramatized this concept of monomania when he
created crazy Ahab. The mad captain gained command of the Pequod
by deceiving her owners into thinking he is sane. The idea emerges
again in Bartleby when he portrayed the strange clerk initially as
a good and dutiful employee. In Billy Budd Melville again toyed --
with the possibility that madness may be cloaked in respectability
and propriety by casting doubt upon the sanity of Vere and Claggart.
In the Rogers case Bemis argued another important insight of
modern psychology when he asked the court to consider that each
individual experiences a different level of provocation to certain
forbidden acts (Bemis, Rogers Report, pp. 158, 162, and 164-65).
The law might pass standards of justifiable provocation for a
healthy personality ("out of tenderness to human nature," as Judge
Shaw expressed it), but such standards were useless in reference to
3George Bemis and George Tyler Bigelow, Report of the Trial
of Abner Rogers, Jr •••• (Boston: Charles C. Little and James
Brown, 1844), p . 165.
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a dis?rdered personality in precarious balance. To Abner Rogers,
wl-.owas convinced that the warden had a design upon his life, the
slightest gesture or look could have suggested peril.
By these lights, Bemis contended, it was difficult to see
how the court could hold a monomaniac a morally responsible agent.
The fact of his delusions implied a totally disordered personality.
It was not safe or reasonable to assume that such a person had
the ability to distinguish right from wrong. Bemis asked the jury
to accept the idea that a monomaniac has an impaired control over
his will. Such a handicap would reduce his moral accountability
as a voluntary agent. Finally, Bemis argued, legal standards of
justifiable provocation could not apply to a morbid temperament
which was prone to detect malicious agencies working against him
where none in fact existed. Thus Ahab believed himself provoked to
murderous vengeance by the white whale that took off his leg, though
it remains a moot point whether the whale acted with malice.
The characteristics and moral implications of "monomania"
which Bemis introduced in the Rogers case bear many resemblances
to those generated by Melville when he created the mad Captain Ahab.
Rogers' symptoms were described by a series of witnesses
produced by Bemis. Relatives testified he used to walk his chambers
every night after everyone had gone to bed, sometimes walking the
floor all night. The next day he would be dull or at other times
(
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wild and pale, complaining of pains in his head. A psychiatrist,
the eminent Dr. Isaac Ray, test~£ied that this sleeplessness was
one of the major symptoms of monomania (Bemis, Rogers Report, pp.
162-66)." Cel1mates complained that they lost sleep because of
Rogers' restlessness, pacing in his cell and making wild outcries.
Ahab's pacing all night is the cause of his quarrel with Stubb, who
4twenty four. Ahab walks the ship from "taffrail to mainmast" until
remarks that the old man is not in his berth three hours out of
the incessant noise brings Stubb from below (Moby-Dick. p. 112).
Further on in the novel, Ishmael reports that the captain would
suddenly burst from his cabin with staring eyes and a wild yell
(Moby-Dick. p. 174).
In opening his charge to the jury in the Rogers case, Shaw
The conduct may be in many respects regular, the mind
acute, and the conduct apparently governed by rules
of propriety, and at the same time there may be insane
delusion by which the mind is perverted. The most
common of these is that of monomania, when the mind
broods over one idea and cannot be reasoned out of
it. (Bemis,-aQgers ReEort, pp. 64-66)
gave the following description of monomania:
sions of the insane are frequently concealed (Bemis, Rogers Report,
Dr. Isaac Ray, controversial psychologist, testified that the delu-
pp. 162-66). Bemis presented cases and anecdotes of monomaniacs
4Herman Melville, Moby-Dick: An Authoritative Text, ed.
Harrison Hayford and Hershel Parker (New York: W. W. Norton and
Company, Inc., 1967), p. 112.
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who had convinced bench and bar of their total sanity until the
prosecution wa~ given th~ key ~o their particular madness (Bemis,
Rogers Report, pp. 64-66). Ahab was able to convince the two
hard-headed ship owners, Bildad and Peleg of his sanity and compe-
-tency, when really, "Ahab in his hidden self raved on" (Moby-Dick,
p. 161). Peleg does tell Ishmael, however, that he knows Ahab
has been "desparate moody, and savage" since the whale took off his
leg (Moby-Dick,p. 77). Bemis won a precedent in the Rogers case by
establishing the fact that the delusions of a monomaniac were not
only concealed, but overwhelming and will-destroying. Rogers was
not a responsible moral agent, because he was "pushed by a will
foreign to his own, and which he could not resist" (Bemis, Rogers
Report, pp. 197, 165, and 205). Chief Justice Shaw, in Bemis'
version of his charge to the jury, repeated the advice asking them
to decide the following: "whether the prisoner in committing the
homicide acted from irresistible and uncontrollable impulse; if so,
then the act was not the act of a voluntary agent, but the involun-
tary act of the body without the concurrence of the mind directing it"
(Bemis, Rogers Report, p. 278). Question as to Ahab's moral re-
sponsibility intrudes again and again upon the narrative of Moby-
Dick. Melville tells the reader that Ahab no longer had control of
his madness or his actions:
this Ahab that had gone to his hammock, was not the
agent that so caused him to burst from it in horror
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again. The latter was the eternal living principle
or soul in him; and in sleep, being for the time
dissociated from the characterizing mind, ... it
spontaneously sought escape from the scorching con-
tiguity of the frantic thing, of which, for the time,
it was no longer an integral. (Moby-Dick, p. l75)
Obviously Shaw's summary cited above is a trifle incomplete. It is
somewhat absurd to conceive of an act as being merely of the body.
Melville, suggestively referring to the possibility that Ahab is
possessed, merely alludes to whatever intelligence is driving Ahab's
body as "the frantic thingtt. Yet if the explanation is taken in its
whole context, the "frantic thing" seems to be "the characterizing
mind". In this way the idea of possession by an external agent
Melville's psychology of how a monomaniac operates is
is undercut by the notion that the thing is merely Ahab's diseased
mind. In any case, Melville used the idea that the body was some-
how acting in a way divorced from the morally culpable part of man,
in Shaw's terminology, "the mind," and in Melville's, "the soul".
identical to that presented by Bemis at the Rogers trial. At one
point the narrator of Moby-Dick explains:
Ahab in his hidden self raved on. Human madness
is often a cunning and most feline thing. When you
think it fled, it may still have become transfigured
into some still subtler form. • . . Now in his heart
Ahab had some glimpse of this, namely: all my meanS are
sane, my motive and my object mad. Yet without power
to kill, or change, or shun the fact; he likewise knew
that to mankind he did long dissemble; in some sort did
still. But that thing of his dissembling was only sub-
ject to his perceptibility, not to his will determin-
ate. Nevertheless, so well did he succeed in that
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dissembling, that when with ivory ~~g he stepped
ashore at last, no Nan tucket.eev thought him other-
wise than but naturally grieved, and that to the
quick, with the terrible t~agedy which had over-
taken him. (Mob>:-Dick, p. 161)
Thus Melville uses Bemis' idea that whatever a monomaniac does
The Rogers case became a precedent in American law. It was
which appears normal is done only to dissemble, that in reality~
every thought, every action taken by an obsessed person is bent
toward his one goal.
cited by every subsequent prosecutor or defense counsel in cases
dealing with a plea of insanity. In America it eventually super-
seded the McNaughten rule~ which treated people with paranoid
delusions as though their will were not impaired nor their moral
sense distorted. After the Rogers case many American courts
dropped the notion of "partial insanityll on the grounds that it
was misleading and untrue.
The evidence of Moby-Dick confirms the idea that Melville
responsible for whatever malice lay behind his persecution of the
accepted, or at least was aware of~ the concept of "monomaniall as
fashioned in the precedent-setting case of Abner Rogers. It is
interesting to note that by these legal standards~ Ahab was not
whale and the destruction of the Pequod. The issue adds weight to
the possibility that Melville saw malice as a force in the universe
independent of human responsibility for its existence.
Not accounted for by the Rogers case is the connnentwhich
169
Melville makes about Ahab's madness. He wrote that it was "his
torn body and gashed soul" bleeding into one another th:.;_ha~ made
him mad (Moby-Dick, p. 160). Melville recognized that the psyche
may be traumatized and that the experience may allow one to trans-
cend the realm of earthly values and orderings. Pip, Gabriel, and
Elijah were crushed and crippled beings whose bodies became houses
of divine wisdom. Melville concludes: "So man's insanity is
heavents sense; and wandering from all mortal reason, man comes
at last to that celestial thought, which, to reason, is absurd
and frantiC; and weal or woe, feels then uncompromised, indifferent
as his God" (Moby-Dick, p. 347). Ordinary earthly existence is
a series of compromises and comfortable adjustments made by reason- -
ableness. Absolute justice or absolute truth may wreak cataclysmic
disasters of the magnitude one usually attributes to "an act of
God," as the insurance companies call it. Insanity releases men
from temporal contingency and its necessary concomitants of reason-
ableness and common sense. If one is carried down to wonderous
depths like the little cabin boy,5 or delivered up to Demogorgon
5Boston Daily Transcript, November 19, 1850: on the front page
is an article puffing Forbes' Journal of Psychological Medicine for
October, 1850. The note discusses the pathology of insanity. Illus-
trating the argument is an anecdote of a shipwrecked emigrant in the
straits of Dover who was traumatized into raving insanity by one
night and one day in the water.
-
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in a whale, one is brought face to face with the Absolute and is
forever changed. It is not their insanity per 2!:. which makes ?ip
and Captain Ahab equals, but the fact that they have both passed
over into a different state of being from that shared by most
mortals, one for weal and the other for woe. Melville seems to
be saying that Ahab's great injury and Pip's great fright were
enough to destroy a part of their mortal being and to dissolve
their allegiance to this earthly state of existence. Naturally
then their moral sense was abrogated by an order of things alien
to worldly ways, causing Ahab to set aside his duties as captain
of the whaling vessel and Pip to disregard all further protocol
in his behavior on board the ship.
Although the Rogers case offers a possible source for Melville's
conception of Ahab's disease, it als~ raised questions about the
relationship between the world of the "undoubted deed" to the inner
world of the mind, between the world as a reasonable and prudent man
sees it and the vision of reality available to a diseased or abnormal
mentality. Bemis asked the court to assign a relative value to the
term "fact" as meaning one thing to the normal mind and another thing
to the abnormal mind.
Tbe second controversial trial of interest to students of Mel-
ville's work is that of rough and tumble Peter York, indicted for
the murder of another waterfront character in a scuffle over a woman.
The stabbing occurred in full view of a crowd which had gathered to
1j 1
watch. The trial would have resulted in another routine convfct toa
had the defense counsel not been the young Richard Henry Dana. Jr.,
who had the zeal and audacity to challenge Shaw's interpretation of
the law of implied malice. The jury had returned a verdict of guilty
after listening to Judge Shaw's directions that in any case in which
an intentional homicide is proved the court must presume malice if
there is no evidence to the contrary. Dana argued that though many
witnesses had seen York stab his opponent, none could know whether
York actually had malice in his heart. Therefore~ Dana asserted,
Shaw had erred in directing the jury to presume malice if they felt
that the homicide itself had been proved. The letter Dana sent Shaw
advising him of his intention to appeal the case on these grounds is
still in the Shaw papers at the Harvard College Library.
It would appear that Melville introduced a similar problem
into Mardi (Taji stabbed the priest Aleema over the woman Yillah
and then pondered his motives for the act, wondering whether he had
committed murder.) The plot mechanism may have had its source in the
York case, which had provided the first, and at the time, the only
instance in which Dana had had a confrontation with Shaw. Biographi-
cal evidence would.support such an idea in that the insertion of this
drama into Melville's third novel occurred in 1848, shortly after he
made Dana's acquaintance and at the same time became more intimate
with his new father-in-law, Judge Shaw.
The Supreme Judicial Court, which sat as a court of last resort
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as well as the original trial court, voted to reject Dana's appeaJ
in the York case, one member, Justice Wilde, dissenting. 6 Shp·,..,
wrote the majority opinion, citing twenty pages of authorities, until,
as Leonard Levy remarks, "the roll call of names reads like a 'who's
7who" of English jurisprudence." Later on, when the American authori-
ty, Joel Parker, criticized Shaw's charge on malicious homicide in
the Webster case of 1850, he acknowledged Shaw's doctrine to be in
conformity with that found in English books generally received by
authorities. Shaw had not erred in reporting the law to the jury.
Parker pointed out, however, that the acceptance of the English
authorities was more widespread at the time of the York trial than
8at the time of the Webster case six years later. The remark is
indicative of, among other things, the volatile state of American
law in the decade of the 1840's.
The doctrine that Shaw supported and expounded dealt with the
proof of malice. In general usage, malice means ill-will, but in
its legal sense it designates the ~~, an intent to do an un-
6Commonwealth v. York, 9 Mete. 93 (1845)
7Leonard Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice
Shaw (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 22.
8Joel Parker, "The Law of Homicide," North American Review, 72
(1851), 178-204.
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lawful act. Proving this state of mind was a problem, since no one
is privy to the thoughts and feelings of another. The solution
which Shaw and other orthodox jurists maintained was that malice
could be deduced from the whole evidence. Shaw believed, however,
that this deduction should remain incorporated into the law as a
presumption whenever an intentional homicide was proved, and there
was no excuse offered by the defense. More liberal thinkers wished
to see the matter left in the hands of the jury. In that case malice
would always have to be proved by the circumstantial evidence, and
the burden of proof would fall upon the prosecution. In this way
a defendant would remain innocent of murder until the state could
convince the jury that his actions had been malicious.
Dana's audacity in the York case and Bemist ingenuity in the
Rogers case began the debate in the Shaw Court (in its time the
most repected tribunal of criminal law in the nation) over the
validity of deducing moral truth from appearances. The issue
culminated in the Webster trial of 1850, in which the full bench
unanimously maintained the ground they had defended in the York
case. However, as a glance ahead to the Hawkins murder trial of 1855
reveals, the vindication of the position Shaw had tak~n in the York
case was more dramatic than real.
By 1855 public and professional opinion had had an effect upon
the court. In that year the Hawkins case came up for trial before
Shaw, and in this instance he restricted presumption of malice to
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cases in which nothing was known beyond proof of intentional homi-
r~de. This qualification had been made in the York and Webster
cases~ but then it seemed to mean that the rule applied only when
there was no excuse shown for the crime (Levy, p. 226). In the
Hawkins case, Shaw did not instruct the jury to presume malicet but
to examine the eVidence, and if they became satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the act was done with malice, to return a
verdict of murder, otherwise to return a verdict of manslaughter.
Furthermore, he explicitly stated that the murder charge must be
proved and that the burden of proof was on the Commonwealth (Levy,
p. 226). Although Levy does not seem to think so, the charge in
the Hawkins case was a considerable retreat from the rule of the
York case. In effect, Shaw quietly dropped the presumption of
malice by the law and instructed the jury that it is they who must
construe the malice "upon all the circumstancell•
Often Melville left the question of malice open for his jury
of readers to decide. At the conclusion of Mardi, Taji sails away
and the reader still has no answer as to whether Aleema's death
was murder of which he still stands accused, or justifiable homicide.
Melville employed the same device subsequently in Mohy-Dick. Genera-
tions of readers have failed to agree about whether the captain or
the whale is the real villain of the story. Finally in Billy Budd
the reader once more becomes involved 1n judging the case and de-
termining whether the defendant deserves death or not .
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In that final book, Vere adopts a position remarkably similar
to that taken by Judge SP:.~.,.Here believes that the necessity for
society and order takes priority over individual lives. At the
heart of Shaw's insistence upon the presumption of malice in the
law is the proposition that society cannot permit willful homicide
regardless of the private intentions or motivations of the indi-
vidual. In spite of dire provocation~ in spite of what evil one
might believe he perceives, retaliation must be channeled through
the forms that society allows for redress. If society allows no
way for the individual to relieve himself of oppression, he must
sacrifice his desire to retaliate to the priorities of law and order,
the foundation of civilization. Part of Shaw's definition of malice,
as we shall see, emphasizes the presence of a heart which prompts a
man to act IIregardless of social duty".
Shaw also believed that the sense of social responsibility
requisite to the disinterested disposition of cases was best pre-
served in the body of the law and in the hands of the judge. To be
discussed in a later chapter, this concept of the judicial function
plays a large role in determining the character of Captain Vere in
Billy Budd.
The controversy over proving malice from physical evidence carne
to a climax in the Webster trial of 1850. In this case the victim
of the homicide was George Parkman, one of Boston's most prominent
citizens. The defendant was Harvard professor John White Webster,
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who pleaded innocent. Acting prose~utor was George Bemis. This
case especially merits the atte~cion of Melville scholars because
it took place before Judge Shaw during the composition of Moby-
Dick. While his father-in-law sat in Boston~ embattled by the furor
created by the Webster case, Melville was residing in the nearby
Berkshires, working on his whaling story and preparing to buy
Arrowhead. The Melville and the Shaws visited one another several
times during this period. As the following narration of the case
unfolds, it may become apparent that there are marked similarities
between the murder victim, Parkman, and mad Ahab and between Webster,
the accused, and the White Whale. The Webster trial contains several
elements of plot and persona to be found in Moby-Dick.
On November 30, 1849, just 50 days after Melville left for
Europe, gruesome remains were found in a vault beneath a privy in
the Harvard Medical College. Within hours Dr. John White Webster,
Harvard professor, was arrested for the murder of his colleague
and creditor George E. Parkman. Thus began the Webster-Parkman
case, still considered to be the most sensational trial of the 19th
century.
The Webster case cause an unprecedented furor because of the
hideous dismemberment and because of the dozens of Boston's most
prominent citizens it involved. The remains were found scattered
about Webster's laboratory. A pelvis and two pieces of leg were
found in his privy and the thorax with the other thigh jammed into
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its cavity was discovered under a qr.antity of tan in a tea chest.
Charred remains of a skull werp found in the laboratory furnace, and
it looked as though the profess had been trying to dispose of the
body by burning. The hands, the feet, and the lower portion of the
left ~ were never found at all. It seemed that Parkman, like Ahab,
had suffered a bodily dismemberment.
When these pieces were collected, several august members of the
Harvard Medical School, later "expert witnesses" at the trial,
assembled to inspect them. Among these grave doctors was the Dean
of Harvard Medical College and George E. Parkman Professor of Ana-
tomy, Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes. Twenty-five of the Harvard faculty
and alumni were called as witnesses, including President Jared
Sparks. In addition, two counsel for defense, two prosecutors, and
all four judges, including Chief Justice Shaw, were Harvard graduates.
The roll call of the other witnesses reads like the Boston social
register.
Webster's arrest immobilized the social world, caused some
businesses to close down, and monopolized the attention of the public.
Harvard's unofficial historian, librarian John Langdon Sibley, report-
ed in his diary that the affair had checked all hilarity and parties
just beginning in Cambridge and Boston for the winter and that people
met and talked with the understanding that the subject of the murder
should not be introduced. Harvard suspended classes in the week
following the grisly discovery, and the militia was mobilized to fend
-_
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9off attacks made on the Medical School by an excited rabble.
The press responded with a deluge of coverage. At least
eleven Boston newspapers carried the story; within a short time
the major New York and Philadelphia papers had correspondents on
the scene. Freeman's Journal and the Police Gazette reported
the story nationally. Rapidly the news spread to all sections
of the country and to capitals overseas. Newspapers in London, Paris,
and Berlin carried the story in full. Before long, according to
the gossipy Sibley, every man, woman, and child in the United States
and western Europe was acquainted with the "Boston Tragedy".
In his diary, Sibley lamented the attention the murder re-
ceived, which in his opinion amounted almost to a public monomania.
The sensationalist press pandered to such morbid interest, capturing
and holding the public's attention by dramatic, well-timed install-
ments appearing throughout the year even after Webster had been
hanged. Like the celebrated case of the cigar store girl, Mary
10Rogers (later Poe's Marie Roget), the Webster trial was given an
exaggerated amount of coverage even by respectable journals, far
beyond the norm for such cases.
Malice had been found under the respectable facade of a Harvard
9Robert Sullivan, The Disappearance of Dr. Parkman (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Co., 1971), pp. 38 and 214.
10John EVangelist l.]alsh,Poe the Detective; the Curious Circum-
stances Behind the Mystery of Marie Roget (New Br~wick: Rutgers
University Press, 1968).
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professor, and during the uproar the unsavory dunning practiced by
Parkman among the poor had been aired. That a Parkman should jeal
with one of his own in this fashion and that the unassuming Dr.
Webster should act like a common "hoolighan" over his debts, such
doings were a greater scandal to Boston society than all the noise,
dirt, and fuss of a thousand Irish immigrants. The press of course
did not miss the chance to make comments about the evil that might
lurk behind the doors of the first institution of learning in the
land. The murder ripped the masks off two of society's members and
the exposure proved by far, it seemed, to be a more unforgivable act
than the homicide itself.
Although scholars have declined to question the circumstance,
it seems odd that Evert Duyckinck should have resurrected Hawthorne's
book, Mosses from an Old Manse, for review in the summer of 1850,
seven full years after its first publication. Some have dismissed
Duynckinck's giving the book to Melville in July for a review as
being a gesture somehow connected with the prospect of his meeting
Hawthorne in the Berkshires. However that may be, one is also
justified in seeing Duyckinck as a magazine editor anxious to capi-
talize upon the public furor over the Boston Tragedy that prevailed
throughout 1850. The clamor reached a climax in July when Webster's
luridly detailed "confession" of the atrocity waS published in news-
papers allover the nation. It is not unlikely that the embarrassment
suffered by Boston society was at least partly responsible fo~
1£,0
Melville's focusing upon "Young Goodman Brown". The story, one
recalls, deals with the "heart of darkness" that may ul'<.lerli~even
the most respectable facades, particularly that of Puritan Boston.
Several comparisons between Dr. George Parkman and Ahab are
possible. Before his disappearance the family worried about Parkman's
sanity. Dr. Edward Jarvis testified before the Executive Committee
on Pardons reviewing Webster's conviction that he had examined
Parkman shortly before his disappearance because the family believed
he might be having a relapse of a previous mental condition. Enough
credence was placed in "sudden mental aberration" to include it in
26,000 reward notices distributed (Sullivan, p. 8).
At the trial, which began on March 19, Parkman's brother-in-law,
Robert G. Shaw, testified that Parkman had insisted upon personally
prosecuting his debt on Webster. According to Robert Shaw, Parkman,
like Ahab, pursued his victim with an inexplicable vehemence, amount-
ing almost to obsession. This pursuit was corroborated by other
witnesses. The defense made what it could of this circumstance,
addressing the following remarks to the jury:
• • • you know that under that imputation of injustice
and dishonesty, he pursued him with an unchanging re~olu-
tion. . •• So early as the first conversation with his
brother-in-law, Mr. Robert Gould Shaw, ••• the feelings
of Dr. Parkman were strongly excited against the prisoner
• • • • from that hour to the last in which he was known
to be alive, that excitement never subsided, but continued
rather to increase. In pursuit af the one object, of
which he never permitted himself to lose sight, he had
several interviews •••. he would not be deterred from
lr.l
persisting in further efforts. He had said em-
phatically to Mr. Shaw, that he would have his
money. Mr. Shaw kindly essayed to calm his mind,
and induce him to give over his purpose ..••
he could not forbear the pursuit. . . . He would
not resort to the law, nor seek the aid which that
might afford him. . . • He seems to have believed,
that he could adopt some mode of proceeding for
himself. • • . Accordingly, his pursuit was con-
stant and unremitted, his purpose never changed
and inflexible,---his manner never calm or tran-
quil. (Bemis, Webster Report, pp. 316-17)
After Webster's execution, popular sentiment swung to a whole-
hearted sympathy with the underdog; and the Boston Daily Times
printed this unflattering account of Parkman:
The Tiger Creditor Parkman, was an old man burdened
with his riches, hunting down his victim, Webster,
knowing Webster would not dare resist; a Shylock
seeking his pound of flesh; Parkman's activities
were more revolting than Dr. Webster's, hunting
Webster at his place of business, at his place of
repose, not only insulting Webster but his wife and
children, threatening him with poverty and a blasted
character, ruin for his familYltnd much more with
the utmost ferocity of manner.
The public divided between believing Webster innocent or believ-
ing him guilty but not proven so (Sullivan, p. 166). Opinion was
unanimous, however, in believing that he had been twice mercilessly
pursued, first by t.he"Tiger Creditor" and second by a Parkman re-
1lSullivan, p. 167; quoted from the Boston Daily Times, August
31, 1850.
surrected in the power and influence of his family and in all of
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Boston society. There were many who said that the Parkmans had
enlisted the ship of state in their private quest for v=-rgeance ,
Melville's persecuted whale was not the only "victim" manufactured
in 1850 whose motives remain ambiguous to speculation. In the
public mind there existed a "bad Webster," chiefly before the
trial, and a "good Webster," after the conviction. A pamphlet,
garishly titled The Boston Tragedy! An expose of the evidence in
the ~ of the Parkman Murder!, was published just weeks after his
arrest. It was written before the trial began and does anything
but report the true facts. The pamphlet is highly prejudiced
against Webster, convicting him of the crime and moralizing upon
his unbounded wickedness in the most sentimental fashion of the
day. It contains a portrait of Webster which shows him so sinister
12
that it has been dubbed "the vampire portrait". In the most widely
circulated picture published after the trial, Webster appears in
13baby-faced benevolence. This latter illustration was an etching
done for the Boston Herald, later borrowed by other publications
up and down the East coast and finally selected for the Bemis Report.
12 .anonymous , The Boston Tragedy! An expose of the ev~dence in
the ~ of the Parkman Murder~; published in Boston before the trial,
this pamphlet is listed in Thomas W. McDade~ The Annals 0: Murder: A
Bibliography of Books and Pamphlets ~ America;-Murders from Colonial
Times to 1900 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961); see also
Sullivan,p,44 for a reproduction of the llvampire portraitll•
13Sullivan, frontispiece; reproduced from John A. French, The
Trial of John ~ Webster (Boston: Boston Herald Steam Press, 1850).
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Even today debate continues over who was the real villain of
the case, Parkman, the murder victim, or Webster, the convictel
murderer. Two books have been published within the last several
years, one supporting Webster's claim of innocence, the other at
1 t i i 0 b hi 01 14eas ra s ng quest10ns a out s gU1 t. The problem remains the
same today as in 1850. Was Webster a monstrous, malicious murderer?
Or was he simply guilty of manslaughter which occurred when he was
cornered by the monomaniac Parkman? It is probable that the question
will never be settled and that criminal lawyers and historians will
go on debating Webster's character endlessly, just as Melville
scholars seem disposed to debate without convincing resolution the
goodness or evil of the whale.
The Webster case came to its climax in July and August of 1850
just at the time when Melville began his serious revisions of Moby-
hunt and the question of malice or innocence in the object of the mad
pursuit. IS It would seem that Moby-Dick became a looking glass
Dick. Studies of these revisions show that they involve a monomaniac
filled with images of the grimly staged events in Boston.
14Besides Sullivan's ~ Disappearance of Dr. Parkman (1971)
there is also Helen Thompson's Murder at Harvard (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, c1971).
15Howard Vincent, The Trying-Out of Moby-~ (1949; Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1965), pp. 25, 36, and 40-49; see
also Leon Howard, "The Composition of Moby-Dick," Moby-D:i.CK.pp. 709-
27.
184
It strikes one repeatedly in browsing through accounts of the
Webste~ trial that the desciptions of the murdered Parkman read like
no:es for a portrait of Ahab. Fortunately, to obtain this descrip-
tion of the Boston murder victim it is not necessary to follow the
steps of the officers from the coroner's office, who had to grope
into privies and chest filled with tan to find the pieces, nor as
Melville suggests in Moby-Dick is it necessary to "grope down into
the bottom of the sea after them, to have one's hands down among the
unspeakable foundations, ribs and very pelvis of the world" (Moby-
Dick, p. 118). Handbill accounts, trial testimony, and newpaper
reports gathered by a modern researcher are sufficient.
At the time of his disappearance Parkman was about sixty years
old, tall and slim with well-muscled legs. His hair was gray, and he
had a noticable scar under his chin (Sullivan, p. 8). Ahab is fre-
quently referred to as an old man, and he reveals to Starbuck in
liThe Symphony" that he is in fact 58 years old (Mohy-Dick, p. 443).
For the character of Ahab, Melville expanded the scar, which he says
was "threading its way out from among his grey hairs" (Moby-Dick,
p. 110). Later, when Ahab has an encounter with the ship's carpenter,
Melville describes Ahab's legs as litheheron's legs! long and slim,
sure enough!" (Moby-Dick, p. 392). The peculiar stru<_::.tureof Park-
man's body, in particular his long, slim, well-muscled legs, was
mentioned frequently by his acquaintances in their attempt to identify
the remains. Parkman was known for his rapid, nervous way of walking.
Illustrating the New York Globe's Trial of Professor John ~ Webster
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and Bemis' Report is a sketch of Dr. Parkman which makes him look
remarkably like a heron i.. the angle of the body to the long slender
legs, the tail of his frock coat hanging down over the hiPS.16
Finally, Parkman's body had been dismembered and the lower left
leg was missing. Melville refers to Ahab's loss of his left leg as
"his bodily dismemberment" (Moby-Dick, p. 160).
Features of Parkman's personality are identical to those of
Ahab. Both were irritable and stubborn, given to outbursts of
temper when crossed, but capable of tenderness toward the weak and
the infirm. Parkman was known as a ruthless creditor, capable of
high dudgeon and relentless pursuit. At the same time he had a
reputation for going out in the middle of the night to relieve the
sufferings of his pauper tenants.17 Ahab too is described as
having his humanities, and he shows kindness for poor Pip.
Besides this gross similarity in physical details and in some
another, macabre resemblance. The suggestion that occurs several
aspects of personality between Parkman and Ahab, Melville created
times throughout Moby-Dick that Ahab is kin to other traditional
16Sullivan, p. 35; reproduced from New York Globe pamphlet, TheTrial of Professor John W. Webster (New York: Stringer and Townsend,
1850).- ---
17Richard Henry Dana, Jr., Two Years Before the Mast, 2nd ed.
(Boston: Fields, Osgood, & Co., 1869), p. 441. -------
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species of undead. While these hints strengthen the idea that he
is possessed by an evil spirit, they also support the notion that
Ahab was resurrected for the fin~l pursuit of his victim. His
first spoken words reflect the idea:
he seemed so much to live in the open air, that
truly speaking, his visits were more to the cabin
than from the cabin to the planks. "It feels like
going down into one's tomb," he would mutter to
hi.mself, "---for an old captain like me to be
descending this narrow scuttle, to go to my grave-
dug berth." (Moby-Dick, p , 112)
Later, Melville speaks of Ahab's mental agony as "some guilty mortal
miseries which shall fertilely beget to themselves an eternally
progressive progeny of griefs beyond the grave" (Moby-Dick, p. 385).
In this same passage he discloses Ahab's accident on shore in which
he was beaten and left senseless by ruffians (Moby-Dick, p. 385).
(Defense had theorized that this had been Parkman's fate.) After-
wards nursing an injury to his crippled side, Ahab "sought speechless
refuge among the marble senate of the dead" (Moby-Dick, p. 386).
The note is struck again by the carpenter working on a new leg for
the captain: "let's finish it before the resurrection fellow comes
a-calling with his horn for all legs true or false .•. " (Moby-Dick,
p. 392). The words "resurrection fellow" may allude to the archangel
Gabriel, but they were also applied to those who robbed graves to
supply the medical schools with bodies. The star witness of the
Webster trial, janitor Ephraim Littlefield, was a known resurrection-
ist. Defense even hinted to the jury that Littlefield's activities
le7
could have explained the presence of the corpse in Webster's labcca-
tory. Finally, in the midst of a tempest Starbuck fincJ Aha~ sleep-
ing in his chair: "Terrible old man~ thought Starbuck with a shudder,
sleeping in this gale, still thou steadfastly eyest thy purpose"
(Moby-Dick, p. 202). This description characterizes Ahab as a
spectre. There were those who said that Parkman was a spectre,
resurrected in family and friends, renewing his unrelenting pursuit.
Twice more images from the Parkman case cross the pages of Moby-
Dick, as Ahab exclaims, "By heavens! I'll get a crucible, and into
it, and dissolve myself down into one small compendious vertebra.
So" (Moby-Dick, p. 392). Starbuck echoes the grim thought as he
muses to himself:
I have sat before the dense coal fire and watched it
all aglow, full of its tormented, flaming life; and
I have seen it wane at last, down, down, to dumbest
dust. Old man of oceans! of all this fiery life of
thine, what will at length remain but one little heap
of ashes! (Moby-Dick, p. 412)
The attempt to dispose of Parkman's body by chemical dissolution
or by burning makes up nearly one-fifth of the testimony in the
Bemis Report. One witness, another medical researcher, admitted
to disposing of cadavers he had worked on by destroying tr..~min
his own living room fireplace, before which he would sit and tend
the merrily blazing fire until the neighbors complained about the
stench it created.
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Both Parkman and Ahab had a certain kind of power. As head
of his crew, Ahab, says Melville, was like a Mesopotamian desPJt,
head of a large family committed to finishing his quest even though
he were to die. "'Tis Ahab," cries the mad captain, II---his body's
part; but Ahab's soul's a centipede, that moves upon a hundred legsll
(Moby-Dick, p. 459). Though blasted by his efforts to harpoon the
white whale, Ahab will not give up. He instructs Starbuck to prop
him up so that he can continue the struggle. Even though the indi-
vidual was down, the institution he had usurped for his purposes
can function on.
The Parkmans succeeded in enlisting the "ship of statell for
their private vengeance ( or so their enemies claimed). In addition,
they were able to add a reward out of their own pocket and to pay
for the services of a special prosecuting attorney, George Bemis,
known as the best criminal lawyer in Boston. It waS considered
highly irregular for Attorney General John Clifford (the man who
supplied Melville with the "Agathall story) to permit Bemis to pro-
secute the case for him. George Parkman, Jr. paid $1,150 for these
services, an arrangement which Bemis himself acknowledged to be a
questionable deal (Sullivan, p. 59).
Ahab takes similar precautions in outfitting himself with a
specially prepared boat and privately paid crew so he can personally
join in the hunt and not be thwarted by any of his regular crew who
might have the scruples or the cowardice to hang back from the unholy
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chase. Melville's discussion of the matter suggests its impropriety.
And what a boat's crew! In no less than five places t~_j ar~ referred \
to as Ahab's "tiger-yellow" crew (Moby-Dick, p. 190), recalling
Parkman's reputation as the "Tiger Creditor", Elsewhere Melville
remarks that human madness is a "most cunning and feline thingl1
(Moby-Dick, p. 161).
In the eyes of many, the Parkmans were guilty of a'worse crime
than Webster, who may have been stung into taking manly retaliation.
This characterization of Webster in the popular press as the valiant
underdog must have struck a responsive note in the author of White-
Jacket. In that novel Melville had opined that a passionate noble
spirit had no business being in this man-of-war world. The image
of the relentless pursuer, irrationally provoked against some
relatively inoffending character who is his inferior in station
occurrs at least three times in Melville's work after the Webster
affair. It is in the major plot of Ahab pursuing the whale, in
the minor one of Radney hounding Steelkilt, and finally in Claggart's
harrassing of Billy Budd. Two of these instances are in Moby-Dick,
the book which was in process in 1850 while the Webster case was
being tried before'Melville's father-in-law in nearby Boston. Un-
questionably it must have piqued Melville's rebellious imagination
to see Webster's plight against such an overmatch,
The story of Radney and Steelkilt is the most explicit statement
of the case. This inserted story culminates in a scene in which the
lYO
mate insults the sailor and pursues him relentlessly around the
deck, shaking a heavy hammer in his face. Parkman had pllegPJly
inSUlted Webster repeatedly and in the fatal scene, according to
a "confession" Webster published in July prior to execution, the
rich man had cornered the professor in his laboratory, demanding
his money be paid instantly, threatening Webster and shaking his
fist in his face. This scene in the Webster affair supposedly
terminated with the meek professor losing his temper at last and
striking Parkman a blow which proved fatal. The basic story in
all three instances (Ahab's pursuit of the whale, Radney and
Steelkilt's confrontation~ and the Webster-Parkman case) is the
same: an initially unoffending creature is provoked to violence
by the pursuit of one much his superior in station. The underdog
wins the confrontation, but is then judged a criminal in the eyes
of the world.
Although Melville was in Europe during 1849-50, he must have
learned about the Webster trial just as well as any other "obscure
man in every obscure part". It is unwarranted to assume from the
silence of all his papers and letters on the subject that it could
not have interested him. While he was in London, he attended the
execution of England's most famous murderers~ Mr. and Mrs. Manning,
on November 13, only two weeks before the grisly discoveries in
Boston. He sent his father-in-law a broadside of the hanging, de-
picting the miscreant couple on the scaffold and containing a ballad
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about the "wretched guilty Mannings," no doubt feeling Shaw would
have a professional interest.1S Melville kept a corresP~ndep~e with
Shaw while he was abroad, separate from his letters to Lizzie and
Allan. In London, he would have received the news about the Parkman
When Melville got back on February 1, Webster's trial was only
murder three weeks late. The London Times carried the story on
December 23. It was not the issue that Melville notes sending Shaw
on December 14 (Leyda, I, 347), but a copy of the Times article is
in the file of clippings on the Webster trial in the Shaw collection
of the Massachusetts Historical Society. Melville may have carried
the paper with him when he sailed on Christmas Day.
18, and the case was to be tried when the court convened in March.
a month and a half away. The indictment had been returned January
Shaw, then a freshman at Harvard, came to visit for a few days, re-
A few days after Melville's return, his young brother-in-law, Sam
Out of mere wish for domestic felicity Melville would have been
turning February 10 with gifts for the Shaw's, Melville's remembrances
from abroad. The collegian must have been a treasure house of in-
formation about a subject so near and dear to his alma mater and his
father's position. In the Shaw papers at the Harvard College Library
there is a student·pass for Sam Shaw to the Webster trial itself.
18Jay Leyda, The Melville Log: A Documentary Life of Herman
Melville, 1819-1S91 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, c1951), I, 330-31.
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cautious not to commit himself to auy statements about the case,
especially since he had b=come :'loreand more aware throughout the
early part of 1850 that his family needed new living quarters. In
September, only days after Webster's execution, Melville had to
obtain a second loan from Shaw on Elizabeth's inheritance, this
time for $3,000. The money was used for the purchase of their
home in the Berkshires. It seems likely that out of common pru-
dence and forethought Melville would have avoided involving himself
, or his opinions in the touchy situation which developed over
Webster's conviction.
Melville's position as the Chief Justice's sou-dn+Law would
19
explain too why there was no discussion, as Leon Howard remarks,
at the August picnic in the Berkshires even though the execution
was only days away. Oliver Wendell Holmes, one of the guests at
that picnic had been a witness for the prosecution. The "Autocrat"
could have wished for no casual review of the trial or his role in
it. The introduction of the subject could only have been in bad
taste.
Two articles in the Literary World provide the only record of
opinion about the affair within the Duyckinck group. In the April
20th edition there appeared an amusing front page article; liThe
19Leon Howard, Herman Melville: !Biography (Berkley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 156.
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Young Attorney Who Could Have Saved ~lebster," signed "H". The
piece undoubtedly satirizes publ~c obsession with the case during
which everybody, but especially amateurs and sophomore law students,
had an opinion. The following is taken from the World article:
o. G. (warming into talkativeness with the ale).
No use, youngster. There's nothing like standing
by Magna Charta and the Baronial Bill of Rights in
a murder case, and hanging the man who can't give
an account of himself under suspicious circumstances.
It was a duty of the subject always to be ready with
an account of himself to his sovereign.
Y. A. (rising to his feet). What monstrous doctrine.
Miserable subterfuge of defunct feudalism. Even
Beccaria---
o. G. Pshaw! 20
O. G. (excited). Becky Rea was a novel reading house-
maid. I remember her in the Spectator. I say again
Webster ought to be hung under Magna Charta. Why he
couldn't account for the notes! (triumphantly)
Y. A. (rolling ~ the old .£.2P.Y..2i the Times for ~
gesture wand). He paid 'em. You've got to take the
whole of the admission, Starkie says so, and its good
law even with Judge Paine. Webster says he came into
the room---gave up the notes---received his money---
and went out. Look at the injustice of the government
and the ignorance of the Judge.
It would appear that the Duyckinck group had its doubts and ambiva-
lent feelings about the way in which the Webster trial had been
conducted, but preferred to carry the matter no further than good
20 anonymous , "The Young Attorney Who Could Have Saved Webster ~11
The Literary World, 6 (1850), 341-42.
On July 13, just after Web~ter's confession was published,
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humor or polite speculation would a:low.
the Literary World ran a ponderously moral editorial expressing
21relief that the court's decision had been vindicated. This
front page article concluded with a panegyric on the wisdom of
Judge Shaw's court in trusting to the time-tested jurisprudence
to deduce the truth of the matter. Unlike the first, humorous
sketch quoted above, the later article probably came from con-
servative lawyers among Duyckinck's friends, his old tutor~ John
Anthon, for example:
As in the Rogers case several years earlier, post-trial qualms
induced George Bemis to get out a book presenting his version of
the story. Once again he had the collaboration of Judge Shaw and
others who had participated in the trial. Shaw revised his charge
to the jury for Bemis' Report. He started on that task sometime in
late June or early July. The Evening Transcript announced the
forthcoming publication of the Report for July 9. Considerable
delay was to develop before the book finally appeared on November
28. Bemis sheds light on the problems of revision in his diary
entry for November 3, 1850, in which he blames litheomissions of
my associates" and the Chief Justice's absence from town as the
21 anonymous, "The Webster Confession," The Literary World,
7 (1850), 25- 26.
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. 22major hindrance to comp1et~on. SPdW was absent from town in mid-
September, visiting the Melvillp '.s and holding a short term of
cour.t in Lenox, residence of Nathaniel Hawthorne, a mere carriage
ride away from Arrowhead. The Chief Justice may have had with him
the proofs, if not for the entire Report, for at least his own
portion, the charge to the jury. In any case Bemis' book waS out
in time for Lizzie and Malcolm's regular Thanksgiving visit, and
for the Christmas visit which may have been made by Melville him-
self. 23
A comparison of texts from Stone's "phonographic" report, from
newspaper verbatim accounts of the trial, and from Bemis' Report
shows the last of these to be unique in containing passages and
22Sullivan, p. 174; quotes from George Bemis' Diarx, which is
among the Shaw Papers in the Massachusetts Historical Society Library.
23Howard P. Vincent, The Trying-Out Qf Mohy-Dick (1949; rptd
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1965), p. 23n; and
Leyda, I, 402: "Dec. 30, 1850---Someone in the augmented Shaw house-
hold does some reading on M's current subject; charged on Shaw's
membership at the Boston Athenaeum: An Account £t the Arctic Regions,
with ~ History and Description of the Northern '.[haleFishery by
William §coresby." In addition, Howard Vincent (Trying-Out, p. 23n)
remarks that Melville probably made a Christmas visit to the Shaws'.
phrases which are echoed in Moby-Dick. The same heavy, melodramatic
style also characterizs Bemis' earlier work on the Rogers trial.
The following are examples of the kind of material in the Report
lY6
which Melville might have found particularly suggestive. The fir~t
is Bemis' version of a speech by one of the defense counsel i'"l the
Webster trial,
There is a mystery, beyond which you cannot
solve ..•• they may be allowed to belong to that
great class of the inscrutable facts of human life,
which baffle the power of human reason, and defy
the most intense efforts of human investigation.
(Bemds, ~-lebsterReport, pp , 290-91)
Further on, defense counsel once more speaks of a "truth verified by
all individual experience. • . • that truth is stranger than fiction.
The imagination cannot keep pace with the actual events of life.1I
He continues,
There are mysteries in the order of Providence, in the
circumstances of our condition, and in the ordinary
course of our lives, which no intelligence we possess
can adequately explain, they lie deeper down in the
depths of our being than human reason can fathom,---
where its profoundest exertions can never sound.
(Bemis, Webster Report, p , 291)
Elsewhere, Bemis represents the defense attorney as speaking of the
"thick darkness which often shrouds the ways of men" (Bemis, Webster
Report, p. 306), and the "darkness which cannot be penetrated and
mysteries which cannot be explained" (Bemis, Webster Repor_f, p. 343).
That Melville dealt with ideas identical to these in Moby-Dick is
plain to anyone who has read the book.
There can be no doubt that the Webster-Parkman affair is more
than merely reflected in the pages of Moby-Dick. The controversy
1~7
over the trial flamed highest during the summer of 1850, a period
already agreed upon by scholars as being critical in the authrc's
decision to transform the simple whaling novel into a cook quite
different from the one he started out to write. As a result, more
than just plot and characters were affected by the furor of debate
following the verdict in the Boston Tragedy. It is entirely possible
that although he was silenced by his position as the Chief Justice's
son-in-law, Melville was nevertheless able to incorporate controversy
from the passing scene (an intrusion which had its precedent in
Mardi), into his whaling novel, letting it explode into a "tragic
drama of Aeschylean proportions."
As critics Howard Vincent and Leon Howard agree, in late summer
or early fall 1850 Melville introduced monomaniac Ahab, who in his
cracked way had become obsessed with the malice of the whale. Howard
X singles out "The Quarter-Deck" and "Moby-Dick" as the two chapters
the author added in beginning his revisions after his friends left
Pittsfield. In these two chapters Melville describes how Ahab's
feud became that of the crew also and how rumor and superstition had
transformed the ordinary perils of the fishery into popular terror
at the "unexampled, intelligent malignity" (Moby-Dick, p. 159) of
the white whale. Melville created, from that point, a novel in
which Ahab and his crew pursue the white whale in much the same
fashion that the Par~nan's and the public pursued the hapless Webster.
Opposition within the press and within the legal profession con-
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demne~ Shaw and his court for participating in what was felt to
h~ a spirit of vengeance against the accused, instead of insisting
that the case be dispatched in a regular and business-like manner.
Heaviest criticism fell upon Chief Justice Shaw, because as head of
the court he had permitted questionable procedures in the conduct
of the trial. Each of the charges against Shaw's handling of the
case finds in Moby-Dick an analogous expression of protest against
Abab's persecution of the whale.
First, professional censure of an atmosphere of vindictiveness
has its analogy in Starbuck's outrage against Ahab's manner of
seeking out the white whale for a purely vengeful destruction.
Starbuck is the voice of prudence, but Melville also makes a special
point of portraying the first mate as a business-like man who does
not mind chasing whales for the regular motive of profit, but who
experiences a moral revulsion against the captain's special interest
in one particular whale. Melville's description of Starbuck as a
right-minded man whose personal courage has been undermined by life-
long commitment to social forms contains implicit criticism of his
father-in-law, Judge Shaw. Shaw should have stood up against the
pressure exerted by the Parkmans and their influential friends in
Boston society. He should not have allowed them to use the Massachu-
setts judiciary in seeking thorough retribution against Webster.
Melville calls Ahab's personal power over Starbuck a "superior
moral force." and" in a sense, the social prominence of the Parkmans
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might be called a "superior moral force". In the same way the
emotional feeling among the Boston general public which prevailed
against W~bster may also be termed "superior moral force". Just
as Starbuck had Ahab and the ship's "people" to pit himself against
should he try to put the whale hunt back on a business-like basis,
so also did Shaw have the scions of wealth plus the immediate public
to stand up against in any attempt to deal with Webster routinely.
Melville dramatized the same idea in a later novel when he portrayed
Falsgrave being overwhelmed by the "superior moral force" of Mrs.
Glendinning's social position. The Starbucks and the Falsgraves
of this world become so used to dealing with the ordinary events
of life through the ordinary channels, that they lose their ability
to confront the extraordinary situation. In Billy Budd consideration
for the security of the state becomes the "superior moral force"
which coerces Vere's decision, although in that case it is no longer
clear whether such influence is improper.
There is a further analogy to be drawn in he~ween the whaling
captain and the Parkman family, if our tired literary critics will
permit one last drop to be wrung from MelVille's choice of that
particular Biblical name Ahab. > The Parkman family, which included
Robert Gould Shaw, possessed fortunes founded primarily upon the
ownership of valuable properties. There is a distinct resemblance
between the Parkman family's methods of acquiring their real estate
empire and King Abab's chicanery in wresting the vineyard away from
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Naboth, a shady real estate deal if ever there was one. Ahab
received his final conden.uatLou bJ God for his unwarranted perse-
cution of the innocent Naboth. In comparison, the Parkman family
took special pains to convince others of their peer group, which
controlled most of the wealth and influence in Massachusetts, that
their special prosecution of Webster was justified. Moby~Dick's
Captain Ahab dissembles his insane motives to wealthy shipowners
(i.e., ship-of-state owners) in gaining command of the Pequod.
In the name of the rich and powerful, Jezebel suborns the "ancients
and chief men" of Jezrahel to procure false witnesses against Naboth
in-order to convict him of blasphemy and put him to death. In
each case, those of great power usurp the machinery of the state
for the private purpose of oppressing another.
The analogy between the Parkman-tiebs t er affair and the story of
Moby-Dick is by no means complete. Ahab's usurpation of the Pequod
leads to the destruction of the ship and its whole crew. On the
other hand, a miscarriage of justice, if any, which resulted from
the Parkmans' pressure on the court in Webster's case, was not
likely to destroy the state or society at large. Yet, one may argue
further that such a vision was present to many in the pre-Civil War
period.
A connection between Ahab and the sources of wealth in Massachu-
setts would support the contention of some critics that MelVille
incorporated in Moby-Djck a broad condemnation of the Northern Cotton
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Whigs' collaboration with the South In harnessing the power of
established authority to support the institution of slavery.24
In this connection it may be useful to add that in addition to the
criticism'Judge Shaw took for the Webster trial, he was simultanc-
ously under censure for yielding to the influence of his political
intimates, mostly northern industrialists. in remanding the fugitive
slaves to their owners (Levy, pp. 86 an 90-91). There were those
who feared that the continued policy of the law in keeping slavery
alive in America would eventually destroy the union. Melville's
choice of names for his shipowners is significant in this respect.
Bildad is named for the man who tried to convince Job that man's
expedient righteousness can stand up before God's absolute justice;
and Peleg is identified in the Pentateuch as he who lived when the
earth was divided. It is possible that the latter name is a for-
boding reference to the civil war that might erupt so long as the
state permitted the private interests of wealth to usurp the machinery
of government for its own purposes.
24See for example, Charles H. Foster, "Something in Emblems!
A Reinterpretation of Moby-Dick, II New England Quarterly, 34 (1961),
3-35; James B. Hall, "Moby-Dick: Parable of a Dying System, II
Western Review, 14 (1950), 223-26; Alan HeImert , "Moby-Dick and
the American Political Symbolism," American Quarterly, 15 (1963),
498-534; Sidney Kaplan, "The Moby-Dick in the Service of the Under-
ground Railway, II Phylon, 12 (1951), 173-76; and Willie T. Weathers,
"Moby-Dick and the Nineteenth Century Scene," Texas Studies in
Language and Literature, 1 (1960), 477-501.
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In the comparison of the Webst~r affair with Moby-Dick, there
are further analogies to be drawu between the more particular ob-
jections that were made to the exact manner in which the trial was
conducted'and the elements of Ahab's whale hunt which appear morally
objectionable.
In recounting the general outline of the murder case it has
already been recited how the Attorney General, John Clifford, allowed
the Parkman family to hire their own special prosecutor in the trial,
an unprecedented irregularity. Ahab takes with him a special boat's
crew to help insure victory over the whale.
Second, critics of the trial insisted that it had been conducted
with a "packed jury". It is true that by modern standards the jury
had been insufficiently sounded to see whether they had made up their
minds as to Webster's gUilt under the influence of the continuing
25furor in the city. Public and professional indignation was also
roused, however, because Chief Justice Shaw upheld a recent and
controversial Massachusetts statute requiring all jurors in a capital
case to give verbal assent to the death penalty. Applying the
"packed jury" concept to Moby-Dick, one notes that;Ahab calls his
crew together and makes them swear their oath that they will hunt
the whale to its death, and not hang back until he spouts black blood.
25The Webster case was cited recently by Sen. Ted Kennedyis
defense in the Chappaquidick affair as an example of a man tried
in the press as a result of an open coronor's hearing; Sullivan, p.45.
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The sailors were already prejudicied against the white whale be-
cause of his notoriety in the fishery, information based upon near-
say and rumor. Several generations of readers have likewise been
persuaded that Moby Dick had a malicious character on the basis of
the ill-fame that Ishmael passes along in his narrative.
Furthermore, Webster was prevented by the rules of evidence
concerning the incompetency of witnesses from presenting his side
of the story at the trial; he was compelled to remain silent while
his lawyers did a shoddy job of defense. A similar situation exists
in Moby-Dick in which the whale is unable to speak out in his own
defense. Starbuck remonstrates with Ahab for seeking vengeance on
a "poor, dumb brute," while Ishmael does a dubious job of vindicating
the whale.
There remains to be discovered one more important legal issue
of the Webster trial (shared by the other homicide cases reviewed
in this chapter), which became a critical philosophical problem in
Moby-Dick; the difficulty which presents itself when a moral or
psychological truth, in this case malice, must be deduced from
physical evidence, either of a direct or an indirect nature. Ahab
states the problem in Moby-Dick and announces his position (Moby-
Dick, p. 264): malice can be deduced from the appearances of nature.
Ishmael elaborates on the question several times throughout the
novel, notably in "The Whiteness of the Whalell and "The Doubloon".
The epistemological problem debated in Moby-Dick is identical to the
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one argued so hotly by young, liberal lawyers in the face of the
establishment of judges. In legal circles the issue focused p~eci-
fically upon the right of the law to presume malice, cather than
leave the question open to the deliberation of the jury. The
epistemological problem in the whaling novel also centers upon
whether the whale acts with malice in his homicidal attacks.
Three factors seem to converge in 1850 to fan the embers of
this controversy into flame. First, the enormous publicity of the
Webster trial limelighted flaws in its procedure. Professional
interest in the Webster Case was quickened by the prosecution's
lack of direct evidence of a crime. (Shaw was accused of, besides
other breaches of procedure, permitting the corpus delecti., or
the fact of the crime itself, to be established on the basis of
circumstantial evidence alone, a charge which prodded even con-
servative members of the profession to protest Shaw's handling of
the case.)
Second, by 1850 an increasing number of young lawyers were
more than willing to rebel against some of the heavy, moralistic
assumptions taken for granted by "the Age of Sentimentality". This
spirit is evident in the support gained by procedural reforms, which
were to remove as many forms of presumption from the law as possible,
primarily because they were often prejudicial to the truth.
Third, public reaction after the Webster trial tended to regard
the defendant as a much persecuted underdog, more a victim of public
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hysteria than anything else. Detecting unfairness in public opin~on
was one matter, however; finding it in the attitude of :":le C!"..I.ef
Justice was quite another. The perception served to revive Dana's
old charge that Shaw's interpretation of the law of malicious homi-
cide was in error. This time what had been a lone voice in the
five years later in the Hawkins murder case, Shaw quietly conceded
York case, vanquished then, seemed to spring back a hundred-fold
and with such increased vigor, that, as we have seen, by 1855, only
the fight by dropping his insistence on the law's presumption and
allowing the issue to be decided by the jury on the basis of the
whole evidence.
Joseph Stone's "phonographic" version of the trial was one
of the loudest of the voices.26 The report was enough to send
27form of letters and pamphlets, one of which compared Shaw to the
Shaw, Attorney General Clifford, Acting Prosecutor Bemis, and defense
counselors Sohier and Merrick into a panic (Sullivan, p. 171).
Criticism had been pouring in, especially to Judge Shaw, in the
26James W. Stone, Report of the Trial of Professor John B.:..
Webster (Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co., 1850).
27Frederic Hathaway Chase, Lemuel Shaw, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts~30-1860 (Boston and New
York: Houghton Mifflin Company and the Riverside Press, Cambridge,
1918), p. 207.
The court evidently thought it necessary to
secure a unanimous verdict, and such a verdict as
would correspond with public opinion. This is the
only way that we can account for the extremely
arumentative character of the charge of Chief
Justice Shaw ,
The whole community shudders at the law of mali-
cious homicide as expanded by the Chief Justice:
'''Thereare thought to be two theories on
which this is thought to be murder. One is that
it was by express malice; and the other that it
was by implied malice; that is, if the express
malice is not proved, still in cases where there
is not accident or suicide, it is murder by im-
plied malice.,,29
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hangi~g judge of the reign of James II, the infamous Jeffries.28
A~ the same time that Stone's version of the trial appeared, Stephen
A. Phillips, a legal scholar who had succeeded his father on the
Monthly Law Reporter, attacked Shaw in the May edition of that
journal in a lengthy article criticizing the trial. The following is
extracted as much for its tone as for its argument:
Phillips was probably grossly misquoting Shaw. Stone's version
of what was actually said conforms more nearly to previous opinions
28Chase, Shaw, p. 208; most of these letters and.pamphlets are
still among the Shaw papers preserved in the Massachusetts Historical
Society Library. In his sentimental biography Chase deplores both
the volume and the content of the opprobrium and makes a weak attempt
to exonerate Shaw from the charge that his handling of the Webster
trial was not all that could have been desired.
29 Stephen A. Phillips, "The Webster Case," Monthly Law Reporter,
3 (May 1850), 1-16.
by Shaw in language and intent:
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The authorities ••• ~roceed to state that the
implication of malice arises in every instance
of intentional homicide, the fact of the killing
being first proved. . •• If there is no justi-
fication or excuse in the attendant circum-
stances, the case will be such as to warrant the
conviction of the party. • •• (as quoted in
Sullivan, p. 135)
Despite the probable misrepresentation in Phillips' account, the
adverse criticism was typical of the impression received and re-
created by the opposition.
As a second example of such attacks, here is what another critic
But over all and through all, was that fatal error
in the law assumed by the majority of the court in
Peter York's case viz. that "when on trial for mur-
der, the killing is proved to have been committed by
the defendant, it is an act of murder, and proof of
matter of excuse or extenuation lies on the defendant."
Thus that if the jury came to the conclusion that A
died by the act of B, that is enough to convict him
of murder, unless B can prove beyond doubt that the
killing was under provocation, in mutual combat or
in self-defense. The effect of this is to throw
all doubts, as to murder, against the prisoner.
The doctrine is derived from old King Canute
and the edicts of William the Conqueror, who to
protect his robber Normans, laid down the law of
murder to be, 'that if a man was found to be slain
it was to be intended in law, first, that he was
a Frenchman; second, that he was killed by an Englisb-
man; and third, that the killing was murder.
This is palpably a relic of barbarianism, and in
my judgment, and I believe that of most of the bar,
it is judiCial murder to hang a man under it in the
of the Chief Justice's charge had to say in the Evening Transcript,
front page, for April 18, under the pen name "One of the Suffolk Bar":
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19th century.3D
To review quickly, in each of the trials discussea in this study
the issue under debate was not whether the accused had committed the
crime, but whether he had done so with malice aforethour,ht. In a
Benthamite spirit, defense had taken up the question of whether a
moral truth could be deduced from a physical truth. They made the
homicide trials out to be a case of trying to ascertain the state
of the "invisible spheres," to use Melville's phrase, from the only
evidence available in this world, the visible truth. The problem
is complicated by the fact that man's only guarantee as to the mere
existence (let alone condition) of this inscrutable realm is his
highly suceptible moral sense.
In the York case and in the Rogers case there has been in fact
many witnesses to the deed itself; yet in the former Dana succeeded
in convincing so eminent and respected a jurist as Wilde that though
a crowd of people had seen Peter York strike the deceased a mortal
blow, not one had been privy to York's thoughts and inner feelings
which made up the state of his will, nor could any feat of logic
deduce the moral truth from the act itself. In the latter case,
Bemis was able to convince a jury of hard-headed laymen that Rogers
was a homicidal maniac whose act could not be interpreted at all by
"normal" moral standards.
30"00e of the Suffolk Bar," "The Webster Verdict," Boston Evening
Transcript, 21, No. 6056 (April 18, 1850), front page.
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In the Webster trial the problem took on added dimension bec4use
the prosecution had nothing but circumstantial evidence ~o gc on.
The body said to be that of George Parkman was so dismembered and
partially destroyed that identification had to be made by inference
from certain details of description. There were no witnesses to
any crime having been committed. As a result, the corpus de1ecti
was established by circumstantial evidence. Finally conceding
hypothetically all these items, the defense in Webster's case could
still as Dana's question whether malice aforethought, the prisoner's
deliberate, conscious intention to do an unlawful act, could be
deduced from the fact of the act itself. Could the law deduce a
crime from a cloud of appearances when it was still questioned,
despite Shaw's efforts, whether malice could be deduced from a deed
committed in full daylight in front of scores of witnesses?
In Moby-Dick Ishmael is chided for attempting to make up for
a lack of first-hand experience by a process of ratiocination:
•. Clap eye on Captain Ahab, young man, and
thou wilt find that he has only one leg."
tlWhat do you mean? Was the other one lost by
a whale?"
"Lost by a whale! Young man, come nearer to me:
it was devoured, chewed up, crunched by the monstousest
parmacetty that ever chipped a boat!---ah, ah!"
I was a little alarmed by his energy, perhaps
also a little touched by the hearty grief in con-
cluding exclamation, but said as calmly as I could,
tlWhat you say is no doubt true enough, sir; but how
could I know there was any particular ferocity in
that particular whale, though indeed I might have
inferred as much from the simple fact of the accident."
"
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"look ye now, young man, thy lungs are a sort
of soft, d'ye see; thou dost not talk shark a bit.
Sure, ye've been to sea before now; sure of that?
-- (Moby-Dick, p. 69)
Malice, said the law as Judge Shaw propounded it, is to be
inferred from man's visible acts. In reply to Dana's appeal of the
York decision, Shaw apent a good deal of time defining lImalicell in
its legal sense. Th~ following is an excerpt from that opinion:
Malice in this definition is used in a technical
sense, including not only anger, hatred, and revenge,
but every other unlawful and unjustifiable motive. It
is not confined to ill will towards one or more individual
persons, but is intended to denote an action done malo
animo, where the fact has been attended with such circum-
stances as carry in them the plain indication of a
heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent upon
mischief. (Bemis, Webster Report, pp. 156-57; cf. Comm.
~ York, 9 Metcalf 102)
To laymen malice meanS ill will, but in law it denotes
the ~~, a state of mind manifested by an intent
to do an unlawful act. Since the devil himself, as the
I have called attention before to Shaw's selection of this definition
from the English commentators, particularly to his choice of the
words "a heart regardless of social duty". To this phrase we can
now add "fatally bent on mischief" and arrive at a description more
nearly befitting the heart of Ahab than that of the creature he
pursued.
Leonard Levy summarizes Shaw's definition of malice 1n light of
opinions delivered in the York, Webster, and Hawkins cases:
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saying goes, knoweth not the mind of man, how
can the malicious state of mind be proved? The
answer is that malice can be implied sic from
the facts proved by the whole evidence. (Levy,
p. 223)
According to legal authority past and present, therefore, malice
is to be inferred from man's visible acts, with the usual safeguards
of the jury system for the normal distortions of moral sense among
individuals. Even so, the answer can never be certain. Since no
conclusive connection can be made between the invisible and the
visible, man must leave open the possibility that the truth of the
universe may well be indifferent to moral truth. If so, of what
significance is man's perception of moral value in any of its events,
particularly value assigned by individuals isolated from society,
individuals who act without regard to social duty, without reference
to any mores or human laws whatsoever? Such perceptions and valua-
tions are conditioned arbitrarily upon the individual's disposition
and circumstances. If one sees moral perceptions derived in the
above way, then, as Bentham suggested, they may range a complete
spectrum from good to bad; they are thus of existential value only,
unless conditioned.by empirically determined obligations to the
rest of humanity.
It may be assumed at this time that Melville had some knowledge
of the legal definition of malice, and it is easy to demonstrate
another carefully constructed ambiguity: that is, whether malice
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may be assigned to Moby Dick or to Ahab. The whale acts, by all tile
evidence, with what appears to be deliberate, intelligent, af~Lethought
malice. Yet the whale, by legal standards has every justification for
his deeds: he is protecting himself and his kin from murderous attacks.
Ahab, on the other hand, acts, as noted above, with a "heart fatally
bent on mischief" and "regardless of social duty". He is clearly
culpable of malice, or a malo animo, in its legal sense, and his mal-
ice, unlike that of the white whale, is avowedly premeditated. Yet
Ahab, like the acquitted Abner Rogers, is insane, and thus not morally
culpable. The captain too must be excused.
Phenomenologically speaking, there is no judgment of good or bad
which can be assigned by worldly understanding to the actions of this
mad captain and the whale he pursues. The unreturning wanderers, who
are the crew of the Pequod, says Melville, go "to lay the world's
grievances before that bar from which not very many ever came back"
Moby-Dick, p. 108). What bar, may we ask? The answer lies in the
story. Melville has chosen the most barbaric mode of justice as the
only test possible in life. The trial of Ahab v. the whale is a trial
by combat, and Ahab musters his "Knights and Squires" for the occasion.
Whatever the outcome of such a trial, men will insist upon
assigning values of good and bad, but it is possible that Melville
means to suggest that the truth is beyond that. The issue of the
contest becomes for the parties involved a judgment by Fate as to
what, simply, shall be. For Fate, as the ancients believed, is
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superior even to celestial rule. It is a mysterious, impersonal
force, which moves along sweeping gods and man alike in its un-
changing flood. Indeed the old concept of Fate bears a remarkable
resemblance to modern theories of the naturalistic universe. Al- ~
though Darwin did not publish his Origin of the Species until nearly
ten years after Moby-Dick had been written, it has been demonstrated
frequently that the idea of the "survival of the fittest" was incipi-
cnt in many areas of thought during this era. It is, therefore, not
at all surprising that Melville should have conceived of trial by
combat as the most appropriate climax for this modern morality play.
In a way that showed a rough but adequate knowledge of legal
apparatus, Melville made his own procedural choice for reviewing
the decision of the bar before which the unreturning crew of the
Pequod went to lay the world's grievances. He takes a preliminary
I care not to perform this part of my task
methodically;.but shall be content to produce the
desired impression by separate citation of items,
practically or reliably known to me as a whaleman;
and from these citations, I take it---the conclusion
aimed at will naturally follow of itself. (Moby-Dick,
p. 175)
deposition from his only eyewitness, Ishmael, in the chapter, "The
Affidavit" (Moby-Dick, pp. 175-82). In the opening of this chapter
Melville remarks upon the paucity of "narrative" in the book. He
goes on to have Ishmael say,
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The term IInarrativellis defined by legal dictionaries as the case
that a lawyer presents to the court after weaving all the facts made
available to him into a story that is favorable to his client. The
narrative is what a lawyer uses to cast the evidence into the light
that he wishes the judge and the jury to see it. The alternative
is to lay the whole evidence before the court, item by item, and let
the jury draw its own conclusion. This is the procedure followed
in a court of common law when facts alone are to be decided by a jury
with the guidance of a judge. It is also the process used in open
inquiry as in a coroner's inquest or a grand jury investigation.
Melville's failure to IInarrate" the case of Ahab v. the whale
or to return a conclusive verdict continues to provoke readers who
do not wish to draw their own conclusions, but would rather prefer
that Melville had placed a judge over the novel to argue the case
and to charge upon the evidence, some narrator who would have
eschewed the Shandean compulsion to tell all there is to tell appar-
ently in the order it gets told. As modern criticism has shown,
however, Melville's brief takes on the burden of both prosecution
and defense in a careful orchestration of ambiguity and ambivalence.
Melville has refused to give us the narrative coherence of
traditional form. Instead, he made a deliberate commitment to reject
conventions of form because such constructions tend to prejudice the
reader against the IInatural verity" of the materials themselves.
He reduced his composition to a separate citation of items which he
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delivers with an eye mischievously on the science of evidence to
maintain the most foolproof of unsolvable ambiguities.
The knowing reader, however, is not excluded from the joke;
Melville comments frequently enough upon the quality oi the evidence,
designating some as hearsay, worrying about the competency of wit-
nesses, introducing "exp~rt" testimony, presenting ancient documents,
and warning his readers in spots by evaluating evidence for the
credence that may be attached to it. Whatever judgment he makes,
however, about the quality of the materials throughout the book,
he lays them nonetheless before his jury of readers in l1endless
processions."
In the analogies of form to be found in the legal controversies
that raged among his friends and relatives in the mid-forties and
early fifties, Melville lighted upon a philosophical basis for his
own curiously modern brand of impreSSionism. The methodology of
legal inquiry could well have suggested the validity of a properly
constructed pastiche as a way to produce the effect needed in his
attempt to paint what he knew to be "invisible spheresl1• He moves
through his novel like a judge delivering his charge, reviewing the
evidence along with the interrogation of witnesses, but reserving the
verdict for his jury of readers. He offers only hints that the
issue was perhaps already resolved the only way possible, in the
final combat, whereby fate alone was able to pass judgment with con-
elusive force on the merits of Ahab v. the whale.
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Like the lawyer who defends a man he believes to be a crimin~l,
like the prosecutor who must help try a man he thinks is innoc~nt,
Melville carefully sidestepped responsibility for the judgment to
be passed upon the events of the novel. He probably believed that
no one should ever be able to settle them to a certainty given the
epistemological conditions he provided in the book (see Chapter III,
supra, concerning Melville's use of the rules of evidence).
Melville's acknowledged readiness to borrow material from what-
ever source presented itself paid rich rewards when the course of
his life brought him into intimate contact with Judge Lemuel Shaw.
Though reputed to be a tough disciplinarian on the bench, Shaw
was also a kind father, a loving husband, and a warm personal friend.
With these obvious humanities he also occupied the office of Chief
Justice of Massachusetts for 30 years of increasing dilemma as the
United States wandered on the brink of civil war. He was crucified
repeatedly in the press, North and South, not only with the hysteria
displayed over capital cases, religious quarrels, and business dis-
putes, but with a bitterness only the spectacle of the Fugitive Slave
trials could have provoked.
The young writer may have condemned what he felt was an inevit-
able and ignoble weaking of the personal moral force in a man with
Shaw's commitments; but his privileged observation of the judge's
painful ordeal on the bench provided him with a living source for
creating the depth of moral vision his work required. While it is
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true that both Moby-Dick and Pierre contain implicit criticism of
his father-in-law, the passing years may have enabled ~~lviJ1G to
feel compassion for Shaw as he struggled in his perplexing and
lonely position. Understanding for the daily dilemma of the judge
is apparent in Melville's grudging but unmistakable admiration.of
Franklin in Israel Potter, and in the slow ccescendo of sympathy
for both clerk and master in Bartleby. In the end it was perhaps
mature reconsideration of the career of Lemuel Shaw, one of the
most eminent jurists of the century, that made it possible for
him to create the unforgettable tribute to the anguish of Pilate
which emerges in Billy Budd.
Chapter V
Codification, or the Ambiguities
The left-wing Democrats that Melville met through Evert Duyckinck
were involved in practical schemes to reform the law. They had three
pet projects in the 1840's: constitutional revision; an overhaul of
the court system; and the codification of the law. Members of the
legal establishment considered the last of these the most radical,
and for that reason they engaged its proponents in some of the most
heated debates of the era.
Codification was the name applied to the process whereby the
unwritten laws, those contained only in precedent court decisions,
were gathered up and formulated into a "code," or a body of rules.
These were to be used like statutes, as the law to be applied in
any case brought before the bar. The alternative, established method
was to research each case for any possible court decision that might
apply and to derive a rule for each case individually as it came up
for trial. Modern practice is to use a code, but to modify its
application by reference to precedent case law. In Melville's day,
however, the very idea of turning the ~ommon ~aw into a code was
anathema to the vast majority of the legal establishment.
Numerous authors in the last ten years have tried to evaluate
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2i9
the influence of the New York group's radical politics upon He IvLl.Le ' s
Idevelopment. Others have analyzed his attitudes toward authrr1ty
by using as starting points biographical information about his life-
long servitude in ships and in the Custom House or his experience in
2the South Seas. Most of this criticism, however, deals with the
idea of democracy only in its most general form. Discussion of
specific issues has been limited to slavery, presidential elections,
Fundamental issues of the codification controversy affected
the growing power of industrialism, and events in the Carribean.
None of these, except possibly slavery, are primarily legal questions.
The present chapter explores the possibility that issues which emerged
from the agitation for law reform in New York state may have played
a significant role in determining Melville's ethical concepts.
Melville's work. They flavored his interpretations of life in the
South Seas, and may in fact account for Melville's report on the
read as a dramatization of the opposing sides of the codification
deleterious results brought about by the code of blue laws imposed
by missionaries on the natives custom and usage. Pierre may be
ISee Leonard Engel, "Melville and the Young America Movement,"
Connecticut Review, 4, No.2 (1971), 91-101.
2See for example John Bernstein, Pacificism and Rebellion in the
Writings of Herman Melville (The Hague: Mouton, 1964); Nicholas----·-
Canaday, Jr., Melville and Authority, University of Florida Honographs,
Humanities No. 28 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1968).
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and law rc.:,jrmmovements. In addition, the dichotomy of the ideal
and che real in conflicting views about the source of the law is
a great help in explaining the roots of the problem presented in
Billy Budd. The battle fought over codification among lawyers and
jurists is the best probable source of Melville's condemnation of
the idealist and the extreme rationalist as the most dangerous kind
of fool.
Among Melville's friends in New York City were several who
figured in the attempt to codify the laws of the state. David
Dudley Field, a member of the "Young America" group and a neighbor
of Melville during the 1850's in the Berkshires, and Alexander W.
Bradford, Gansevoort Melville's Albany and New York City acquaintance,
played prominent roles in the fight. Both these men were members of
the codification commissions set up by the legislature in the late
1840's and 1850's. Field is known today as the "Father of Codifica-
tion" because of his lifelong efforts to get the codes written and
to get them accepted by legislatures, not only in New York, but in
the entire world. In addition, political journalists Mathews and
Bryant, both of whom belonged to Duyckinck's and therefore to
Melville's literary circle, occasionally contributed by writing
articles supporting codification. Mathews, for example, wrote
magazine satires, much in the manner of Dickens, on the ponderous,
outmoded court system.
Finally, in 1850, Evert Duyckinck opened the pages of the
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When the British colonists came t'oAmerica~ they brought with
Litera~y World for debate on the subject~ thus providing further
ev:f.Jenceof the group's interest.
Perhaps it is necessary at this point to supply a brief history
of the codification controversy during this formative era in American
3law.
them the Common Law of England. This body.of law is not to be found
written in any book. Instead, having grown up from the customs and
usages of the English people, it was to be found embodied in the
decisions of the courts and 'in the commentaries made by eminent
jurists. To this body of unwritten law were added all the statuatory
laws of England and, in addition, whatever statuatory law was passed
by colonial assemblies.
After the Revolution, the state legislatures passed acts which
declared that the English Common Law, plus all statuatory laws of
England which had been passed before the Revolution, was still in
effect, except those parts which were repugnant to the concepts of
a free government. In addition to this law there was the statuatory
3Alison Reppy, liTheField Codification Concept," in David Dudley
Field: Centenary Essays, ed. Alison Reppy (New York: New York Univer-
sity School of Law, 1949), pp. 17-54; Perry Miller, "The Common Law
in Jacksonian America," The Proceedings of the American Philosophical
Society, 103, No.3 (1959), 463-68; Roscoe Pound, "David Dudley
Field: An Appraisal," in David Dudley Field: Centenary Essays, pp.
3-16; and by the same author, The Formative Era of Anlerican Law
(Boston: Little,Brown and Co.,-r938). --- -- ---
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law of the state and the state and federal constitutions. The
fOl'adation of American law, however, was the English Common Law.
Despite Anglophobia, it was impossible to go to court in America
without the English Common Law, even in constitutional cases,
because the Common Law regulated court procedure. The Common
Law also governed the interpretations, and therefore the effective
law, of the constitutions themselves.
In 1830, when Lemuel Shaw became Chief Justice of the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court, the debate over whether America should accept
the English Common Law on a permanent basis was far from settled.
The establishment of older lawyers and judges, of which Shaw was
a part, supported the British system, not as a temporary relief
measure for the young republic, but as a time-tested body of wisdom
and jurisprudence which America could ill afford to lose. For a
long time, those who wished to see the Common Law adopted had the
advantage over their opponents, because there was nothing here to
replace it. In any case not covered by a statute, the Common Law
had to be relied upon, even by its worst enemies.
Those who objected to the Common Law had several complaints.
First, it was not written in any systematic form and was therefore
difficult to know. The people had limited access to the law. As
a result they were dependent upon lawyers to conduct their business
and upon judges to tell them where justice lay. Second, the pre-
cedents of the Common Law were criticized for being more appropriate
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to the problems of an earlier age and a diff~rent country than to
those of nineteenth century America, a difficulty which increa~ed
as economic conditions diverged more and more from those of the
past. Third, the complex and rigid procedures of the Common Law made
justice expensive and time-consuming.
Most of the judgeships, certainly those in the courts of last
resort---like those of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
where Melville's father-in-law, Lemuel Shaw, sat---were appointive,
not elective. It is therefore not hard to see why Jacksonian Demo-
crats and their successors tilted so earnestly at the prerogatives
and privileges of the judiciary. The Whigs, on the other hand,
particularly those whose wealth was in property rights rather
than con@erce, were understandably content with a legal procedure
"feudally conceived" and with the technicalities of the chancery
court which kept property a frozen rather than a liquid asset.
For the above reasons a faction had grown up that wished to
replace the Common Law with a written code such as the one that
Napoleon had set up in France. These reformers began their most
resounding attack in the days of the Jacksonian democracy. They
proposed to digest the scattered elements of the Common Law, em-
bodied only in the implications of the thousands of historical
cases decided by the English bench, into a set of abstract princi-
ples to be used in deciding all cases in the future.
Commissions had been formed in several states to study the
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idea of codifying the law. In Massachusetts agitation led by Robert
Ra~toul had resulted in a study which returned its report as early
as 1836. The project was headed. however, by Joseph Story, who
coerced its findings into his own legal theories. These ideas
supported the Common Law and merely called for more American
commentaries upon it.
The situation in New York was somewhat different. New York
was a hotbed of the radical Democrats. The legal establishment
there did not take the initiative in dealing with the pressure as
the Massachusetts bar had wisely done, but left the project in the
hands of those genuinely interested in radical reform.
David Dudley Field opened his fight in 1839, long before he
knew Herman }1elville. He began agitation at the instigation of
Henry Sedgwick, by publishing his Letter to G. C. Verplanck ~ the
4Reform of the Judicial System of This. State. In this pamphlet he
argues for a constitutional amendment to authorize either the
legislature or the judiciary to reform itself without further re-
Course to constitutional amendment. Field led the agitation
throughout the 1840's, making speeches and publishing pamphlets
in favor of the codification concept. The most notable of these
was a treatise which appeared in January, 1847, What Shall Be Done
with the Practice of the Courts? Shall It Be Wholly Reformed?
4David Dudley Field, Letter to G. C. Verplanck of the Reform
of the Judicial System of This St~e-(New York: n. p., 1840).
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In 1846, the constitutional reforms which Field and the other
Questi0ns Addressed to Lawyers, a copy of which, bearing the signa-
tu~e of Herman Gansevoort, is to be found in the Gansevoort-Lansing
Collection of the New York Public Library.5
Democrats had pushed for the overhaul of the court system had gone
through in large part, and the legislature had been empowered to
reform procedure. By 1847 he had persuaded the legislature to set
up a commission to study the question and to write the code as well.
After getting himself appointed to the commission, he lost no time
in writing the procedural code, which combined in one process the
features of the courts of both law and equity. This code was
adopted by the New York legislature in 1848, procedure being the
Meanwhile Field continued codifying the criminal and civil
area most conspicuously in need of reform.
parts of the law and submitted these late in 1849. His criminal
and civil codes, however, ran into the backlash of conservative
too far already with the reorganization of the judiciary and the
elements of the legal profession who .felt that things had progressed
adoption of the procedural code. In January, 1850, they voted
down any further codes, and by April, repealed the codification
commission itself. It was just at this point that we find Herman
SDavid Dudley Field, What Shall Be Done with the Practice of
the Courts? Shall It Be ~y Reformed? Questio~Addressed to
Lawyers (New York: J. S. Voorhies, 1847).
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Shortly thereafter, Field got busy campaigning to revive the
Melville aud Field hobnobbing during an August picnic in the
Ber'kahd.r es •
issue in the state. He wrote several pamphlets, including the
following three: The Administration of the Code; A Short Manual
of Pleading under the Code; and The Codification of the Common
Law. 6 By 1857 the legislature had reauthorized a codification
commission, known as the Field Commission, and the work of writing
the code was resumed. On this second commission was Alexander W.
Bradford, Gansevoort Melville's old friend; he helped with that
Although the Field codes were not accepted in New York State
portion of the civil code relating to the estates of deceased
persons.
until the early 1880's and then only in a much revised for~m, they
It is useful at this point to compare the chronology of the
were adopted eventually by twenty~six,)(j).bhe'r.:s.tlat:e!s,'primarily ·.those
newly formed out of the territories. In addition, the codes played
a significant part in the English Judicature 1874 and in the
development of Indian jurisprudence.
controversy with the dates of Melville's writing. Although agita-
tion to open the question of codification had been going on in
America since the end of the 18th century, it was not until the
6Henry Martin Field, The Life of David Dudley Field (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1898):-PP.~9-70.
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1840's that any significant activity began in New York. Field
pub:ished his first pamphlet in 1839~ but his most intensive and
effective efforts were made in 1846-47. Field was agitating for
these reforms, with the aid of men whom Melville knew quite well,
just at the time when the latter was writing Typee, Omoo, and
Mardi. In 1850, while Moby-Dick was in progress, a second period
of agitation began when Field's codes were rejected and the first
codification commission disbanded. We have already noted Melville's
association with Field at this time, and the simultaneous appearance
of the issue in the Literary World. Pierre also belongs to this
second period. of agitation, as do Bartleby and Israel Potter.
The codification controversy was interrupted in America by
the Civil War, and it was not until the late 1870's that effective
action on the question began once more in New York State. The
Albany Law Journal, which began publication in 1870; carried many
articles on codification, some of which specifically attacked the
code's weakness on the law of malicious homicide, another issue of
continuing interest to Melville. A criminal code was eventually
accepted by the New York legislature in 1883-1884. In 1878, Melville
returned to the problems of codes and judge-made law in writing
Billy Budd.
The scheme of argumentation of the codification debate was as
follows: first, the nature of man had to be settled; second, the
nature of law in relationship to man; and third, a resulting political
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Preliminary to his discussjJn of two concepts of nature in
philosophy.
Billy Budd, John Noone paused to make the following observation:
Perhaps the first impression a student receives
upon reading Billy Budd, Foretopman, is that it
reflects something of that clash of ideas which
gave such vitality to the 18th century. IJithout
asserting an historical connection between specific
works of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, on the one
hand and Billy Budd on the other, it appears that
Melville has drawn upon these systems insofar as
they are symbolically represented in some vague
"climate" or "stream" of intellectual history.7
In October, 1841, and January, 1842, there appeared in the
After examining the debates of the legal reformers, and codifiers
in particular, one need no longer cast about for this '~istorical
connection" or to view Melville's source as merely some "vague
'climate' or 'streaml of intellectual history." The codification
issue had re-opened the eighteenth century clash of ideas about
the nature of man versus the nature of the laws that govern him.
American Jurist a lengthy two-part article by J. Louis Telkampf of
Union College, Albany, who argued in favor of codification.8
7John B. Noone, "Two Concepts of Nature in Billy Budd,"
American Literature, 29 (1957), 249.
8J• Louis Telkampf, "On Codification, or the Systematizing of
the Law, II American Jurist, 26, No. 51 (1841), 113-144 and No. 52
(l842) , 283-329.
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Telkampf begins the discussion by reminding his readers that there
were two basic concepts of law in juristic thinking. The firs~
was the notion of the law as a mere texture or web of external re-
strictions placed upon man in society like a loose fitting garment
in order to bring him into the minimal cooperation required by
social living. He points out that this concept is founded upon
the idea of human nature which is basically Hobbesian (De Cive)
and entertained as well by Spinoza, Hume, Haller, Hugo, and Fichte.
To these thinkers man is basically irrational, swayed most by
his needs, deSires, and illusions. The social contract improves
his lot by bringing order into reality, but the order may be ex-
pedient and arbitrary. The law, by these lights, is "but an empty
shape" (Telkampf, p. 117). If one accepts fundamental irrationality
at the base of our social restrictions, Telkampf asserts, "it might
easily occur that the same thing should be both right and wrong at
once; and thus morality and law would have been reduced to a chimera"
(Telkampf. p. 117).
Melville explores this problem in Pierre. In fact, the premise
suggested by Telkampf becomes that of the protagonist in the novel,
when Pierre decides that the social restrictions lodged against
Isabel and DeIly Ulver are without reason. By the end of the book,
Pierre soon finds that he has reduced vice and virtue to chimeras,
ironically because he attempted to replace the time-honored rules
with ones of pure ratiocination.
2:'0
The opposing view~ as described by Telkarnpf, sees law not as
arbitrary or expedient, but as founded upon the law of G~d and
Nature and as growing out of the rational nature of man. It is
not an empty shape, but a solid structure rooted in man's essential
being. This idea of the law was entertained by Socrates, Xenophon,
and Plato, among the ancients, and by Blackstone~ Hooker, Grotius,
Montesquieu, Rousseau, Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, Krause, Wolf, and
Hoffman, among the moderns. It is the view of law, said Telkampf,
espoused by those who believe that the law can be codified, or
systematized. "The source of the law is in the ideal. We may define
law as the result of reason applied to the external affairs of man;
when applied to the internal affairs, it is called morality" (Telkampf,
p. 121). Later we shall see some of the problematic ramifications
of locating the source of the law in the ideal.
Telkampf's assertion that he and others who wished to codify
the law rejected the Hobbesian doctrine implied that anyone who
opposed their efforts did entertain these cynical opinions; and,
in all justice to this inference, it is not difficult to imagine
that the conservatives of the legal establishment and their cohorts
in the American ar:i,stocracyof wealth would have readily contem-
plated the encroaching masses with just this squinting Hobbesian
misanthropy. At any rate, that the Common Law advocates were not
above describing some parts of the law as arbitrary is eVidenced
by the following extract from a friendly review of Kent's Commentaries,
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which had just appeared in a new edi~ion in 1840:
In what we have ueen daying, it has been taken
for granted that tt.e case actually had a right and
a wrong side; but it is clear that there must be
matters in which it is not so much importance in
how the law is fix~d, as that it should be cer-
tainly fixed; and in all cases we should expect
to find the judges adhering steadily to that which
they might have found in use, without regarding
any other consideration than the desire of firm-
ness and stability.9
Kent himself says in the Commentaries that a distinction is to
be made between those laws arising out of the principles of natural
law and those which are merely positive law decided somewhat arbi-
trarily by whatever power of the state happened to hold sway at
their foundation. Yet Kent is careful to advance the claim in
behalf of such laws that these sections of the positive law---mostly
concerning real estate and legal procedure---are not entirely arbi-
trary or divorced from reason.lO
The British Common Law had indeed grown "like Topsy" through
the centuries. It had never been formulated all at once by the light
of rational principles alone. Thus there was some justificati·on to
the charge that there was much in the Common Law which had evolvt'd
from arbitrary and non-rational motives of interest. The history
911E. L. C., It review of Kent's Commentaries .Q.!! American Lt\w by Jas.
Kent, 4th ed, (1840) in American Jurist, 25, No. 49 (1841), lO4.
lOJames Kent, Commentaries .2.!!. American Law, 4th ed. (New York:
printed for the author, 1840), p. 1.
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The codifiers chose to base their arguments upon a Rousseauvian
of the English law, if not that of all law, seemed to support Hobbes'
theories.
ideal of man. This viewpoint accorded well with their other demo-
cratic notions; but the position required a curious retreat, as
Noone has indicated, to philosophical ideals long since put aside,
and to a replay of a debate rehearsed nearly a century before. The
codifiers were defeated in the first round by broadsides from the
same arsenals of empiricism and "common sense" which had blasted
the detached rationalism of the prior neo-Platonic revival. Never-
importance of the nature of man to the nature of the law, and raised
theless, they did succeed in reviving the controversy over the
questions as to the kind of wisdom needed for solving ethical dilemma.
One noted scholar in American history has concluded that the enor-
mous quantity of impassioned rhetoric expended in the codification
struggle was really directed at contrasting ideals of American soci-
ety (the democratic possibility v. the rule of established interest),
11
rather than toward the immediate issues of law reform ~ see
Herman Melville's orientation on the above question seems
basically Hobbesian. His difficulty was in reconciling this Bssump-
tion with an equally strong belief in democracy. In the ~~rly work,
11Perry Miller, The Life of the Mind in America from the
Revolution to the CivUWar (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
Inc., 1965)-,-p~254-55.
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Typee, Melville is willing to speak of natural man in the tone of
Rousseau's approbation. Yet the qualities for which the primj~ive
is admired in Typee are indwelling principles of virtue and robust
health. Neither of these have anything to do with men's rational
faculties or with the idea of Nature as essentially rational. In-
stead, Melville finds that the primitive is motivated by innate im-
pulses and governed by mysterious taboos.
In Typee, no essential distinction is made between the civilized
man and the native. Melville's juxtaposition of the cannibal king
with the French admiral du Petit Thouars, ostensibly for the purpose
of contrasting them, is filled with ironic overtones. A few pages
preceding he had raised the question as to who might properly be
called a savage in the light of the European atrocities committed
against the islanders, which, ttproclaimed to the pagan inhabitants
the spirit that reigned in the breasts of Christian soldiers.,,12
Between the Frenchman and the Polynesian there is a difference
created by the effects of civilization, which had in the case of
the admiral "gradually converted the mere creature into the semblance
of all that is elevated and grand" (italics mine, Typee, p. 29).
The French admiral. represented the most civilized, most "rational"
people in the world; the naked island chief, the most non-intellectual,
12Herman Melville, Typee, ed. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker,
and G. Thomas Tanselle (Evanston and Chicago: The Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 1968), p. 26.
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natural people to be found. Yet, Melville suggests, the difference
between them is an illusion. Tp~ civilized man is no less a savage
than his primitive counterpart. In fact, the white civilized man
is "the most ferocious creature on the face of the earth" (Typee,
p. 125).
It is interesting to note also that Melville's criterion in
judging the relative merits of the primitive and the civilized man
is in terms of the Benthamite emphasis on "the greatest happiness,"
which is in itself a non-rational good feeling. Elsewhere in the
novel he tells the reader that "despite all the advantages of his
condition, the Polynesian savage, surrounded by all the luxurious
provisions of nature, enjoyed an infinitely happier, though certainly
a less intellectual existence, than the self-complacent European"
(Typee, p. 124). One's happiness, therefore, did not appear to be
dependent upon the development of the rational faculty at all.
John Bernstein has noted in Pacifism and Rebellion in the
Writings of Herman Melville that one of the motifs in Typee and
II 13Omoo is the "noble savage" contrasted with the "corrupted savage .
By extension, one can infer that the corrupted savage is not just
the PolyneSian degenerate of Tahiti, but the civilized European as
well. Furthermore, if one were to ask exactly what it is which has
13John Bernstein, Pacifism and Rebellion in the Writings of
Herman Melville (The Hague: Mouton, 1964), pp. 20-21.
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corrupted the natives and the whites alike, the answer would be
the imposition and strict mainte~ance of arbitrary codes which
tend to distort human nature, for example, the missionaries' im-
position of Christian rationalism upon the natives. In Typee
Melville specifically condemns the pernicious effect that arbitrary
codes have had upon western civilization (Typee, p. 201).
In many respects, according to the picture presented by Melville,
civilization and Christianity had canonized and overdeveloped the
unlovelier aspects of man's inclinations: vanity, greed, lust for
power. Left in surroundings close to a state of nature, these dis-
positions are meliorated and subdued by constant contact with the
harmonious bounty of creation. The rational faculty, when not kept
in its proper place, only tends to usurp nature, often to no felici-
tous end.
In Typee and Omoo Melville demonstrated that there is no essential
intellectuality in nature. The rational order found in the law of
nature is a peculiar emphasis of civilized man. The European, even
more than the Polynesian savage, places faith in systems of signs and
codes, which are seen upon close scrutiny to have their origin in our
own mysterious impulses coupled with the fortuitous course of event.
Civilized man is duped by the credulous faith that the rational
faculty is the only valid path to the truth. As Melville wrote to
Hawthorne,
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••• perhaps, after all, there is E£ secret.
We incline to think that the Problem of the
Universe is like the Freemason's mighty secret,
so terrible to all children. It turns out, at
last, to consist in a triangle, a mallet, and
an apron,---nothing more! 14
In Mardi Babbalanja and Media carry most of the di~cussion about
the nature of man. Babbalanja's "diabolical theory" is a case in
point. He lays it down as a maxim from old Bardianna that all men
are bedeviled; i. e., all men are possessed by devils, or as he says,
more properly speaking, the devils are possessed by men. His own,
Azzageddi, seems to break out in raving whenever Babbalanja in his
meditations or discourses seems to be getting close to the inmost
nature of things. The closer one gets to truth, the more inadequate
rationality becomes. Elsewhere Babbalanja remarks upon the diffi-
culty of trying to communicate in any rational way the deepest part
of his being. He speaks of theltworld of wonders ensphered within the
spontaneous conSCiousness," and of his error in trying "to invest
sublunary signs with celestial sense.,,15 He tells Mohi that "truth
is in things, and not in words, truth is vOiceless" (Mardi, p. 283).
Man's deepest apprehension of reality is in the mysteriOUS communing
14Herman Melville, The Letters of Herman Melville, ed. Merrill
R. Davis and William H. Gilman (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1960), p. 125.
15Herman Melville, Mardi and ~ Voyage Thither, ed. Harrison
Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle (Evanston and
Chicago: Northwestern University Press and the Newberry Library,
1970), pp. 352-53.
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of his being with all that is.
The philosophers of Mardi do not reject reason entirely, but
insist it be assigned to its proper place. There is no impiety in
the right use of our reason (Mardi, p. 426). Reason was the first
revelation, and Babbalanja goes on to explain:
••• so far as it tests all others, it has prece-
dence over them. It comes direct to us without
suppression or interpolation; and with Oro's in-
disputable primatur. But inspiration though it may
be, it is not so arrogant as some think. Nay, far
too humble, at times it submits to the grossest
indignities. Though in its best estate, not in-
fallible; so far as it goes, for us, it is reliable.
When at fault it stand still. We speak not of
visionaries. But if this our first revelation
stops short of the uttermost, so with all the
others. (Mardi, p , 576)
In the groves of Alma Babbalanja asks whether faith in Alma
does not conflict with reason. He is told that Right-reason and
Alma are the same, or else Alma would be rejected; but Alma must
be known through love, not reason. Thus the followers of Alma
accept his precepts and "seek no comment but our hearts" (Mardi,
p , 628).
In Mardi, therefore, Melville argues that man does indeed possess
a rational faculty, and that God too is rational ("in his faculties,
high Oro is what a man would be," Mardi, p. 426). Yet existence
itself cannot be reduced to one of its attributes, and those who
would confuse the two mistake one path toward the truth for the
truth itself. In his wandering search through the universe for
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wisdom man is ever thrown back upon the promptings of his heart, that
primitive~ non-rational, if not ~rrational, part of his nature~ for
his deepest apprehensions of being.
Yet another clue to Melville's ideas about the basic nature of
man is afforded by his choice of the name "Ishmael" for the observing
narrator of MobX-Dick. The Biblical character of that name was called
a "wild man," and one is reminded of Cooper's use of the name in The
Prairie (1827). In that work "Ishmael Bush" is the name of the bru-
tish, low-browed character who roamed the prairie guided by his
instincts and passions, not by what little intellectual capacity he
possessed. Likewise, Melville's Ishmael was guided by the promptings
of his own irrational "hypo" and by the impulsive confidence he
placed in Queequeg over the choice of the Pequod. Once on board, he
found himself inexplicably drawn into Ahab's fantastic hunt. His
participation in the captain's mad chase is still another non-rational
decision of his mind.
In MobX-Dick Melville is fairly explicit about his concept of
natural law. Although nature Can be bounteous and harmonious, its
balance is not static. Change goes on constantly; as in the flowing
balance of an ecological cycle, for example. In Typee the Poly-
nesians were admired for their unspoiled natures, especially in
contrast to their European counterparts. Yet the reader was never
allowed to forget that they were after all cannibals only tenuously
restrained by notions of hospitality toward their outlandish captive.
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By the time Melville was writing Moby-D1ck, his emphasis shifted
from the bounty of nature to what he called its "universal can~li-
16ba1ism". Cannibalism is one of the motifs of that book, mani-
fested in the Queequeg-Ishmael relationship, the decoration of the
ship) the nature of her crew, etc. The reader who keep& the idea
of "natural law" Melville presented in Moby-Dick in mind while
reading Billy Budd will begin to suspect that many critics of that
work have been holding the picture upside down, so to speak. We
shall return to this point at the end of the chapter.
Pierre's Isabel is a female Ishmael. She is an outcast, a
by-blow of the human race. She too WaS motivated by her impulses,
and (like Babbalanja) by incoherent mystical assurances of identity
emanating from some source deep within her own being. She exerted
a physical and spiritual magnetism over Pierre, which drew him
17"wantonly, ignorantly, and unintendingly."
People must make constantly what the existentialists call a
"leap of faith". Before ratiocination can begin, they must commit
themselves to their premises; or, like the wretched infidel in ~IobX-
Dick's "The Whiteness of the Whale," they would gaze themselves bl;lnd
16Herman Melville, Moby-Dick: An Authoritative Text ••
Harrison Hayford and Hershel Parker (New York: W. \-1. Norton
Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 235-36; cf. also pp. 255-56.
17Herman Melville, Pierre, ~ the Ambiguities, ed. Harrison Hay-
ford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle (Evanston and Chicago:
The Northwestern University Press and The Newberry Library, 1971),
p. 151.
. ,
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stari06 at the leprous, palsied universe (Moby-Dick, p. 170). In a
nU:Jber of works Melville portrayed humanity as the dupe of its ab-
solute need to believe (Mardi, "Faith and Knowledge," pp , 296-97).
A person's particular beliefs are determined by the eVidence of his
or her senses tempered by his or her desires, which in turn arise
out of the non-rational part of human nature interacting with the
fateful course of events.
Thus even the casual reader of Melville's work must soon come
to the conclusion that the author was preoccupied with settling the
question of man's basic nature and its relationship to the order in
human reality. It is significant that as early as Mardi he was
drawn to the conclusion that the rational faculty is inadequate, that
the deepest apprehension of the truth cannot be captured by a mere
sequence of language. "Truth is in things, not in words," says
Babbalanja, thus signifying the futility of any effort to abstract
truth fully into written, "codified" principles. Codes can only
distort truth. Truth must always lie immanent in the ongoing ex-
perience of existence.
For this reason, as might be expected about his commitments
about the nature of man, Melville could not have shared his friends'
wish to see the law codified. His thinking follows that of the
opposition that wanted to leave the law embodied in custom and
usage, and in precedents. The past must act as a guide, but not a
dictator, to future decision making.
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These thoughts bring us to some approximation of Melville's
attitude toward law and his preoccupation with the outlaw or r~negade.
Because man is liable to the delusions of imperfect wisdom~ whether
they stem from the imagination or from the rational faculty, and
because he is further subject to being bedeviled by the irresistible
promptings of a non-rational will, law is a necessary restraint with-
out which man would do his fellows harm. Furthermore~ law embodies
the human wisdom available to create the equitable situation of
allowing individuals the greatest freedom possible in our soc1al
condition. The plot of Pierre demonstrates what happens when law,
as well as custom and usage, is put aside. Yet because the nature of
man and the universe cannot be crystallized once and for all in the
institution or in any written body of absolute, ideal principle, there
is always a part of man left out, not taken care of, by the systems
of law which man creates. No matter how perfect or right such law
may seem to be, it is never to be mistaken for a definition of man's
essential nature or the nature of existence. The search for truth
must always remain open---ttMardi behind, an ocean before" (Mardi,
p. 652). Each man must always remain, in his deepest nature, an
outlaw and a renegade, if he stays true to himself and to the ideal
of a more perfect wisdom always to be attained sometime in the future.
One of the questions which codifiers and Common Law advocates
debated with some confUSion, until they were interrupted by the
Civil War, was whether it were possible to formulate precisely in
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written form the rules and principles of law. Systematizing had
already been accomplished to some degree in digests, indexes, ~ud
comprehensive commentaries. Some Common Law proponents were even
willing to concede that the criminal law and the political law might
be codified, but upon the unwritten civil law, that which controlled
contracts, real estate, inheritance, tort actions, etc., they stood
fast. They did not deny that the principles and maxims of this law
were reasonable, but argued, instead, that in an abstracted form
such rules were unserviceable without the attendant details and
circumstances out of which they arose. Separating such principles
from their origins in actual cases would lead to a distortion of their
meaning and to a source of ambiguity for future decisions. They
argued that such ambiguity could be resol~ed only by the medieval
method of philological interpretation, a debate of definitions and
intentions referable to the authors of the code, or by a return to
the vast body of reports that the code was supposed to supersede. If
the first method were to be followed, the ambiguity of language
divorced from its concrete antecedents would produce only confusion.
If the latter course were chosen, the code would be practically
useless except as another index.
The argument, for our purposes, may be reduced to four ports.
First, is it possible to lay down universal maxims, no matter how
rational, which divorced form contingent circumstances, could once
and for all determine decisions in all possible cases in the future?
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Second) does ambiguity result when ideal abstractions are used as
a ~uide without considering the concrete realities out of ~hich these
arose? Third, was it desirable to divorce present law from the
history out of t-rhichsuch law arose? Fourth what are the ramifi-
cations of identifying the law or the source of the law in the
ideal? Any student of Melville will recognize at once that all four
of these propositions are debated· and dramatized throughout his
work, and in Mardi, Pierre, and Billy Budd especially.
The legal establishment, led by such men as James Kent, opposed
the reforms being pushed by radical Democrats and their liberal
associates. Like the members of that other bastion of conservatism,
the clergy, orthodox legal philosophers during the first half of
the 19th century had buttressed their apologetics with the principles
of Scottish Connnon Sense Realism. Clinging to the philosophical
compromises of the Scottish school, they rejected the idealism of
both rationalist and transcendentalist extremes. Scottish realism,
as one commentator has pointed out,18 had given Americans the means
to be universal while being particular and had shown them the way to
avoid the subtleties and "shocking conclusions" of men like Hume and
Berkeley.
The Scottish School of Realism, also called the Scottish School
18Richard J. Peterson, Scottish Common Sense in Amer f.ca, 1768-
1850; an evaluation £f its influence (Washington: American University,
1963; Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1973).
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of Common Sense, posited the existen~e of the extramental world.
Further, this existence did not ~epend upon anyone's apprehension
of it. As far as anyone can know, the nature of the extramental
world is Just what most people would agree that it is. In other
words, for all practical purposes it is exactly what common sense
tells us it is. The position was most succintly, if not most
soundly, expressed by Samuel Johnson, when---as the story goes---
he reacted to David Hume's proposal that the world might not exist
at all, by kicking a stone and crying "Thus I refute him." Positing
the nature of the extramental world and describing its nature accord-
ing to the perseptions of common sense allows one to "fall back upon
the old furniture of the mind.11 The approach permits one to avoid
the extreme skepticism that says one cannot know at all whether any-
thing exists. It also skirts the danger of having to account for
each individual aberration in the perception of this reality. In
this manner Scottish realists escaped the pitfalls of Lockean empiri-
cism while at the same time dismissing the ideality and mysticism of
neo-Platonism. The philosophy provided a path that was safe for
educators and that was available to anyone who could claim to be in
touch with common sense.
Those who opposed the codifiers modeled their tactics upon the
attacks which realists such as Kames, Reid, and Stewart had success-
fully launched against the rationalists of the 18th century. Like
most educated men of their day, the conservative la~ers had been
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coJ:ege training in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Now,
made to memorize these arguments as part of a regular course of
when pressed by opponents who avowedly enlisted rationalism in their
cause, the orthodox faithful did not hesitate to throw such prepared
Proponents of the Common Law attacked the rationalism of the
rebuttal into the breach, confident of its reception among the educa-
ted public.
codifiers as a brand of idealism which might be appropriate to pure
science, but not to an applied science like the law. In a friendly
review of Kent's Commentaries, one writer, who signed himself
"E. L. C.," Charlestown, N.H.," began his article with the following
Law has been many times called a practical science.
It might also be called an experimental science---for it
is always to a certain degree tentative, and may be and
often is changed, if its rules are not found to work we l.L
when practically applied. • • •
Now it is obvious that a system of arbitrary rules,
prospectively enacted by the sovereign authority, could
never possess the elasticity essentially necessary for
this. A system which should leave the law in the breast
of the judge, till the occasion arose on which it should
be declared, and then supply the principles of morality,
religion and humanity, to the solution of the problem,
seems the only one capable of producing such a result.
Such a system, the English Common Law may in general
terms be affirmed to be. (liE.L. C. ," review, pp. 102-103)
concise statement of the argument:
The term "arbitrary rules, prospectively enacted by the sovereign
authority" applied to a code to be passed by a democratic legislature
might be confusing to one who did not know that both sides of the
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debate had fallen into the practice ~f accusing each other of the
same faults. The Common Law adv0cates maintained that purely
rational principles were so abstract as to be merely arbitrary with
respect to contingencies. Codifiers insisted, however; that such
wri.tten principles could be formulated and arranged so that lithe
right mode for determining any particular case should be visible
on the face of it~" and so be within the grasp of any person of
scientific attainments. Codifiers also argued that Common Law
practice was arbitrary because of the latitude allowed to the judge's
discretion and because of the vast structure of historically evolved
forms and procedures which had to be supported when trying a case.
By and large the familiar tone adopted by the legal establish-
ment toward the codifiers was that of a wearied elder forced to deal
with sophomoric nonsense. The following comment by Daniel Webster
is typical of these condescending dismissals:
It yet appears to us to be among the idlest and
weakest theories of the age, that it is possible to
provide, beforehand, by positive enactment, and in
such manner as to avoid doubts and ambiguities, for
all questions to which the variety of human concerns
gives rise.19
Webster made this statement as early as 1818, but~ as Perry Miller
has pointed out, this "thesis would continue to be the principle
19As quoted in Perry Miller, "The Common Law and Codification in
Jacksonian Amcrica~tt pp. 465-66.
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argument of the anti-codifiers throu~hout the controversy.20
It was repeated again in 18~1, for example, by Burlington
Chauncey Goodrich in an article titled "Codificationll which appeared
in the Southern Review for August of that year. Goodrich quoted a
M. Portalis, an eminent French jurist of the 18th century, who in
1800 was placed on the French committee for the redaction of the
Civil Code. According to M. Portalis,
Nothing were more puerile than to take such
precautions as would prevent a judge from having
anything more to do, than to apply a precise text.
To prevent arbitrary judgments, we should expose
society to a thousand iniquitous judgments, and
what is still worse, we should run a risk of having
no justice administered at all; . • • we should
make of legislation an immense labyrinth in which
reason and memory would be equally lost.21
The crux of philosophical debate over codification concerned the
sources of ambiguity in man's attempt to translate his experience
into a usable body of wisdom for the purpose of creating truth and
justice in his world. Those who felt that such wisdom could be
codified into easily understood maxims and rules regarded nature
20perry Miller, The Life of the Mind in America, p. 251.
21Burlington Chauncey Goodrich, "Codification,1t Southern Review,
7, No. 14 (1831), 407.
as an orderly creation, readily apprehended by means of the ratioral
faculty. In Nelville's work, Ahab and Pierre are ideali!'ltsof this
sort. Ahab howls "0 Nature, and 0 soul of man! how fdr beyond nIl
utterance are your linked analogies! not the smallest atom stirs or
lives in matter, but has its cunning duplicate in the mind" (Moby-
Dick, p. 264). It is part of Melville's irony to suggest that such
extreme rationalists are really insane. In Billy Budd he asserted
that certain madmen had minds "peculiarly subject to the latJof
22reason".
However, characters like Plinlimmon, Franklin, Falsgrave, and
the various personas of the Confidence Man reject the notion thnt
wisdom may be codified into rules or that reality is such an easy
mystery to solve. Moreover, no matter what one might think of their
ethics, these figures are nevertheless portrayed by Melville as
being eminently sane men. It is significant also that in the legal
contr~versy, those who opposed the codification scheme emphasized
a fundamental inscrutability in reality, for which man must compensate
by constantly readjusting and perfecting his Wisdom. These anti-
codifiers verge at times on the edge of confessing a moral ambiguity
about events not unlike that which plagued Melville's peace of mind.
Codifiers argued that Common Law advocates Wished to lJrescrve
22Herman Melville, Billy Budd, Sailor (An Inside Narrative). cd.
Hershel Parker and Merton Seal~Jr. (Chicago and London: l~l1i-
versity of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 76.
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the ambiguity of the law by leaving it unwritten for the purposes
of judicial discretion, a power they equated with the caprices of
tyranny. Their opponents replied by maintaining that any attempt
to formulate universal maxims or rules of law abstracted from the
data of experience would only multiply the sources of ambiguity
by replacing reality with a chimera of mere words. Under such
conditions, man would be tyrannized by the arbitrary and treacherous
nature of language. Pierre, Melville's persona of the philosophical
novelist, expressed just these same frustrations with the limitations
of language.
Opponents of the codification scheme also criticized the notion
that perfect justice was possible here on earth. Codifiers, it
must be remembered, were idealists who wished to divorce America from
the corruptions of European civilization. Mathews and Bryant, for
example, were nationalists who argued for the supremacy of nature
and the American experience. If one examines the backgrounds of
men like D. D. Field and the Sedgwicks, one finds the Puritan heritage
of Stockbridge conspicuous in their upbringing, always a purer vari-
ety than that of Boston. Such men were heartily committed to the
American dream of re-creating an Eden here on earth. America was a
second chance given by God to man for undoing some of the mistakes
of the past and starting over again in virgin territory. They actunl-
ly believed that Americans had a real chance for creating n perfect
society. Their opponents reasoned much more sensibly, it would seem,
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that Americans had already brought over and established European
civilization in America and that furthermore 1n this temporal,
fallen world society wOuld always be imperfect. Absolute morality
and perfect justice are standards by whicQ we are guided, but
they are always hedged by the contingencies of conflicting interest
and the historical evolution of circumstances. At any rate, the
confrontation between the two systems of thought are to be found in
Melville's Pierre in terms strikingly similar to the formulas
quoted above.
In that novel the protagonist creates the worst disaster of
inequity, not to mention iniquity, that Melville's satiric humor
could devise. The portrayal of the "codifying" Pierre as a Fool
of Truth must have come as an unpleasant comment to those in the
"Young America" group who ;were·"actively campaigning for codification.
The active presence of the codifiers 1n the Duyckinck group may
account in part for George Duyckinck's bilious attack on Pierre in
the Literary World and for some of the rift that developed between
Melville and his former associates among the radical Democrats. With
these thoughts in mind, we may proceed with the interpretation of
Pierre from the perspective of the codification debate.
Pierre clashes with his mother and Mr. Falsgrave, the family
minister, because he wishes to get the clergyman to sanction some
abstract principle by which he can resolve his dilemma regarding
Isabel. He proceeds under the notion that truth and justice are
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absolute ideals which may be formulated and expressed regardless of
circumstances. Of course he is ~revented from explaining any of
the circumstances he ha~ in mind by his mother's presence. He finds
that Falsgrave is unwilling to separate moral principles from their
temporal contingencies. In a curious echo of Daniel lvebstert swords
quoted above, the minister tells Pierre,
It is not every question, however direct, Mr. Glendinning,
which can conscientiously be answered with a yes or no.
Millions of circumstances modify all moral questions; so
that though conscience may possibly dictate freely in any
known special case; yet by one universal maxim, to em-
brace all moral contingencies,---this is not only im-
possible, but the attempt, to me, seems foolish.
(Pierre~ p. 102)
Melville deliberately connected Falsgrave to the Scottish School
by bringing him to the door in the middle of the night "invested in
his very becoming studentfs wrapper of Scotch plaid" (Pierre, p. 163).
As a real life figure, Falsgrave would be against codification. He
and Mrs. Glendinning have made their decision according to the 10ng-
established wisdom of the community. Indeed; if Pierre were to do
throws out or burns all his old things, so that he is left without
the same and fall back upon "the old furniture of the mind," as the
Scottish School advised, he would cast his lot with the conventional
society and marry Lucy Tartan. Instead, Pierre, like the codifiers,
his past, "untrammeledly his ever-present self" (Pierre, p. 199).
Pierre makes the mistake of thinking that the decisions made
by this "common senseI! wisdom are purely arbitrary, having grown up
2~2
out of the customs and usages of a secular world. The world and
its past he takes to be worthless ephemerae, less real a~d le~~
valuable than ideal principles of an absolute morality. For the
realist, however (in philosophical jargon, the "positivist"), such
principles have no existence at all without the events and circum-
stances which form their embodiment.
Further on in Pierre, Melville in his authorial voice advises
the reader that man must not get lost in the "hyperborean regions"
of truth, because in that "rarified atmosphere" man "entirely loses
the directing compass of his mind; for arrived at the Pole, to
whose barreness only it points, there the needle indifferently
respects all points of the horizon alike" (Pierre, p , 165). To
lose sight of contingency and to devote oneself to principle only
is to make the mistake of thinking that man can measure truth by
his rational abstractions. The paradox is, as any good writer knows,
that the more divorced from concrete detail expression becomes, the
Finally, in Pierre Melville introduces Plotinus Plinlimmon,
more likely it is to be ambiguous and inadequate to describe any
situation of real life.
whose pamphlet "ChronoruetrLcaLs & Horologicals?" is yet another
demonstration of the same argument, (Pierre, pp. 210-215) that one's
"moral navigation," as one critic has called it,23 must be wIth
23yvor Winters, "Herman Melville and the Problems of Moral Navi-
gation," in Maule's Curse: Seven Studies in American Obscurantism
(New York: New Directions, 1938), pp. 53-89.
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reference to both unchanging idealities (the sun and the Greenwic~
meridian) and to ever-changing present reality (wherever life cakes
us through time and space). The utility of the unchanging ideal is
to help us get our bearings, to tell us where we are. Changing or
unchanging, such points are not arbitrary at all, but for each man
necessary elements of his existence. Whatever form the local par-
ticulars may have taken, it is certain that these contingencies do
exist and that they do have some form, some undeniable reality which
must be met and dealt with by one who makes a moral decision. P1in-
limmon would deny that one might make ethical decisions with respect
to unchanging, absolute, i. e,, "codified, II p-rinciples alone.
Melville introduces more irony into Pierre's relationship with
the pamphlet. The pamphlet itself is a "codification" of Plinlimmon t s
philosophy, which his disciples made without his consent. In this
"codified" form, Plinlimmon's theory is incomprehensible to Pierre.
Without concrete experience the wisdom is beyond his understanding.
Pierre himself is sophomoric in his rejection of experience as a
guide to conduct. The philosopher Plinlimmon does not take credit
for the pamphlet, which is a distortion of what he really said or
meant. Plinlimmon himself is inscrutable and seems to have his own
dispensations; i. e., he scorns the idea that he might be bound by
rigid, fixed principles. The implication is that whatever his philo-
sophy may be, one cannot write it down into a set of rules.
Plinlimmon and Falsgrave have much the same message for the
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young Pierre. Both have a system for ethical decision identical t~
that of the anti-codifiers in Melville's day. There are other~
among Melville's characters who think likewise. Falsgrave shows
his kinship to them by his brooch. As the minister delivers his
sermon on moral contingency to Pierre. his napkin drops, dramatically
revealing the pinJ which depicts the union of the serpent and the
The history of the patriarch Jacob is interesting not
less for the unselfish devotion which we are bound to
ascribe to him, than from the deep worldly wisdom and
polished Italian tact, gleaming under an air of Arcadian
unaffectedness. The diplomatist and the shepherd are
blended; a union not without warrant; the apostol~~
serpent and dove. A tanned Machiavelli in tents.
dove (Pierre, p. 102). The connection with figures in later works
becomes apparent as Melville characterizes Benjamin Franklin in
Israel Potter by establishing his likeness to the patriarch Jacob and
to Hobbes of Malmesbury. Of Jacob he says:
The patriarch Jacob kept his faith with the inscrutable purposes of
God. At the same time he accepted the world on its own terms. He
this figure would ~ndicate a belief on his part that both kinds of
combined the guile belonging to a knowledge of good and evil with the
heavenly wisdom brought by the dove descending. Melville's use of
wisdom are necessary to a successful life. One may have the heavenly
24Herman MelvllleJ Israel Potter: His Fifty Years of Exile, vol.
IX, The Works of Herman Melville (London: Constable and Co., 1923),
p. 59.
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wisdom, like the old man in the last scene of the Confidence-Man, yet
lack the deep worldly wisdom to save oneself from ruin. One m~y have
the worldly wisdom, like so many of the passengers on board the
Fidele, yet lack the heavenly wisdom to avoid the pitfalls of purely
selfish interest. The best decisions are made, according to these
Melvillean characters, by reference to both principle and immediate
contingency. This is the argument of the anti-codifiers. They
maintained that judicial decision by reference to a code of princi-
ples alone would likely result in miscarriages of justice. It were
better that these principles were left immanent in the great body
of precedents to be extracted and at the same time modified for each
particular case by a learned judge. Franklin himself, as Melville
sees him, spent his life making himself acquainted with both kinds
of wisdom, heavenly and earthly, ideal and rcal. Melville remarked
of the sage, "It was a goodly sight to see this serene, cool and ripe
old philosopher, who by sharp inquisition of the man in the street,
and then long meditating upon him, surrounded by those queer old
instruments, charts and books, had at last grown so wondrous wisel!
(Israel Potter, p. SO). Pointing ahead to the many guises in which
he presents the confidence man, Melville notes that Franklin, "having
carefully weighed the world, . . . could act any part in it" (Israel
Potter, pp. 61-62),
These characters have in common the same metaphysical stance.
They see reality as being made up of two orders, one infinite, ab-
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stract, ideal, and the other finite. imperfect inasmuch as it is
modified by contingencies. He ~.~1Owould move with serenity and
success through life must be able to distinguish the two orders and
keep each'in its proper place.
Good and evil by Falsgrave's and P1inlimmon's lights are too
tangled for Pierre in "fleshly alliances". Yet Pierre himself is
in trouble throughout the novel precisely because he denies his own
fleshly alliances, refusing to recognize them at all, until it
becomes too late to make use of the perception of his error. In
trying to equate the ideal with the real, Pierre succeeds only in
living in a land of shadows until the phenomenal reality he has
let out of his control overtakes and crushes him.
We now have the answer to our first question. Judging from
the evidence of Pierre, it would seem that Melville thinks it neither
possible nor desirable to attempt to lay down universal maxims, no
matter how rational, which could determine ethical decisions in all
possible cases. This conclusion brings us to our second question:
does ambiguity result when ideal abstractions are used as a guide
without first considering the concrete realities out of which these
arose?
Melville, like Common Law advocates and other legal positivists,
demonstrates that once truth is divorced from the phenomenal world,
ambiguity begins. Words, according to Mardi, are as empty and mean-
ingless as algebraic signs, which may stand for whatever one pleases.
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Yet the ambiguity possible to words may be of so many kinds that
perhaps it is best for the purpOFcS of discussion to limit ourselves
to sources of ambiguity rather than the ambiguities themselves.
One may lay it down as a ground rule of the problems with which
Melville presents his readers that one may not dispense with "v1sab1c
[sic] things," "undoubted deeds," or "living acts". Ultimate truth
is never available to man, but his truest path is one which keeps
him in contact with the real extra-mental world. In this respect one
may say that Melville's metaphysics were in agreement with those of
the Scottish realists and of their descendants in the modern school
of legal positivists.
In Mardi Melville demonstrated frequently the predicament of
those who are cut off from empirical reality testing. Donjalolo is
confined to the groves of Willamilla where he is reduced to using
the eyes and ears of others if he wishes to know the world. He is
presented with contradictory descriptions of the coral reef. It is
interesting to note that the evidence ~~ in this episode is
not mutually exclusive, but the hypotheses which this evidence was
supposed to support were. As it turned out the most nearly correct
synthesis was that the reef was neither all red nor all white, but
red and white in different locations. The abstraction needed to be
revised on the basis of the evidence available. But the perception
was only available to Babbalanja who had seen the whole reef (Mardi,
p. 250).
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In Babbalanja's story of the n:i.neblind men who set out to see
the world, each found a stem of a many-trunked tree, stood by it,
refused to heed each other's plea to examine further evidence, and
so entertained hypotheses manifestly incorrect to any who could see
all the trunks at once (Mardi, pp. 355-57). Again, the evidence per
se was not wrong, but the ideas based upon imperfect apprehension of
the evidenc~ were erroneous. The ideas had to be revised. First,
there was no one trunk for the banyan tree. This idea t-rasa false
categorization for the situation. Second, acceptance of all real
evidence is the first necessary step to forming correct ideas. Third.,
ideas are always imperfect summaries or categorizations of reality
and so should be kept open to amendment.
Again, in Mardi, two servitors of King Media dispute over a
fossil track they find on the ground, "tri-toed footprints of some
huge heron". One maintains that they are three toes, the other that
it is one foot. Babba1anja tells them they are both right if they
unite, both wrong if they divide. Media, however, dismisses them
impatiently, saying, "Away, ye foolish disputants! Full before
you is the thing disputed" (Mardi, p. 416). Words or ideas can be
but partial or misleading categorizations. They are never to be mis-
taken for the thing itself.
The theme is continued in Mardi on the isle of Maramma. The
guide there is blind Pani who holds all manner of principles to be
true even if they are flatly contradicted by sensual eVidence. Pani
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relies upon authority and does not dare explore beyond settled cr~eds.
Later, Maramma is contrasted with Serenia. Maramma is ~~11ed the
place where Alma's precepts are preserved (Mardi, p. 625), but
Serenia is the place where piety, or strict attention to the example
of Alma is the ruling principle from which all else follows, precepts
then included. The precepts of Alma are constantly illuminated by
Alma's life: "For every precept that he spoke, he did ten thousand
mercies. And Alma is our loved example" (Mardi, p. 629).
Ahab is another "codifier," or abstract idealist. His madness
prompted him to lose sight of the whale as a whale. He refused to
accept Moby Dick for what Starbuck says he is, "a poor, dumb brute"
(Moby-Dick, p. 144) who out of instinctual self-preservation merely
struck back when endangered. Ahab set up an ideality, an abstraction
as the highest and final reality. He pursued malice. He and the
rest of the crew, Ishmael included, believed in the spirit of
demonism in the world. Ahab did not care if the white whale were
principal or agent, he would destroy him because he believed that
way he could strike at the abstraction which he was sure existed
somewhere somehow. Melville implies that we are all liable to this
madness if we cut ourselves off from the means for testing reality.
In the chapter liTheWhiteness of the Whale" it is the "man of un-
tutored ideality," the "unread, unsophisticated Protestant of the
Middle American States," the "untravelled American" who are most
susceptible to credulous fancies (Moby-Dick, p. 167). It is the
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wretched infidel who refuses to believe in the reality of the colc~
in the universe who must then gaze himself blind at a monumentdl
white shroud, and seek to fill the void with ungraspable delusions.
To believe that Nature paints the harlot, to reject the eVidence of
the senses as real, is to devote oneself to dangerous and unnecessary
ambiguity, if not madness.
The outstanding feature of the Confidence-Man is the total lack
of any means whereby to test reality. The novel may be read as an
extended demonstration of what happens to people who act on logical
principle alone. Both the victims of the confidence game and the
reader are prevented from knowing by any concrete evidence whether
what is said is true or not. Ratiocination without the evidence
is tortuous, ambiguous, and futile. Part of the seduction of the
game is in getting the passengers to set aside both past experience
and present lack of evidence and to make commitments merely on the
basis of argumentation, or principle. One might note too that the
Counterfeit Detector in the last scenes of the book is little more
than a codified guide for judging bank notes. The innocent old man
who attempts to use the Detector finds his task impossible without
25
the experience and,judgment necessary to make his decision. In any
case in the Confidence-Man the victim, and the reader as well, is
prevented from actually knowing the truth. It is possible that he
25Herman Melville, The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade, ed.
Hershel Parker (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc" 1971),
pp. 212-17.
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is si~ply left to believe what he will.
In Pierre Melville demonstrates the warning of the anti-codifiers:
ambiguity results when principles are divorced from experience.
Pierre is warned both by Falsgrave and by Plinlimmon's pamphlet
against setting up universal maxims or perfect ideals in this world.
That way lies not only un~eality, but, as Pierre finds out, devilish
ambiguity as well. Pierre's problem was outlined by Burlington
Chauncey Goodrich, a disputant in the codification controversy, when
he wrote in 1831:
The question arising upon [written law] is not what is
reasonable, but what is commanded. • • • The business
of an interpreter is that of a gramnlarian and a philo-
logist ..• , In the case of a single statute it is
almost impossible to come to any satisfactory conclu-
sion---because it may be absolutely impossible to derive
any assistance from general reasoning on the analogies
and policies of the law. • . • When a principle of
the Common Law is ascertained, it may be fearlessly
pushed out to all its consequences---but in a statute,
a subsequent provision may come in conflict with a
prior, because the legislator did not see, or did not
choose to adopt, the true theory in its whole extent
•••• the common law. , .is the application of common
sense, disciplined and directed by certain established
prinCiples, to the affairs of men. (Goodrich, p. 403)
Pierre has his commandments (honor thy father and mother; love ye
one another; comfort the poor, etc.), but he would not accept the
whole context within which such precepts are actually practiced, or
out of which they had arisen. He did not choose, that is, to "adopt
the true theory in its whole extent", Rather he committed himself
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to absolute ideals which might have been perfect as rational ab-
stractions, yet were imperfect fJr making practical decisions in the
real world.
The first thing that happens to Pierre therefore is that his
subsequent provisions conflict with his prior. He resolves to own
Isabel to the world as his sister, b~t finds then he cannot do that
without wounding his mother and dishonoring his father. He wishes
to take Isabel as his wife but cannot do that without disowning her
as his sister. He cannot honor his vows to Lucy unless he disowns
Isabel as his wife. He cannot elevate Isabel or Delly as he thinks
right because to have to do with them at all means renouncing the
wealth and position by which he could help them. Pierre fragments
the fabric of society with its customs and usages. Society deter-
mines relationships by reference to real situations and to the real
fleshly alliances which Pierre despises. By abstracting ideal, pure
principles out of the body of wisdom he has inherited, both religious
and secular, he brings such commandments into hopeless ambiguity and
conflict, and illustrates the most dire predictions of the anti-
codification faction.
Eventually Pierre finds himself reduced to a "grammarian and
a philologist". This was the fate that the anti-codifiers---Goodr1ch,
as quoted above---threatened was in store for anyone who adopted
Pierre's course of divorcing morality from contingency and concrete
details. Pierre and Isabel become aware of the predicament they are
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in after they have made chimeras out of their most sacred, secular
relationships:
"Thou. Pierre.~'speakes t of Virtue and Vice;
life-secluded Isabel knows neither the one nor the
other, but by hearsay. What are they in their real
selves. Pierre? Tell me first what is Virtue:---
begin!
"If on that point the gods are dumb, shall a
pigmy speak? Ask the air!"
"Then Virtue is nothing."
"Not that!"
"Then Vice?"
"Look: a nothing is the substance, it casts one
shadow one way, and another the other way; and these
two shadows cast from one nothing; these it seems to
me, are Virtue and Vice." (Pierre, p. 274)
Virtue and Vice become mere names by this point to Pierre, as were
other principles, the relationships of mother, sister, wife, for
example. Millthorpe was a lawyer without a law practice; Pierre an
According to the anti-codifiers, and as we have seen, in line
author without having written anything.
with the thoughts Melville had expressed previously in Mardi, laws
might not be at variance with rational ordering or right-reason, yet
the rational characteristic is only a corollary of harmony in the
universe, never a complete statement of the Original PrinCiple.
Rationality is an aspect of the universe not to be confus~d with its
essence. On these grounds, anti-codifiers maintained that the
rationality of morality and law was a false issue and an erroneous
attempt to substitute a descriptive method for the thing itself, much
in the way that one might mistake the name of something or its defini-
264
tion for the thing itself.
This position had two important implications, both of which are
taken up by Melville as philosophical novelist and by the legal
debaters of the codification struggle. The first, which we have
just finished discussing, is the inevitable confusion which must
occur when the judge has only empty words to fall back upon and lacks
their qualification in concrete reality. The second implication is
the subject of the third question: is it desirable to divorce present
law or present means of determining law from the history out of
which such law arose?
David Dudley Field's codification efforts encountered the histori-
cal school of jurisprudence in the full tide of its strength. Although
the chief apostle of the historical school, Savigny, influenced the
English-speaking world primarily after his death, nevertheless, by
1846 many precepts of his thinking had been used by American Common
Law advocates in writings published against procedural reform. The
cautious tone of these writings disappeared after this school of
thought became firmly entrenched as the new establishment, for the
most part after 1850. One of Savigny's most ardent disciples in this
country was James Coolidge Carter, an arch opponent of codification,
who locked horns with Field when agitation was renewed in the 1870's.
Common Law advocates pointed to the historical growth of the
Common Law and to evidence that it was still growing as features of
priceless virtue. Man's wisdom, they said, is imperfect and must re-
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main so until the end of time. Only time itself will prove what is
correct and what is not correct j <lour deductions, and only time can
add to the structure that which is not yet known. The Common Law
was flexible to meet the demands of change, to grow as man and
society grows. Codification, they argued, whenever it occurred,
would freeze the law and its wisdom at whatever high watermark it had
thus far obtained.
Codifiers argued, on the other hand, that since the laws of God
and nature were immutable, absolute, and available to man's rational
faculty, there could be no objection to stating those laws once and
for all, making them thus inaccessible to the vagaries of politics and
the caprices of the judge's discretion. They also contended that
some of the "wisdom" embodied in precedent and the rule of stare
26decisis was patently absurd and inapplicable to modern conditions,
a result of situations extant in the past or in foreign society.
Americans, they declared, had no need to preserve such flotsam and
jetsam of history.
Their opponents rebutted these arguments by recognizing the
existence of useless or nonsensical precedents but declaring these
26stare decisis---Law Latin which is translated litoabide by,
or adhere to, decided cases.tt lYhena point of law has been settled
by decision, it becomes a precedent which judges are not to depart
from except in cases where a rule of law has been clearly misinter-
preted, or,---often the case in modern times---where changed condi-
tions significantly alter the way in which the principles of In~ must
be applied. The intent of the maxim "stare decisis" is to deter
judges from altering the law merely according to their individual
sentiments.
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exceptions which time would take care of if the judge were given t:le
license to interpret the body of the law as a whole in comparj~on
with new situations. In this way he could arrive at th~ best com-
promise between progress and the wisdom of the past. Thus they con-
verted the objection to judicial discretion into an advantage. They
maintained, moreover, that a code would be nothing more than an un-
approachable, monumental body of precedent uncontrollably regulating
the future by the standards of wisdom erected in the 19th century.
Every flaw in the code would remain inexorably operative until
public referendum or the legislature could be prevailed upon to
amend it.
When Joseph Story made his inaugural address at the Harvard
Law School in August, 1829, he extolled the law, and the Common
Law in particular, in the following terms:
• •• law is a science, which must be gradually formed
by the successive efforts of many minds in many ages;
• •• its rudiments sink deep into remote antiquity;
and branch wider and wider with each new generation;
• • • it seeks to measure the future by approximations
to certainty, derived solely from experience of the past;
• •• it must forever be in a state of progress, or
change, to adapt itself to the exigencies and changes
of society; ••. even when the old foundations remain
firm, the shifting channels of business must often leave
their wonted beds deserted, and require new and broadp.r 27
substructions, to accommodate and support new interests.
27Joseph Story, Inaugural Address at Harvard Law School, 1829, as
quoted in John R. Strong, Remarks upon the Codification Controversy 1n
the State of New York (New York: Henry Bessey, printer, 1883), p. 3.
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Perry Miller has said of this famous oration that it was "for decades
regarded as the supreme, the fio~l, the victorious statement within
28the profession of .•• the 'orthodox' conception of its function".
Small wonder then that in 1845 when codification and legal reform
once more threatened established legal opinion that Rufus Choate
should have echoed and amplified Story's statements in another c
address at Cambridge.
Choate's speech justifies his reputation as a powerful orator.
Readers of Melville might note that the metaphors Choate chose are
interesting not just for the idea they contain, but for their re-
semblance to images invoked in Mardi and Moby-Dick. The following
is one such excerpt:
---what is that law? Mainly a body of digested rules
and processes and forms, bequeathed by what is for us
the old past time, not of one age, but all the ages of
the past,---a vast and multifarious aggregate, some of
which you trace above the pyramids, above the flood,
the inspired wisdom of the primeval East. • .• In
the way in which it comes down to us, it seems one
mighty and continuous stream of experience and reasont
accumulated, ancestral, widening and deepening and
.washing itself clear as it runs on, the grand agent of
civilization, the builder of a thousand cities, the
guardian angel of a hundred generations, our own here-
ditary laws. . . . But to have lived for ages, ••.
not swathed in gums and spices and enshrined in chambers
of pyramids, but through ages of unceasing contact and
sharp trial. • • •
28The Legal Mind in America: From Independ cnce to the Civii tolar.
ed. Perry Miller (1962; rptd. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell-University Press,
1269), p. 176.
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and here Choate begins to magnify his v~ciion:
• • • to have lived ';~1rOtl:;~\the drums and tramplings
of conquests, through revolution, reform, through
cycles of opinion running their round; to have lived
under many diverse systems of policy, and have sur-
vived the many transmigrations from one to another;
to have attended the general progress of the race,
and shared in its successive ameliorations,---thus
to have gathered upon itself the approbation or the
sentiments and reason of all civilization and all
humanity, ••• 29
Beginning in Mardi, Melville develops the idea that man's wis-
dom can never be perfect, and that only time can give us understand-
ing. In the chapter "Time and Temples," he says that nothing was
ever built in a day, and that all grand edifices are built upon the
past and with the materials of the past. Time, he tells us, "is the
mightiest mason of all" (Mardi, p. 230). In Moby-Dick he enlarges
this thought by adding that "small erections may be finished by their
first architects; grand ones, true ones, ever leave the cope-stone to
posterity," concluding with the prayer "God keep me from ever com-
pleting anything" (Moby-Dick, p. 179).
Time is praised in Mardi because, among other things, it lIen-
riches and enlightens the mind," "of fables distills truth" (Mardi,
pp. 270-71). Although all beginnings are stiff, he tells us, "we
are lucky living midway in eternity" (Mardi, p. 393). Time enlightens
29From Rufus Choate, The Position and Functions of The American
Bar, As An Element of Cons~atism in t~State: An Addr~ Delivered
Wor;-the J..awSehoci' in Cambridge,July 3, 1845,-;eprintcd in The
Legal Mind in America, pp. 256-66. ---
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because much of what man does in the present, he does unconsciously.
He does not know the meaning of his actions until they are lO~6 past;
the present is always acted out by men who are part somnabulistic,
part lunatic. Melville concludes in Mardi that "much of the wisdom
here below lies in a state of transition" (Mardi, p. 459), but that
by studying the past, man may gain much understanding:
Throughout all eternity, the parts of the past are
but parts of the future reversed. . . . And not more
infallible than the ponderings of the Calculating
Machine than the deductions from the decimals of
history. (Mardi, p. 527)
"The past," said Melville, "is a prophet. Be the future its prophecy
fulfilled" (Mardi, p. 520).
In the political section of Mardi, the radicals of the young
republic are chided by the mysterious scroll for discarding the
lessons of history. The author of the scroll ("a voice from the
gods") admonishes that "while all Mardi's Present has grown out of
its Past, it is becoming obsolete to refer to what has been" (Mardi,
p. 525). He portrays the rash youths tearing up the scroll and
calling its author a fool ("Does he not know that all the Past and
its graves are being dug over?" Mardi, p. 530).
Choate used an extended metaphor in the speech quoted above
which presented law as the wisdom of the ages, derived from the living
deeds and thoughts of men. He characterized this wisdom as "accumu-
lated," "hereditary, It "one mighty and continuous st.ream" pouring
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down through time> finding its release into the present through
similar notion in Mardi with the difference that he does not ex-
, those who reverence and preserve the past. Melville ex~~esscJ a
ternalize such wisdom into the law, but leaves it mystically immanent
in the social, historical dimension of human existence. He declares
that he was present at the flood, at the taking of Tyre~ the downfall
of Gomorrah, in Solomon's court, etc. (Mardi, p. 297). He proposes
that many, many, souls are in him (Mardi, p. 368). To complete the
similarity with Choate's metaphor, and ultimately with that of Story
nearly two decades earlier, he finishes with the image:
And as the great Mississippi musters his watery nations;
Ohio, with all his leagued streams; Missouri~ bringing
down in torrents the clans from the highlands; Arkansas,
his Tartar rivers from the plain;---so, with all the
past and present pouring in me, I roll down my billow
from afar. (Mardi, p. 368)
In Moby-Dick he suggests that in each of us there lies buried a past
which holds the secret of the present:
••• far beneath the fantastic towers of man's upper
earth, his root of grandeur, his whole and awful essence
sits in bearded state; an antique buried beneath anti-
quities, and throned on torsos! •.• So like a Cary tid
he patient sits, upholding on his frozen brow the piled
entablatures of ages. Wind ye down there, ye prouder,
sadder souls! question that proud sad king! A family
likeness! ay, he did beget ye, ye young exiled royal-
ties; and from your grim sire only will the old State-
secret come. (Moby-Dick, p. 161)
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Man can discard the past only under the penalty of ignorance and
blindness in contemporary actions. Without his past he lacks ~he
clue to the present. Left to his own ttuntrammeled, ever-present
selfl1 (Pierre, p. 199), man has only his lunatic-like apprehensions
and desires to fall back upon; his decisions will remain unproven
by ongoing experience until it is too late to save him from folly.
The present is a masquerade produced by our limited perspectives.
Lest one think, however, that Melville did not qualify the
efficacy of time, it is well to point out that wisdom was not merely
a matter of learning history, but like "geometric lines" (1. e.,
parallel lines) they may pierce infinity but never meet (Mardi,
grain; history but gives him the added advantage of an extended
p. 554). The wise man must learn to separate the chaff from the
As he composed Moby-Dick Melville registered his own opinion of
perspective.
a slavish devotion to precedents. In "The Funeral" he tells of
ships mistaking the unharming corpse of a whale for rocks and shoals,
And for years afterward, perhaps, ships shun the place
leaping over it as silly sheep over a vacuum, because
their leader leaped there when a stick was held. There's
your law of precedents; there's your utility of traditions;
there's the story of your obstinate survival of old beliefs'
never bottomed on the earth, and now not even hovering in
the air! There's orthodoxy! (Moby-Dick, p. 262)
remarking,
Precedents may be guides, but not dictators to the future. The past
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must always be checked and rechecked against present reality.
Freezing the wisdom of anyone time into an eternal fixprJcod~
only makes a monumental precedent out of the whole law.
Like his contemporary Charles Dickens, Melville poked fun at
some of the logical nonsense in the law. He burlesques the weighty
authority of the commentators in Moby-Dick's "Heads or Tails"
(the title of the chapter itself refers to the arbitrary nature of
the advice). In this digression he discusses the case of some poor
fishermen deprived of their whale by an agent of the Duke:
It will be readily seen that in this case the
alleged right of the Duke to the whale was a dele-
gated one from the sovereign. We must needs inquire
then on what principle the sovereign is originally
invested with that right. The law itself has already
been set forth. But Plowdon gives us the reason for
it. Says Plowdon, the whale so caught belongs to
the King and Queen "because of its superior excellence."
And by the soundest commentators this has always been
held a cogent argument in such matters ....
And thus there is a reason in all things, even
in law. (Moby-Dick, p. 336)
In the chapter preceding, "Fast Fish and Loose Fish," he likewise
ridiculed legal practice in setting up definitions.
For the purposes of our study Melville's attitude toward pre-
cedent, or "orthodoxy" as he styles it, involving as it d,-.esa
certain concept of time and change, is the most important of the
above. In the incipient naturalism of this pre-Darwinian era, men
of all walks of life had learned that the cosmos was not static.
The spontaneous creation seemed now not ever to have existed; the
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world had grown through time to be the way it was at present and
would continue to grow and evolve through all time. Such perceptions
demanded historicity and spelled the doom of Platonic stasis with
all its corollaries. Change had been palpably demonstrated as a
condition of the universe. It was no longer feasible to maintain,
as it had been under the comfortable cosmology of the Old Testament
world or even under the rationalist cosmology of medieval Christi-
anitYt that there was "nothing new under the sun",
In general, Melville accepts the historical dimension as a
necessary adjunct of the search for truth. He was disposed to satir-
ize Benthamite theory because it gave little weight to historicity,
although he was inclined, on the other hand to agree with both
Carlyle and Bentham that man cannot be contained completely by the
institutions of the society in which he finds himself. Melville
implies in his stories that to divorce oneself entirely from the
past and to attempt to set up pure and rational ideals by which the
ethical decisions of ordinary life must be governed are paths likely
to lead one into fantasYt delusiont nightmare, and insanity. Man
in his "untrammeled, ever-present self" is an outcast from society,
because society is.a web of historically developed restriction. With-
out his social context he is an Ishmael condemned to wander the
wilderness of a chaotic present, like Pierre, courting privation and
death. And, like Pierre, he will eventually fulfill the scriptural
prophecy concerning Ishmael, that his hand shall be lifted against
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every man. The implications of these conclusions for Melville's
existentialism are clear. Man cannot avoid the existential e~ement
of his being. To reject it fully---as rational idealists would do---
is to cut oneself off from reality. But man cannot live in the
present alone. He must accept the historical dimension of experience
and his ability to interpret ongoing experience by reference to the
lessons of the past.
Finally there remains the fourth question: what is the nature of
the fundamental problem in equating law with an ideal such as the law
of nature? In the introduction to his modern translation of Kant's
Metaphysical Elements of Justice, John Ladd offers the following
formulation:
Every political philosophy must, sooner or later,
come to grips with the issue of the relationship between
the actual and the ideal in government and law. Should
our allegiance be to what is actual or to what is ideal?
Is the law defined by what is actual or by what is ideal?
Having posed the question thusly, Ladd goes on to offer the following
estimate of the problems involved in reaching a solution:
• • • • The natural law tradition. • • analyzes govern-
ment and law by reference to the ideal. It maintains
that law is part of morals. This has led to the fre-
quent accusation that it utterly confuses crUCial poli-
tical issues by identifying law (and government) as it
is with law (and government) as it ought to be. Legal
pOSitivists, who are the most ardent opponents of the
natural-law theory, are quick to point out that the
practical effect of identifying law with a part of
morals is either to nullify existing Jaw in favor of
an ideal law or to elevate all eXisting law to the
2i5
status of what is moral; in other words, the natural
law theorist, they maintain, has to be either a 30
radical revolutionary or an unregenerate reactionary.
Ladd's explanation is a fairly adequate description of the horns of
dilemma Melville set up in Pierre, Bartleby, and Billy!udd. The
critics of Billy Budd in particular have often fallen out on one
or the other of these extremes. Phil Withim's "Billy Budd: Testa-
ment of Resistance," (1959)31 presents a convenient survey of the
literature published in the "acceptance or resistance" controversy
surrounding Melville's last work. Ever since 1933 when E. L. G.
Watson published his now famous article, lIMelville's Testament of
11
32 ddtAcceptance, ebate has rage over whether Melville s story of
the Handsome Sailor was the Nunc Dimittis of one who had remained
a "radical revolutionaryll throughout his life or of one who had
bowed in his last years to a reactionary philosophy.
Melville makes it easy for his reader to assume that natural law,
despite its impracticality, has an intrinsic moral superiority over
martial law. He baits the trap with the portrait of Billy as an
extremely attractive specimen of the "noble savage" or the Handsome
30John Ladd , "Ln troduc t f.on,IIThe Metaphysical Elements of Justice
by Immanuel Kant, ed. John Ladd (New York: The Babbs-Merrill Company,
c1965), pp. xviii-xxix.
31phil Withim, "Billy Budd: Testament of Resistance,H Modern Lang-
uage Quarterly, 20 (1959), 115-27.
32E. L. Grant Watson, IIMelville's Testament of Acceptance t II New
England Quarterlx, 6 (1933), 319-27.
Sailor. The scene in which Billy takes leave of the Rights of Man
is redolent with temptation to color it with the spirit of t76. The
recruiting officer falls prey to the enticement. but the narrator
immediately corrnnents"more likely, if satire it was in effect, it was
hardly so by intention" (Billy Budd, p. 49). Melville's deliberate
contrast of the beautiful barabarian with the pallid, over-civilized,
intellectual Claggart again provokes the reader to make an invidious
comparison between the "natural" and the civilized. Yet Billy is
not man existing in a state of nature; he is in fact a social being
with a narrowly defined berth in the social structure. His pOSition
becomes even more narrowly and rigidly defined when he is transferred
from the merchant service to the King's navy. Billy, more than the
reader, it would seem, is perfectly aware of his social obligations
and totally comfortable within them, as may be witnessed by his
cheerful acquiescence in the impressment, his desire to get along with
his fellows and avoid the censure of his superior officers, and by his
reaction to a proposal of mutiny by a man not in his proper place
on the ship:
When Melville was writing Billy Budd -controversy over the
validity of natural law had been revived during the second era of
struggle to codify the Common Law. By this time there were two ver-
sions of "natural law," one a Platonic ideal held by many of the older
members of the legal establishment (and, of course, by the clergy),
the other a product of advancing science and Darwinian biology. The
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natural law referred to in Billy Bud~ is the older version. It made
its last salient appearance, aparc from religious quarrels, in the
law reform debate in the United States and the British Empire during
the 1870's. A£ter that Unatural law" generally meant "naturalism"
with its notions of the survival of the fittest, the law of averages.
As we have seen, Melville himself did not accept the idealist's con-
cept of natural law. It seems only logical to conclude, therefore,
that one ought to approach with extreme caution his portrait of
Billy as ideal, natural man.
Today faith in idealistic natural law seems a quaint indulgence
permitted to antiquarians and readers of romantic literature. On
the other hand, Melville must have been aWare that his contemporaries
needed but little encouragement to see Billy as a creature properly
governed by ideal natural law. All our experience with Melville's
work, however, should tell us that to judge mankind so would be to
act the part of a sophomoric fool or an irresponsible maniac, capable
of causing, like Pierre or Ahab, irreparable mischief.
Captain Vere's idea of the sailors on board the Bellipotent is
Hobbesean. He believes that their natural inclination is to revolt.
They are restrained, Vere surmises, only by a web of order thrown
over them like a loose-fitting garment. Vere is not a rational ideal-
ist. Like the anti-codifiers he believes in tempering principle with
contingency. To Vere the code embodied in the martial law and the
Articles of War should be flexibly applied. He may be aware that the
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laws say that he ought to hold Budd Cor trial on bOllrd the floC ship;
yet the emergency he perceives in the sItuation m.lkf!S him tldju~t th
principle for the particular case, and ht' is glnd thnt: the \lB.~ 9
of the sea permit him to do so. At the snme time. hls decision would
seem to abrogate Billy's rights under natural law.
The ideas of "constitutional rights" and "Ln: l:iennbl \':JBhL"
carry with them the notion that all manmade ll1wS mURt: take th IT
limitation from God, or from the rules of noturnl law os d cl d in
1776 and "codified" in the Constitution of the Un! Led S tauce . Th
problem Melville dramatized in Billy Budd rema:!ns n f undum InIII
problem of American political thinking: the conflict betw n L\
standard of ideal perfection in natural law and the "xi., ncy o· th
passing hour. Our history is studded wi th the trials or th i. que _
tion. In Melville's lifetime the slaver y Iasu • turnIng. it dJll
upon this very point, was firs t brought to a head In th Fug it :t v
Slave trials of the 1840·sand 1850' Stover wh lch Jud& I. mU'l Sh w
presided. Ultimately the issue was re-tried on. the fl IIIor b IttlQ~
suffered, that is, a trial by combat,
The trap in B111y Budd is to asaumc first th3t n Cur 1 L w or
divine justice is the standard by which tho cns~ mu t; h ud d. 'lo
make this assumption is to conclude on the 011~ h nd thnt r, 11'1 l'tLl
law upheld by Vere and his drumhead court iA had law it con-
flicts with ideal, perfect justice. This conelu Ion 1 on \ to
rebellion on the ground that bad law ought; not to br ob )'U. On
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laws say that he ought to hold Budd for trial on board the flag ship;
yet the emergency he perceives in the situation makes him adju~t the
principle for the particular case~ and he is glad that the usages
of the sea permit him to do so. At the same time, his decision would
seem to abrogate Billy's rights under natural law.
The ideas of "constitutional rights" and "inalienable rights"
carry with them the notion that all manmade laws must take their
limitation from God, or from the rules of natural law as declared in
1776 and "codified" in the Constitution of the United States. The
problem Melville dramatized in Billy Budd remains a fundamental
problem of American political thinking: the conflict between a
standard of ideal perfection in natural law and the exigency of the
passing hour. Our history is studded with the trials of this ques-
tion. In Melville's lifetime the slavery issue, turning as it did
upon this very point, was first brought to a head in the Fugitive
Slave trials of the 1840's and 1850's, over which Judge Lemuel Shaw
presided. Ultimately the issue was re-tried on the field of battle;
suffered, that is, a trial by combat.
The trap in Billy Budd is to assume first that natural law or
divine justice is the standard by which the case must be judged. To
make this assumption is to conclude on the one hand that tilemartial
law upheld by Vere and his drumhead court is bad law because it con~
flicts with ideal, perfect justice. This conclusion leads onc to
rebellion on the ground that bad law ought not to be obeyed. On
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the other hand, it is also possible, as John Ladd suggests, to
assume that the martial law is an ideal with final value in it~elf,
sanctioning therefore extreme sacrifice for its sake. Watson, for
example, calls Billy Budd Melville's "testament of acceptance" on
the grQund that imperfect as martial law or any bad law might be, it
alone is able to maintain the order which guarantees all other rights
available to mankind. Such reasoning justifies the other face of
the legal idealist, the unregenerate reactionary.
Captain Vere, however, does not equate law with the ideal; nor
does he see the ideal as the source of the law. He tells his court
"for us here, acting not as casuists or moralists, it is a case
practical, and under martial law practically to be dealt with," He
also advises the court that whatever construction they wish to place
upon the matter between C1aggart and Billy, it must remain a mystery,
"a matter for psychologic theologians to discuss," for the court may
concern itself with the prisoner's deed alone.
Melville in his narrative voice does not equate law with morals.
He goes out of his way to separate the two, especially regarding the
prudence with respect to external acts practiced by good and bad alike.
Claggart's careful, observance of forms is likewise reminiscent of
Ahab's Care to avoid a charge of usurpation. In Mardi, a distinction
between legality and morality is made explicitly in the opening
chapters. The same is either implied or stated throughout Melville's
works from the missionary atrocities of Omoo to the alternative
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method~ of dealing with Bartleby.
If rooting the source of the law in the ideal is an improper
approach, it is appropriate then to inquire for the alternatives.
The obvious option is to receive law as rooted in the social context;
i.e., as an expression of custom and usage with an historical di-
mension which allows for a certain flexibility relative to present
needs. The judge has the responsibility of doing 'whatever is necess-
ary to promote the general welfare within a framework of existing
laws, based upon his estimate of the demands of the situation.
Vere lists the demands of the situation: Budd has struck and
killed a superior officer in time of war aboard a military vessel.
The sailors will expect that he will receive the traditional, pre-
scribed punishment; and if he does not, they will take the opportunity
to revolt, bringing chaos into the military establishment. Never-
theless, the implications, as no critics care to remember, are that
if the emergency did not exist in the light of the aftermath of the
Nore mutiny, then Budd might be dealt with in a less severe fashion.
If the situation had permitted, he might have been IIlet offll with a
considerably mitigated sentence carried out by a regular court martial
on shore or aboard the flag ship at a later date. It was the situa-
tion, however, not the letter of the law, which controlled the outcome
of Vere's decision and subsequent behavior.
Each of Vere's minor decisions throughout the novella are also
controlled by his estimate of the situation. His arranging a meeting
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between Budd and Claggart in his chGmbers, as it were, to see if the
matter could not be settlen out of court is determined solely by
his wish to avoid public notice of the quarrel. The summary handling
of the execution and the burial is similarly performed with a view to
the dangers of the situation. Budd's original impressment from the
merchant ship is justified for Vere, as well as for the recruiting
officer, by another situation, the necessity of manning the King's
navy.
Vere's value judgments are explicit: chaos is bad and not
wanted, forms are his lifelong commitment. Order was a paramount
value. Vere is a legalist whose sentiments might be compared to
those of Kent's reviewer (supra) who said that there were cases in
which it did not matter what the law was, so long as the law was
fixed. Vere opts, therefore, for a government of law and order. It
is interesting to note that he invokes the warrant of the flpeople"
f.or this view of the matter. The ship's ttpeoplett will think Some-
thing is amiss if Budd is not dealt with according to the Articles
of War read over their heads daily. They will assume that if their
superiors suddenly have the right to abrogate the law, then they may
do so too.
It is true that all these "reasons" are merely Vere's specula-
tions. Yet like any good judge he must make such estimates of the
probable consequences of the court's decisions if he is to fulfill
his social duty as well as his judicial function. There are times
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-when the justice immanent in the lon3e-range politicol consequenceR,
and not the justice of a partLcuLar case, must be the primary con-
sideration.
The reader, therefore, might see himself in the po~ition o[ the
three worthy soldiers who sit as Budd I S trial court. Their impuls'c"
like that of the reader (Melville has set us all up) is to judge Budd
by natural law. Vere lectures them, and the reader at the snrne tim',
admonishing them that the true nature of their obligation is to 80c1-
ety, not to ideals or to their compassion for any private ind1v:ldll.l
independent of his relationship to society. Budd has not simply
killed a man impulsively and unintendingly; he has committed Il
summary, which amounts to a judge's charge to the jury, is a dc-
breach of martial discipline unforgivable in the situation. Verc's
scription of the societal nature of Budd's act; and it 1s, ufter u11,
as a society that the readers or the members of the court have any
right to judge him at all. Thus law, if it iA to have nny practical
meaning, must be taken in its social context, which includes nn
historical as well as an immediate dimension. For this context
l
and not a set of disembodied ideals, is the source and the authority
of the law.
Melville's emphasis on the necessity for community has be'n
33
noticed in other contexts. In the next and final chnpter~ w('; 8h:111
33See for example Alice P. Kenney, !h£ Ganspvoort~ of Alb
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press , 1969). pp. 214-228-:- Ql:!1_.
283
* * *
explore the possibility that his obs~rvation of Lemuel Shaw's long
and painful career on the bench ~uring the pre-Civil War decades
might be a source for some of his thinking about the relationship of
the individual to the society which defines his ethical obligations.
Conclusion:
The codification scheme was part of an overall campaign for
law reform mounted by the radical Democrats. Its.-concepts were com-
plex and difficult to understand, though fundamental to the political
philosophy of American life. For the most part this vital political
battle was chiefly known to the lawyers and jurists who took part in
it. Codification of the law was not a topic generally discussed by
the public at large, nor did it enter into the body of information
that became disseminated as the popular legal science of the day.
Though the subject belonged to the more arcane matters dis-
cussed by lawyers and though the issues were difficult to grasp, it
does not seem unreasonable to assume that Melville was versed in the
roots of the problem. It was his avowed purpose to become a "philo-
sophical novelistll• Moreover, many of the most prominent codifiers
were among his congenial acquaintances. It is not at all unlikely
that Melville was stimulated by the activities of these men or that
he chose to dramatize the concepts and differing sides of the issue
in his stories. The internal evidence of the work supports the
hypothesis that Melville was indeed aware of the specific issues of
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the controversy~ placing explicit rehearsals of the argumentation
in the mouths of characters like the minister Fa1sgrave ~n Pi~rre.
Reverberations of the codification controversy are also apparent in
the philosophical debates of Mardi.
The issues of this debate of legal philosophy suggest still
another way in which legal science structured Melville's interest in
ambiguity. Preceding chapters of this study have explored his use
of the rules of evidence to construct unresolvable ambiguities and
to make an elusive myth. Argumentation conducted mostly through the
pamphlet war between the codifiers and the Common Law advocates
revealed two further possibilities for the causes of ambiguity: the
semantic problem in which words divorced from realities become mere
chimeras; the necessity for taking into account ever-changing con-
tingency.
Melville's assimilation of these two principles into his writing
is evidenced by many episodes in the Confidence-Man, but particularly
in the last scenes of the book. In those closing passages the murky
light of the hold symbolically sets an atmosphere of moral uncertainty
much as the fog in Twain's Huckleberry Finn performs the same dramatic
and symbolic function during Huck's moral crisis. In this dimness an
old man is attempting to gain wisdom by reading the Bible. But he is
carrying out his studies in a mental realm far removed from the
sinister realities that swirl around him. In his innocence the old
man is a gullible fool. J He is a perfect dupe for the child selling
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the Counterfeit Detector. His attempts to use the Detector as a
guide are about as futile as his attempts to use the Bible. T~!e
words of both are meaningless to him because he has n3ver seen the
realities to which they refer and finally because these realities
change so rapidly that the "codified" Detector, and perhaps by
implication any codified laws in the Bible (Christianity does
reject the Mosaic code), rapidly becomes outdated. Words divorced
from realities are meaningless; principles separated from fast
changing contingency are worse than useless.
Chapter VI
In the Cold Courts of Justice
"Who's to doom when the Judge himself is
dragged to the bar?"---Moby-Dick
This final chapter completes an examination begun in Chapter
IV. It elaborates on the hypothesis that Lemuel Shaw's career on
the bench was a major source of Melville's persistent formulation of
the judicial dilemma. Chapter IV explored Melville's preoccupation
with epistemological problems similar to those found in homicide
cases to come before Shaw. These questions dealt specifically with
the difficulty involved in deducing malice from external appearances.
for example, the rules of evidence and the principles of jurisprudence
Other sections of this study have outlined some of the resources
for decision-making available from within the science of the law:
derived from precedent cases.
In this chapter the focus is shifted from Melville's interest
in the process of judging to his conception of the character and role
of the judge. For even in situations where all "facts" are known,
making ethical decisions may still seem an impossible task. Melville
like to portray the agony of the man who must choose between the wel-
fare of the individual and the welfare of the community. If he ob-
served Shaw's work at all he saw that the judge is often called upon
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to decide whether to uphold law and order, no matter how unpalatable
to the private conscience, or to permit an act which, no mattec how
justifiable by the standards of absolute right, is yet unlawful.
This predicament seemed to fascinate Melville. As early as
Typee he put the question to his readers. In that first novel the
protagonist asks the reader to judge his actions: jumping ship is
unlawful, yet is it just to make a man suffer under circumstances
he had not contracted for? The identical poser is presented at the
beginning of Mardi, as the narrator prepares to leave the ship. Is
he justified in leaving or no? In Mardi we are also asked to judge
whether the narrator was right to free Yillah even though he had to
kill a man to do so. In Moby-Dick, the first man, Starbuck, faces
the same dilemma when he must decide whether to bind or kill Captain
Ahab in order to prevent the destruction of the ship. In Pierre, the
protagonist finds he must defy the dictates of law and community
when he tries to obtain justice for a woman who may be his half-sister.
FinallY, in Billy Budd the predicament is formulated clearly and
explicitly: though a man be innocent under the standards of absolute
justice, he may nevertheless be guilty under the law.
In Billy Budd, Sailor, Melville set down for the last time a
story he had long struggled to write. It is a tale in WhlCh a madman,
a monomaniac, in a position of power singles out a suborddnaue as his
victim and pursues him obsessively until he provokes his intended
prey to homicide. Society then executes the man who has killed his
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tormentor in self-defense. Melville introduced this same plot in
'f an embyonic state in Mardi when the narrator kills the pr.iest !,leema.
He developed the same idea in Moby-Dick, both in the major plot of
Ahab and the white whale and in the episode of Radney and Steelkilt.
So far as justice may be done the blacks, the problem appears in
"Benito Cereno" also.
In the earlier works the forces which combine to destroy the
weak are to be found simply in impersonal circumstances: forces of
nature, insanity, the institution of slavery. In Mardi there is a
deus ~ machina of an improbable posse. In Billy Budd the vortices
meet in the mind of the captain, Edward Vere, the man who is re-
sponsible for executing the fated sailor. The spotlight in Billy
Budd is upon the man who must play the role of the judge. The
reader must deal with the question first posed explicitly in Moby-Dick:
"Who's to doom when the Judge Himself is dragged to the bar?"
Harrison Hayford and Merton Sealts, editors of the reading text
of Billy Budd, Sailor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962)
offer new textual evidence which indicates that the development of
Vere's role belongs to the third and final phase of composition.
Sealts and Hayford theorize that Melville created the trial scene
in order to dramatize what had been in earlier versiOnS me=e state-
ments and implications concerning the captain's situation (Billy Budd,
"Editor's Introduction," p. 36). If this formulation of the \\Triting
stages is correct, then it is accurate to say that the role of the
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judge was the last matter of importance to occupy the author's mir.d.
In evaluating this final phase of his work, therefore, :i + is i.sefu l
to inquire for the sources used in creating the figure of Captain
Vere, not only among the commanders of old sailing vessels, but also
among the judges Melville knew. It is also fruitful to compare those
playing a judicial or magisterial role in earlier works with their
definitive version of the judge in Billy Budd. In this way one might
construct a fair hologram of the exact position occupied by Vere in
Melville's thinking. Both paths of investigation promise to shed
further light upon what Judge Lemuel Shaw's son-in-law had in mind
when he created the enigmatic captain of the Bellipotent.
A clue to Vere's connection with his predecessors in the earlier
fiction lies in the motifs that surround these characters. Melville
had a habit of using over and over again images that he associated
with particular situations. Those who were given the responsibility
of risky "moral navigation," as Yvor Winters called it in Maule's
1Curse, he decorated with the emblem of the serpent and the dove
entwined. As Hayford and Sealts point out in their notes (Billy Budd,
p. 142, n41), Melville's use of these symbols recurs in his works
from Pierre onward. The reference is to Christ's charge. to his
apostles, and the full quotation from Matthew 10:16 is as follows:
1 .'Yvor Wl.nters, "Herman Melville and the Problems of Moral Naviga-
tion,ttMaule's Curse: Seven Studies in the History of American Obscur-
antism (New York: New Directions, 1938), pp. 53-89.
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"Behold, I send you forth as sheep 1::1the midst of wolves: be ye
therefore wise as serpents, and ~larmless as doves. II The allusion
to the serpent and the dove occurs in Pierre in connection with Mr.
Falsgrave; the minister; in Israel Potter with reference to Hobbes,
Machiavelli, Jacob, and to Benjamin Franklin in Paris. It appears
also in the imagery surrounding the various guises of the Confidence
Man; in Clarel, II, xxxii, where it designates St. Francis of Sales,
and then finally with reference to Billy Budd himself, who is de-
scribed as being "with little or no sharpness of faculty or any
trace of the wisdom of the serpent, nor yet quite a dove" (Billy
Budd, p. 52). Each of the characters tagged with this imagery has
the task of making practical decisions about conduct in a problemati-
cal and dangerous world. All but Billy must make decisions for
whole communities as well as for themselves.
The relevance of this imagery to Captain Vere, however, must
be made by a process of interpolation. Billy, though not quite
as harmless as a dove, was yet more a dove than in any way a serpent.
Claggart, on the other hand, was with no trace of the dove, certainly
not harmless; and yet he was not quite as wise as the Serpent, who,
after all, managed to arrange Adam's downfall without fatal effect
to himself. One critic has suggested that if Billy and Claggart
represent good and evil, they but reflect a dichotomy of natures
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structure of the story, Vera did in fact possess the duality of the
which were united in Captain Vere.2 Thus, by implication in the
serpent and the dove; "a union," as Melville said in Israel Potter,
There is further evidence that one is correct in awarding Vere
"not without warrant."
the standard of the serpent and the dove entwined. Melville com-
pares the Captai.n, at the mo:nent in which he receives Claggart's
first accusation, to the patriarch Jacob when he was presented with
the bloody raiment of his favorite son. In Israel Potter Melville
placed Jacob in the same category as Banjamin Franklin, upon whom
the writer did bestow the apostolic emblem. He elaborates little
upon Jacob himself in Israel Potter, mentioning only that he was a
"tanned Machiavelli in tents", The detail is important, however,
because it suggests the political craftiness-- in other words, the
attention to policy-- required of the man who would successfully
dictate behavior for himself and others in this world.
Other elements of the imagery and the circumstances surrounding
the Franklin of Israel Potter resemble those associated with Captain
Vere. The sceneS between Franklin and John Paul Jones, for example,
oppose the statesman with the barbaric simplicity of the wild·~Scotsman,
who has left neither his tartan nor his brogue behind. In the opening
2Charles \V'eir,Jr. "Malice Reconciled; A Note on Melville Is Billy
Budd," The University of Toronto Quarterly, 13 (1944), 276-85; and
Paul McCarthy, "Character and Structure in Billy ~,tI Discourse, 9
(1966), 201-217.
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paragraphs of Billy Budd (according to the Sealts and Hayford re-
construction) the prototy~e of ~he Handsom Sailor is depicted wearing
a "Highland bonnet with a tartan band", and he is designated a
barbarian. In the former work the circumspect Franklin is contrast-
ed with the vainglorious Jones (much as Vere is contrasted with
Nelson). Jones seems incapable of any but the most direct action.
In that case, however, the statesman Franklin is able to restrain and
direct the militant spirit of the naval commander. In Billy Budd
Vere's thoughtfulness only sets the stage for an action so direct and
straightforward that neither he nor anyone else had the time to deter
Billy's fist from its fatal stroke.
Sage discretion is the leading characteristic which emerges from
the portrait of Franklin. Although he is an inventor, an economist,
a writer, and a statesman, he is above all what Melville called a
"practical philosopher,: a term best translated as "politician".
Similarly, in elaborating upon the character of Vere, Melville tells
us that the captain's literary taste ran to writers "who honestly and
in the spirit of common sense philosophize upon realities" (Billy
Budd, p. 62). More than once the critics of Billy Budd have accused
Vere of valuing expediency above a more direct and noble course of
action. Vere is, on other words, a politician in his actions on
board the Bellipotent.
In Pierre the Rev. Mr. Falsgrave wears a brooch carved with the
images of the serpent and the dove. Falsgrave also has a plaid
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wrapper, ~hich, as we have remarked before d ·mon~tr.ltC9 h:fa .1 Iin!t)'.
not "With the wild highland tribpd, but with the Scottish Common
Sense School of philosolJhy. The minister triC!s to curb the h'ro,
Pierre, who is bent upon a rash and impractical SOlUl {on to hI. ,(hl-
cal dilemma. Falsgrave is discreet and politic in his b hovloI'
toward Pierre's mother, Mrs. Glendinning. nis l~ck oC r~nl nuthorlty,
however, diminishes the respect due to him. In the f. cc or N a.
Glendinning's hysteria (the feminine "heo ru" run wIld) F 1.srav I
discreet counsel regarding the disposition of thr caSUR of PI rr
and Delly Ulver goes unheeded. To the dramatic SC"'ne of F3J 61'3V
overwhelmed by the raging female in Lady GlendinnIng. on mi8ht om-
pare the speech made by Ver e at Billy IS trial in which Ill: COlinA 1 his
court not to let the heart, the feminine part 1n mD.ll,t. k OV"I' th ir
judgment (p. 111) •
Although the Master in Chancery of Bartleby dO~8 not b fll th
sign of the serpent and the dove , neve1:"thel,csshis mnst. t r 1. 1 1"01
in that story entitles him to some comment. After Bartl by 11
replied to his every request with the subdued ~ Stubborn "I pt"f r not;:
to", the lawyer becomes determined to denl with his r\calcJtrn~t cl rk.
but in as discreet and expedient A mann'T Posslbla. 1I "" nt
LO
fathom the truth of Bortleby's myst~ry. So f r ns discr tlon ntl w •
the Master goes to extraordinary le.ngths to
<lccommod 1 t hi WI' Inl
employee. At the point. hOYJever. when Unrtleby b gin
to j up J'tl1z
his bUSiness and that of others, the luwyer is fo.c. .1
• u to " d . I !em:
the clerk is delivered over to the law and sorted by due process bto
the dead letter box of the municipal prison. Though he indulg~d him-
self for a while in a fantastic exploration of human na~urc, the
lruvyer proved a practical philosopher after all. Franklin, Falsgrnvc.
and the Master in Chancery have in common with Vere their willingness.
to sacrifice the rights and welfare of an individual for the welfuce
of a larger community.
Others in MelVille's works who are categorized by the recurrent
imagery of the serpent and the dove as practical philosophers---thc
suave Confidence Man, the eloquent St. Francis of Sales. the politi-
cally astute Hobbes and Machiavelli---all share, if not the propensity
to legalism, then at least a devotion to policy above all else. In
this leading characteristic we find a clue to much of Vcrets behavior.
Viewed in this light Verets portrait reminds one of the first
judge to occupy a place of importance in ~1elvi11c's 1He t his uncle,
Peter Gansevoort. As we recall (see Chapter I) Uncle Peter carried on
a family tradition in taking a leading part in Albany's civic affairs.
Although appointed a judge of the Court of Common P.l~as fot' n short
time in the 1840's, he won much of his reputation for his bchlnd-thc-
scenes manipulation of state politics.
When Melville dramatized the role of Captain VeTe he l..ade the
first scene portray the captain as a judge with II highly dcvl~lopcd
political consciousness. Vere's first decision wjth regard to the
information he gets from Claggart is to try the case in hl~ CAbIn,
i.e.~ "in his chambers". In this way he hopes to avoid the embarrlls
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ment of a public disclosure of the affair. Many of his subsequenr
decisions, !n enjoining secrecy upon his fellow officers and i.\
convening a court to share in the responsibility, ar~ politic moves
calculated to promote the peace and general welfare of the ship.
Peter Gansevoort was clearly the type of the politician, but
he was not the only judge in Melville's life to regard policy with
paramount concern. As Chief Justice of the highest tribunal in
Massachusetts, Lemuel Shaw was charged 't.1ithoverscelngcourt decisions
of the utmost importance to the well-being of government both present
and future. It has been remarked that in the trial of constitutional
questjons the American citizen is daily treated to a lesson in poli-
tical science. To a broader extent, howeve r , almost all of the
questions to be decided before a court of last resort. those p'r-
taining to the police power of the state, for example, touched in
one way or another upon the policy of government. No one was more
aware of his responsibility for this aspect of judiCial work lh~n
Lemuel Shaw; he expressed his concern for the matter repeatedly in
his opinions. Shaw, moreover, was well-known for the firm hond he
kept upon his court and upon his fellow justices. In thirty years
upon the bench he dissented from the majority of his court only once.3
When Captain Vere decided to convene a summary court in order to
3Leonard Levy) The Law of the Commonweal th and Chi £'f Just.icr.
Shaw (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press~957). p-:--g-:--
2~6
share the moral responsibility for the decision in Budd's case; he
reserved to himself the supervision of the court and the trial. As
he prepared to call the court together, he displayed the attitude
of a chief justice. In testifying before his tribunal he temporarily
reduced himself in rank, but he chose to stand on the weather side
of the room, leaving the three temporary judges to leeward. This
move placed Vere physically above the court, since the lee side
would have been canted lower than the weather. Melville remarks
that this circumstance was "apparently trivial" (Billy Budd, p. 105).
The staging, however, placed Vere, whose executive responsibilities
involved an attention to policl, over the court, which had primary
responsibility for determining the law.
In personal characteristics Vere rather resembled Chief Justice
Shaw than Peter Gansevoort. Shaw was generally described as a man
who was difficult to know. He had many professional acquaintances;
and because of his eminence, he and his family were accepted in
Boston society. Yet Shaw had few personal friends. One recalls,
for example, the stiffness of the letters between him and Allan
Melvill. In his sentimental biography of the Chief Justice. Frederic
Chase noted the judge's personal reserve.4 A diarist who had been
invited to the Shaw home for a party wrote a brief account of what
4Frederic Hathaway Chase, Lemuel Shaw, Chief Justice of the
Suprem~ Judicial Court of Massachusett~830-1860 (Boston-;n~
New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, The Riverside Press Cambridge,
1918), pp. 282-84.
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it was like to attend such an affair at the judge's house, drawing
th~ judge himself as most sober and uncomfortable.S Captain Vere was
portrayed as a man who was "lacking in the companionable quality, a
dry and bookish gentleman" (Billy Budd, p. 63).
Second, Shaw is praised by his biographers for being a great
family man (Chase, pp. 291-95). After Allan Melville's death, Herman
had two surrogate parents, Judge Peter Gansevoort and Judge Lemuel
Shaw. Melville knew both men in the dual role of stern judge and
fatherly adult. From another point of view critic Leonard Levy
has accused Shaw of fostering a judicial paternalism in his court
(Levy, p. 165). "Fatherly" is thus a qualified compliment when
paid to a judge who sat in the days when the aristocratic preroga-
tives of an appointed judiciary came under heavy attack from their
democratic opposition. Twice in the story Vere is portrayed as
exhibiting a fatherly attitude toward Billy (Billy Budd, pp. 100
and 115), but he may also be charged with a paternalistic attitude
toward his court, and, fully in keeping with the stereotype of
the ship's captain, toward his men as well.
Vere's emotionalism, witnessed at one point by the surgeon and
then by others who saw him immediately after his last interview with
Budd, coincides with another characteristic peculiar to Judge Shaw.
5Jay Leyda, The Melville Log: A Documentary Life of Herman
Melville, 1819-1891 (1951; rpt. New York: Gordian Press by arrangement
with Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1969), I, 360.
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It has been said that on more than o~e occasion; especially in capi-
tal cases, Shaw spoke the charge to the jury or passed sentence upon
the convicted felon not without visible effort to restrain the emo-
tions that brought tears to his eyes or rendered him almost incapable
of speaking (Chase, p. 285). The trait was well-known as an anomaly
in the character of a man ~ho otherwise looked and played the part
of the stern and sober magistrate.
Besides the resemblances the captain bore to actual judges in
Melville's life, there are other factors that deserve notice too. In
the name "Edward the Honorable Fairfax VereH there are some features
that contribute to his characterization as a judge. Marvell's poem;
"Upon Appleton House," is quoted by Melville in the story as the
-. source for the captain's nickname, "Starry Vere," and in it Fairfax
is the name of the protagonist who finds himself in an ethical di-
lemma. His betrothed had been stolen away by the lesbian, fortune-
hunting nuns of "Nunappleton Housetl• At first the valiant soldier
would storm the convent with his sword and rescue the fair maiden in
true heroic fashion. Fairfax is restrained, however, by his devotion
to law and order. As Marvell phrased it,
What should he do? He would respect
Religion, but not right neglect:
For first, religion taught him right,
And dazled not, but clear'd his sight.
Sometimes resolved, his sword he dr3~S,
But reverenceth them the laws;
For Justice still that Courage led~
First from a judga, then soldier bred.
(11. 225-232)
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Marvell's modern day editort Grosart. makes the footnote heret "Sir
Guy Fairfax, the Judge".6 Thus :'dward Fairfax Vere is connected by
ancestry to a great jurist as well as to a great soldier.
Second, Vere is addressed as "Captain the Honorable". The title
doubtless refers to his aristocratic lineage; nonetheless it is a
title given to judges also. Claggart is always careful to address
Vere as "your honor". Throughout the story Melville plays upon the
notion of civilized honor in Vere and the "uninstructed honor" of
Billy which connives in his downfall.
Finally we may note that "Vere" can be interpretedt as some
have already done, as a Latinate version of "Truth". The appella-
tion makes sense when it is placed in a legal context. According to
Black's Law Dictionary, veredictum is law Latin for lithe truth of
a matter in issue, submitted to a jury for trial". Melville's pun,
had he indeed intended onet would be that Vere's speech, i.e., his
Vere dictum, was a formulation of the truth of the matter, which he
asks the jury of officers to accept and to return as the verdict.
Vere waS a man with a jurist's sensibilities. We have already
remarked in part upon his literary tastes. He loved practical philo-
sophy. He liked to read books about actual men and events; i.e.,
histories and biographies. His love for lasting institutions, we are
told, is behind his distaste for new-fangled notions. Vere had a
6Andrew Marve~ The Complete Works of Andrew Marvell, ed. Alex-
ander B. Grosart (Printed for private circulation, 1872; rpt. New
York: AMS Press, Inc., 1966), I, 21.
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Hobbesian opinion of the ship's people. He obviously thought the
sailors' best interests were pre~erved~ like those of the nation at
large, by a devotion to law and order. He believed in sharing re-
sponsibility wherever possible~ playing dowa personal authority in
favor of legal procedure and an appeal to tradition. Vere's affinity
for "Forms, measured forms" suggests the lawyer's personality.
Melville hints that Vere belonged to the class he called "martial
uti.litarians" or "Benthamites of war". This last is a typical
Melvillean jab at the lawyers who pretended to despise Bentham while
acting every day in such a manner as to give life to some of Ben-
tham's most alarming theories.
Vere had the trained eye of a lawyer. As we have noted in
Chapter IlIon the rules of evidence, the lawyer was expected to be
able to tell much about a witness from his deportment. When Claggart
first approached Vere with his information, the Captain is struck by
the manner of the master-at-arms:
••• something even in the official's self-possessed
and somewhat ostentatious manner in making his speci-
fications reminded him of a bandsman, a perjurious wit-
ness in a capital case before a courtmartial ashore of
which when a lieutenant he (Captain Vere) had been a
member. (Billy Budd, p. 94)
Vere's initial decision is to try the case "in his chambers" by ob-
serving the deportment of the accuser and the accused; he wished to
"scrutinize the mutually confronting visages" (Billy~, p. 98).
By now it must be apparent that Melville gave Captain Vere not
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only the role of a judgeJ but the cparacter of one as well. He drew
in part upon the personalities o~ judges he knew. He also constructed
Vere out of those traiL~ he could have observed that lawyers held in
esteem.
These literary details of characterization are not the only
material Melville gleaned from his personal acquaintance with judges.
Most of the ideas debated in Billy Budd (especially those expressed
in the trial scene) probably originated·---or at least were clarified
for him---by problems of law and government Shaw confronted during
a tenure of office that spanned the tumultuous period preceding the
Civil War.
Shaw gained a reputation as an "Expounder of the Common Law,,7
based upon his ability to reduce the complicated technicalities of
the law to terms that his juries of laymen could understand. His
opinions were learned and ponderous; yet they are replete with con-
crete illustrations, and they reduced complex problems to their
simplest principle. Reading these opinions is always an education.
Elijah Adlow, another of Shaw's modern critics and a judge himself,
speaks in the following glowing terms of the Chief Justice's ability
to make the law plain:
7Elijah Adlow, The Genius of Lemuel Shaw, Expounder of the Common
Law (Boston: Massachusetts Bar Associatio~962).
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In his opinions we find something more
than the mere adjudication of causes. We dis-
cover behind Shaw the jurist, Shaw the teacher.
He was not content with the mere decision of a
cause, but sought to vindicate his judgment by
reasoning out his solution on the basis of funda-
mental principles. . • • He gave his contemporaries
an excellent opportunity to discover his method.
(Adlow, p , 10)
Melville presents Captain Vere with the problem of explaining his
intricate thinking to his fellow officers) who are assembled much like
a jury. Such men he knew were guided less by their intellects than by
"primitive instincts strong as the wind and the sea" (Billy:Budd,
p. 109). As Vere pOises to begin, the narrator remarks:
After scanning their faces he stood less as mustering
his thoughts for expression than as one inly deliberat-
ing how best to put them to well-meaning men not
intellectually mature, men with whom it was necessary
to demonstrate certain principles that were axioms to
himself. (Billy Budd, p. 109)
Vere's method resembles Shaw's. He reduces the case to its
simplest terms and translates its parts into concrete analogies: the
conditions of war well-known to the seasoned officers. In so doing
Vere sacifices none of the rigor of his logic. The argument itself
advances syllogist~caily. First Vere presents the principle; i.e.,
he declares the law. Then he asks the officers of the court martial
to determine whether the facts of the case fall within the definition
of that law. The procedure is identical to that of orthodox juris-
prudence, the same for which Lemuel Shaw won acclaim.
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The "axioms" that Vere demonstrated to his court are the pripci-
pIes which Shaw upheld in the Supreme Judicial Court of Has sachuse t ts .
Some of the ideas they share affect whole systems of thinking. For
example, Vere's sense of history, along with his theory of crimes
and punishments, sustains concepts of jurisprudence for those who
worked with the Common Law in Shawls era.
Other principles involve specific axioms of government, and
these were somewhat peculiar to the work Shaw himself performed
on the bench. They may be divided into two main propositions.
First is whether a community and a state has the police power to
abridge the rights or welfare of inividuals for the sake of the
general welfare. The second is the basic concept of American poli-
tical science that government ought to be by law, not by men. Each
of these major ideas surfaced in Shawls day in the conflict between
Romantic individualism and the demands of the ever more complex
industrial society. Not infrequently the conflict worked its way
to the highest tribunals.
Like Chief Justice Shaw, Vere was a magistrate who believed in
the historical school of jurisprudence. He was fond of reading
histories and biog~aphies. and he was likely to cite history as part
of his casual conversation. He regarded the events of the past as
factors which have played a part in determing present conditions. The
cumulative past predicates the course of the future as well. Vere
was convinced that the Nore mutiny was a dangerous example to the
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! men and a warning to those in authority that similar revolts might
easily recur. For officers assigned the responsibility of decision
and command, history should be read as a possible guide to the pre-
sent, a design inching toward completion in the future. In Captain
Vere Melville presents the portrait of a man who deals with reality
as though it were a set of causes the effects of which may only be
guessed.
Melville's desire to provide a counterpoint to this theme might
be what lies behind the otherwise curious intrusion of the exchange
which takes place after the hanging between the surgeon and the
purser. The ususal spasm did not occur just after suspension. The
surgeon assures the purser that science has no need to account for
·this phenomenon except as an "appearance the cause of which is not
immediately to be assigned" (Billy Budd, p. 125). Here is an effect
without a cause. Other items in the story which fall into the same
category are the unkown origins of Billy, the goodness of his moral
character, and the "mystery of iniquity concerning Claggart's actions.
Like any proponent of the historical school, Vere believes that
government should be rooted in custom carefully built up over the
centuries. Vere WaS glad that "it would not be at variance with
usage" (Billy Budd, p. 104) to convene a drumhead court in Billy's
case. As critics have already noticed, in point of fact, the captain
acted erroneously. There were contemporary naval laws dealing with
the situation on board the Bellipotent which prescribed that only a
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squadrun commander could convene a courtmartial to try a serious
crime on the high seas. In the case of a felony committed on a
naval vessel isolated from the rest of the fleet, the captain was
obligated to hold his man until he could turn him over to higher
authorities. Although Sealts :and Hayford aCCuse the author of
once again not having done his ho~ework (Billy Budd, p. 176, n234),
Melville appears to have known of the lawful procedure; for he puts
it in the mouth of the surgeon (Billy Budd, p. 101). Perhaps Mel-
ville deliberately chose to have the captain pursue the course that
he did in order to continue building up the character of Vere by
emphasizing the priority he placed upon usage over statute. Further-
more, if Melville treated the alternative of the drumhead court as
a lawful option, he did so with the knowledge that American courts
had vindicated Captain MacKenzie and Lieutenant Guert Gansevoort for
conducting the same kind of trial in the Somers affair. Melville
knew, moreover, that his father-in-law had approved more than once
the summary process that had been used in Massachusetts to send
fugitives back to slavery in the South.
It Ls admitted that in Billy Bud<i_Melville treated some of his
"facts" loosely. However, in view of the fate suffered by many, both
black and white, in the Reconstruction rule of the subjugated South-
land, Melville may have been accurate after all in his statement that
the tale of mutiny hysteria in the British fleet is a "narration
essentially having less to do with fable than with face' (Billy Budd,
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p. 128; italics mine).
Because Vere believes that the past predicates and guides the
present, he gives each current decision a momentous significance. The
result is the urgency and necessity he invokes throughout Billy Budd.
He fears to allow the present situation to become another dangerous
precedent. Immediately after the homicide, the captain strikes an
attitude which dramatizes an intellectual position Shaw often assumed
after he took on the responsibilities of Chief Justice. Vere stands
impassive, one hand covering his face, and the narrator asks: "Was
he absorbed in taking in all the bearings of the event and what was
best not only now at once to be done, but also in the sequel?" (Billy
Budd, p. 99).
Shaw felt the momentous nature of the cases to come before the
court of last resort. None could be approached lightly because of
what it might mean to the future. In this connection an anecdote
was repeated about the time that the Chief Justice was discoursing
rather ponderously on the question of whether a calf was exempt from
an attachment on the cow. When his solemn manner produced a titter
among the lawyers in the courtroom, Shaw turned to them with the
rebuke that it was a very important question to a great many poor
families (Chase, pp. 280-81).
To one confirmed in the historical school of jurisprudence, nO
present action is isolated either from its causes in the past or from
its effects in the future. The thought is expressed frequently in
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Shaw's opinions as a major part of tl.lerationale behind the ultimate
decision of the court. It is no exaggeration to say that the tenet
lies at the base of Shaw's legal philosophy in its mature phase.
Vere ·shared other aspects of Shaw's j;dicial thinking. The
Chief Justice was notorious for his adamant persistence in upholding
the police power of the state. In its broadest sense, the term
"police power" refers to the right of the state to do whatever is
necessary in order to protect the welfare of the community as a
whole. There were times, Shaw admitted, when exigency might re-
quire the abrogation of a few Individual rights; but, as he expressed
it in a remark which Leonard Levy calls "the Chief Justice's most
enduring contribution to the police power concept" (Levy, p. 243),
a suit might "to a certain extent interfere with the liberty of action,
and even with the right of property ... but this cannot be considered
as going beyond the limits that justice requires. ,,8 This pre-
mise is central to the concept of the police power---the legislature
has a right to interfere with liberty or property if that is what is
necessary for the common welfare. Justice demands that society be
served before the individual. We have noted before (Chapter IV), in
connection with Shaw's definition of the law of homicide, that his
notion of justice included the idea of "social duty".
At times the operation of this principle seemed to be little more
8 ,.Commonwealth v. Farmers and Mechanics Bank, 21 pickering (1839)
542, 546; also quoted in Levy, p. 243.
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than an expression of Shaw's conservative Whig affiliation. The
Shaw court undeniably patronized the infant railroad industry; and
his role in aiding the South to reclaim its fugitive slaves made
abolitionists certain that the judge had collaborated with the
cotton magnates then prominent in Massachusetts politics. It is
true. moreover, that Shaw believed in manipulating the latitude
found in the Common Law in order to promote a healthy business
atmosphere.
Modern analyses of Shaw's career suggest, however, that his
work cannot be summarized in the simplistiC terms of political
party affiliation. The number of decisions the Shaw court handed
down which were unsympathetic to the "Cotton Whigs" argues that his
political philosophy was shaped by other than mere monied interests.
Levy proposes that the key factor was his insistence upon the ele-
ment of "social duty". Shaw felt that the obligation to the welfare
of the community is absolutely essential to the just disposition of
individual cases, even if it meant interference with personal liber-
ties. At times the rights which were abridged belonged to entre-
preneurs, at times to others. If what was good for corporate enter-
prize was also go09 for the community, Shaw freely lent the weight
of the law to encourage the business atmosphere. If, however , such
enterprize meant only selfish gain for the investors, Shaw threw the
favor of the court toward the maintenance of the public good.
The same rationale was often apparent in his handling of criminal
3u9
cases. His notion of government required that the public as a whole
should be protected before the court might consider attepuatin~
circumstances surrounding a crime. This theory of crimes and punish-
ments, however, was orthodox, for it was to be found also in Black-
stone. Punishment was not meted out for revenge or for the payment
of a debt to society, but in order to deter by example any further
commission of crime. (We may note that this theory was Vere's also.)
In the murder trial of Abner Rogers, Shaw prefaced his charge to the
jury with the observation: "the great object of punishment by law
is to afford security to the community against crimes, by punishing
those who violate the laws; and this object is accomplished by
holding out the fear of punishment, as the certain consequence of
such vio1ation.1t
It was not in the best interests of society or community that
people should be allowed to settle their quarrels by acts of personal
violence, no matter what the mitigating circumstances. In the Webster
case Shaw spoke of homicide as an injury to the rights of another.
Citizens have a right to life, as well as to liberty and the pursuit
of happiness. The punishment of death was a dire infringement of
these fundamental rights. Only the state could be permitted to de-
prive a man of his life; and its only justification, by Shaw's lights,
was the security and the well-being of the community.
It would seem to follow from this line of reasoning that any
crimes which particularly tended to subvert the moral or political
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fabric of society ought to have been rec~ived with outrage by
right-minded citizens. If one r~ilects upon the cases which
stirred the greatest puhlic interest in Boston during the 1840's
and 1850's---a few murder trials~ chiefly the Webster-Parkman affair~
the Somers mutiny case, and the fugitive slave renditions---it strikes
one that the furor did indeed focus upon the danger of subversion in
each instance.
In the "Introduction" to his edition of Dana's Journal, Robert
F. Lucid drew a comparison between the Webster and MacKenzie cases,
locating the matter squarely upon community support for the status
guo and duly constituted authority; The following is his conclusion
regarding the nub of feeling among those who considered themselves
to be the pillars of Society:
position and authority in that world were inseparable
partners, carrying with them responsibilities which
overshadowed all other considerations. • •• The
granite foundation of conservatism, asserting the
transcendance of institution over individual, could
hardly be more overwhelmingly apparent.9_
The most dramatic contest between those who held the individual
sacred and those who insisted that the community took priority was
in the fugitive slave trials of the 1840's and 1850's. National
attention was focused upon Massachusetts, a state notorious by mid-
9Richard Henry Dana, Jr., The Journal of Richard Henry Dana, Jr.;
ed. Robert F. Lucid (Cambridge; Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1968)~ I, xx.
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century for freeing black slaves brought within its boundaries and
for dOing everything possible, not excluding mob violence, to rrevent
southern slave owners from reclaiming their human property. Congress,
therefore, made up its mind to compel the minimum cooperation from
the northern communities and in 1850 passed the Fugitive Slave Act,
making it unlawful for any persons or state agency to interfere with
the process of capturing a fugitive. The act also provided for special
federal officers and summary courts. These tended to imbue the
slave-catchers activities with a sham of legality.
Although Shaw was opposed to slavery and had even helped form
an early abolitionist society," he believed in the supremacy of the
law. The Chief Justice did what he could to aid Negroes in getting
their freedom so long as he was able to construe the law for their
benefit.
In 1836 two slave cases occurred which served as preludes for
the more serious events of later decades and which also reveal Shaw's
position in the matter. The first of these involved two former
slaves, women who had arrived in Boston on board the brig Chickasaw,
Henry Eldridge, Captain. A slave-catcher had persuaded Eldridge to
detain the women, locked in their cabins, until he could make arrange-
ments for rendition. Outraged abolitionists and Boston blacks insti-
tuted legal proceedings in behalf of the women. The case was argued
before Judge Shaw, sitting alone, on the question of whether Eldridge's
actions in turning the brig into a federal prison were legal. The
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argument spread to consideration of Massachusetts Act of 1793 which
gav~ statuatory reinforcement to the provision in the United States
Constitution calling for the return of fugitive slaves. But Shaw
confined discussion to the question of the legality of the detention
on the brig, ruled that it was illegal, and discharged the women.
Before the slave-catcher could obtain a legal warrant under the pro-
visions of the Act of 1793, abolitionists who had packed the court-
room rushed forward, seized the ex-slaves and hurried them outside
into a carriage which bore them into obscurity and freedom. Shaw
had freed the ex-slaves by confining the question before his court
to the legality of their detention. Because of the forced rescue
it remains moot what he would have done with the pair if he had had
to rule on their statuS under the Act of 1793.
Several weeks later, however, Shaw revealed once again that
he was a friend to the anti-slavery cause. He was called upon to pass
decision on a suit brought by the Female Anti-Slavery Society for the
freedom of a slave girl named Med, who had been brought into the
Commonwealth temporarily by her mistress visit to Boston. The speech
by Benjamin R. Curtis, counsel for the slave owner, deserves notice
in our study because it touches upon an issue which emerges in Billy
Budd and which became a source of much bitterness between members of
Boston society, particularly among the lawyers and politicians.
Curtis took it upon himself on the occasion of Med's trial to remind
"the judges of the full bench that their opinions las men or moralists'
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were without bearing on the question," and !theventured that the
Court's decision should be based on what the law deemed moral or
immoral" (Levy, p. 64).
The Shaw court freed the slave girl in a landmark decision.
Shaw wrote the unanimous opinion, in which he meticulously treated
of every point of law that applied. He asserted that slavery was
against natural right, but not contrary to the law of nations.
Being against natural right, it could not be supported except by
positive enactment, though it could be a subject of agreement be-
tween sovereignties. The statute which covered the case of slaves
on free soil applied only to fugitives, and Shaw would not apply
it any farther than that. On this basis he protected the Consti-
tution; but while he was still able, he freed the slave.
The argument in Med's case resembles that used by Captain Vere
when he admits that though natural law would acquit Budd, yet martial
law, or the King's law, did not. Vere forces the decision upon the
court in Billy Budd, by reminding his officers of their sworn obliga-
tion to uphold the King's law, that "imperial code," before they
obeyed the dictates of natural law or their o,Ynprivate conscience.
In 1842 Shaw refused a petition for a writ of habeus corpus in
the case of a fugitive named Latimer who had been apprehended by a
slave catcher bearing a warrant for his arrest on charges of larceny
committed in Virginia. The petition stated that Latimer, as a citizen
of Massachusetts, had title to all the civil rights accorded any other
314
citizen, and demanded that his case be given to a jury to decide
whether he might be extradited. Shaw interpreted the action, ~orrect-
1y, as a ploy to thwart the provision in the Constitution for the
return of fugitive slaves. He refused to support any activity which
endangered the treaty made among the states and lying at the founda-
tion of the union. Defense in the Latimer trial contended that a
state law authorizing the ex-slave's arrest as a fugitive from justice
was unconstitutional because it covered relations between states, a
right delegated to the federal government.
Shaw was of another mind, however, for in reply he reiterated
the police power of the state:
It is competent for any State to make all such laws,
as in the judgment of the legislature may be necessary
to secure the peace and promote good order within its
borders.lO
Shaw declared a recent Massachusetts statute, the Personal Liberty
Law, inapplicable to fugitive slaves. According to the Liberator
(November 4, 1842), a contemporary abolitionist newspaper, he had
decided that Latimer's was not a case in which an appeal to natural
rights or to the law of liberty would prevail. The Constitution of
the United States and the law of Congress was to be obeyed "however
10Coffinlonwealth~.Coolidge, 5 Metcalf 536, 550; this case was
regularly reported in the Massachusetts Reports. The Latimer case
does not appear in the Reports because it was not argued in regular
session of the court or before the full bench.
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disagreeable to our own natural sympathies and views of duty. "
because on no other terms could union between North and South De
preserved. At any rate, Latimer was actually ordered returned to
a fugitive slave warrant.
Virginia under a warrant for his indictment for larceny, not under
Abolitionist reaction to Shaw's decision in the Latimer case
was bitter and vituperative. In response, Peleg Chandler undertook
his defense in an editorial in the Law Reporter. Chandler rebuked
critics 'tJhoblamed Shaw because he did not free the slave in accord-
ance 'tJiththe "law" of conscience. The conservative editor presented
a portrait of the neutral judge who
has nothing to do with the moral character of the
laws 'tJhicha society chooses to make, and which,
when made, it places him upon the bench to apply to
the facts before him. . . • the judiciary is the
mere organ of society, to declare what the law is,
and havinr ascertained, to pronounce what the lawrequires. 1
Chandler's rebuttal argued that the ideal judge does not permit
private conscience to interfere 'tJiththe discharge of his duty.
The Latimer case was actually re~olved when the slave was sold
for $400 to Massachusetts abolitionists who released him immediately.
Once again, rendition had been avoided; but fugitive slave agitation
was destined to increase rather than subside as the nation moved
llpeleg Chandler, Law Reporter, 5 (1842), 483; also quoted in
Levy, p, 83.
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closer to civil war.
In 1851 Massachusetts had ~cs first opportunity to test the
temper of the court on the notorious Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.
A black waiter named Shadrach was arrested as a fugitive as he un-
suspectingly served breakfast to a United States Deputy Marshal.
He was locked up in the United States Courtroom while rendition
papers were prepared by the Federal Commissioner. Vigilance Com-
mittee lawyers, led by Richard Henry Dana, Jr., volunteered to defend
Shadrach.
Dana personally took charage of defense proceedings, and approach-
ed Judge Shaw with his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The
petition was refused by the judge entirely on technical grounds,
none of which were substantial. The abolitionists were correct in
perceiving that Shaw had no real objection to the petition ~ se,
but that he simply did not wish to cooperate with the faction seeking
to undermine the Fugitive Slave Act. The impasse was resolved by a
rescue performed by blacks and anti-slavery men, and a legal rendition
was avoided once again.
Conservatives were naturally outraged at what they termed a case
of treason. In other quarters, however, Bostonians in sympathy with
the anti-slavery movement began to exult that no slave had ever been
returned from their city. A showdown was inevitable. When it came
it was attended with all the melodrama and sloemnity that the age
could have demanded.
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In April, 1851, before the controversy over the Shadrach resr.ue
had died down, Thomas Sims, a former slave, was arrested and ~onfined
in the jury room of the Court House. He was, at least technically,
in a federal prison and legally outside the jurisdiction of the state
courts. Abolitionists nevertheless approached the Supreme Judicial
Court for a writ of habeas corEus to bring Sims before the court to
decide whether he was being held in legal detention. Shaw refused
the writ, saying that if the writ were issued and the prisoner brought
before the Court, it duty would be to send him back to the custody of
the Federal Commissioner, because it had no jurisdiction to decide
whether or not he was or was not a fugitive. Shaw also refused Sims'
counsel permission to argue on the constitutionality of the law of
1850.
Shaw did even more by way of emphasizing his intention to bow to
the law of the land. The city Marshal, Francis Tukey, had ordered the
Court House, where Sims was being held, surrounded with a heavy chain.
The militia had been called up, along with two hundred and fifty
United States troops, to prevent all possibility of a rescue. Any-
one going in or out of the courthouse, including the judges, had to
duck under the chains. Accordjngly, on the morning of April 4, 1851,
the aroused citizenry of Boston were presented with the spectacle of
their courthouse in chains, the Chief Magistrate of the land stooping
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beneath th~m to gain access to his chambers.12
This sight, along with the low-profile kept by Shaw during the
later, even more notorious Burns case of 1854, prompted Richard Henry
Dana, Jr., to note in his diary that the Chief Justice was "a man
of no courage or pride" (Journal, II, 631). After the "bleeding
Kansas" bill of 1854, all but the most conservative of the old union-
ist faction moved into the ranks of the newly formed Republican Party.
Shaw remained among those who insisted that pacifying the South with
a policy of cooperation with the slave power was the only way to
save the union. He died shortly after the outbreak of the Civil
War. His last public acts and appearances were 1n support of the
Fugitive Slave Act and the territorial compromises that Webster had
engineered in cooperation with Henry Clay. In this respect too
there is a resemblance between the Chief Justice and Melville's
captain of the Bellipotent, both of whom die before the war.is ended
still clinging without remorse to their principles (Billy Budd,
p , 129).
Critics of the novella have jibed at Vere, finding him less than
12See Charles H. Foster, "Something in Emblems: A Reinterpretation
of Moby-Dick," New England Quarterly, 34 (1961),3-35; Foster sees Sha\o/
as a de facto enemy of the anti-slavery cause and interprets Mobl-Dick
as Melville's defiance of his father-in-law. Shaw's role in the
slave controversy was far more complex, though, than Foster seemS to
realize.
,
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heroic. They have detected an "authorial attitude" which suggests
th~t Vere's devotion to legalism is not a particularly admirable
quality in a man. Shaw too was heaped for opprobrium for what people
considered "unmanly" behavior toward the threats of the slave power.
Although Shaw was Ghief Justice from 1830 to 1860, it was not until
the last decade of his tenure in office that he became the object of
repeated and furious attacks by the press for his apparent collabora-
tion with monied'interests and with those who wished to tolerate the
institution of slavery. This characterization was not a particularly
enviable one in the North during the pre-Civil War era. Shaw emerged
from the hullaballoo of the Webster murder trial in 1850 looking to
some like a disgraceful puppet of the Parkman family. At about the
same time he had the sad and extremely unpopular task of refusing the
habeas corpus in the fugitive slave cases. As the slavery issue split
the nation, Shaw's apparent political and social connections with the
"Cotton Whigs" brought up for popular scrutiny more and more of his
decsions on the bench.
Shaw had always been known as a stern judge whose flexibility was
limited to that of the law itself. Caught in the same currents that
were rapidly polarizing public opinion in many other ~ays, Shaw gained
a reputation, for the most part unjustly, as an unfeeling martinet,
a hanging judge, and a shameless tool of established authority. More-
over, the bitter rift between Shaw and Dana over the slave issue may
help to explain the termination of the budding friendship between Dana
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and Helvi1le.
Modern critics of Judge Shaw have been more tolerant of ~is
course in the slavery affairs. Leonard Levy describes Shaw in these
emergencies as "earnestly a man of peace who would not consciously
aggrevate a situation offering the menace of a Igreat national cala-
mityll (Levy~ p . 72). The abolitionists agitated mightily throughout
the slave trials. Always their cry was that men owed obedience not
to the Constitution but to a higher law. Their activities, naturally,
threatened the political stability of the nation. Levy summarized
Shaw's situation thus:
As a judge, Shaw felt duty bound to enforce the
Constitution as law regardless of whatever moral
twinges he may have experienced. When the aboli-
tionists hurled their barbs at him, they aimed at
a man who regarded the return of the runaways as
a legal necessity. (Levy, p. 72)
In these dilemmas Shaw's position resembles Captain Vere's. The
analogy is plain. In the United States, if rebellion were to be a-
verted, law and order had to prevail. There was in the fugitive slave
cases a "legal necessity". In comparison, in the man-ol-war world of
the Bellipotent law and order had to be preserved if mutiny were to be
averted. There was what Melville termed a "military necepsity".
In the slave cases, the rights of man whfch belonged to the blacks
under natural law and which were guaranteed them by the state consti-
tution of Massachusetts had to be abrogated in or.der that the union
might be preserved and that the general welfare, as Shaw saw it, might
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be secured. Billy's situation is less clear. It is not certain
specifically what natural rights he loses when it comes to the crucial
trial. Perhaps for that reason Melville found it necessary to
strengthen his point by including the dramatic scene in which the
sailor takes leave of the Rights-of-Man and makes the transition
into the bondage of impressed service in the royal navy.
The codification controversy (see Chapter V) was not the only
issue to raise questions about eighteenth-century conceptions of
natural law. It was the slavery issue in fact which carried the
fight from the courtrooms onto the battlefield. During the period
following the enactment of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, aboli-
tionist preacher Theodore Parker delivered an anti-slavery sermon
which he later published under the title The Rights of Man (1854).
The phrase figured repeatedly in Congressional debate and newspaper
editorializing of the period, particularly in anti~slavery circles.
Several other aspects of Billy Budd suggest the anti-slavery
controversy. The prototype for Billy is a black Handsome Sailor.
Second, impressment into the British na~y is like a seizure into
bondage. The royal navy's claim that the fleet could not be worked
without such recru~tment is suspiciously like the argument used by
Southern cotton growers that their plantations must fail without
slave labor. Finally, Vere's fear that the sailors might mutiny if
the law were not enforced is analogous on the one hand to Northerners'
fear that the South might rebel and on the other hand to the Southcrn-
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ers' fear that the slaves mjght revolt if they saw that th~ lnv~r~
law was weakening.
To return to our comparison of Vere's thinking with thnt of
Chief Justice Shawt it is necessary only to point out the C,ptnin's
belief that the security of discipline in the fleet ov~rrode any
consideration of an individual t s welfare, no matter how much of nn
innocent or an "angel of God" he may be. Shnw likewIse sympathiz,ed
for the blacks who were innocent victims of tha political situation.
In view of threatened civil wart however~ his first rcspooRibiltty
was to the community. He had no choice but to ordcr the 81 ave,
returned.
Both Shaw and Vere affirmed the police power of the stato nnd
the necessity for backing it up in the judiciary, The po11c:~ POWC'l"
may not be challenged by acts of private consc1cnc~. Billy could not
be permitted to answer Claggart's accusation. though unjustJ by th{
might of his fist. The court of officers could not ign()r('b c,us
of private feelings the need to punish mutiny. for to do so, ill
Vere's best judgment. would be to endanger the gcncr31 w lfBI~ of thl
fleet and by extension that of the society it was supposed to protc"l,
Though the analogy, may not be complete, it is at Lcas t RUSS s t Lve
that Billy's antagonist, Claggart, is the "police pow r" r.bonn! lill
Bellipotent. Melville makes a point of defining the Innst ('1'- t: - "1M
position as a sort of "chief of police" in the shlp'A communily (.lll!l:Y.
Budd, p. 64). This matter is, of coursc, npart from the "my (try of
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iniqu~_ty" to which Vere refers.
Playing the role of a Chief Justice, Vere is ultimately called
upon to instruct his court. He elevates himself suddenly to be their
"coadjutor" because he sees the officers comprising his sunnnary court
to be in need of help. Vere proceeds to charge them with the ortho-
dox doctrine of judicial self-restraint, also an outstanding feature
of the avowed policy of the Shaw Court.
Vere advises them that they are not authorized to create the
law'of the matter; they are permitted only to ascertain the facts of
the case and to decide if they amount to a criminal act according to
martial law. He tells them they must ignore the "mystery of iniquity"
which lies at the origin of the affair. Likewise they must not de-
bate the rightness of the law. He concludes, litheprisoner's deed---
with that alone we have to do" (Billy Budd, p. 108). Further on in
his address to the court he becomes more explicit in phrasing the
question to which they must confine themselves:
If, mindless of palliating circumstances, we are
bound to regard the death of the master-at-arms as
the prisoner's deed, then does that deed constitute
a capital crime whereof the penalty is a mortal one.
(Billy Budd, p . 110)
Vere goes on to say that in omitting flpalliating circumstances"
this rule 1s contrary to Nature (note: he meant "Nature" in its old
idealistic connotation), but he reminds them that in accepting their
commissions they ceased to be natural free agents and became officers,
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agents of the King. The argument is directly analogous to that u~ed
by Shaw in the Latimer case: that though slavery be against npcura1
law, yet it can be a subject of agreement between sovereignties and
may be supported by positive law (statute or constitution) which the
courts are bound to uphold.
As public officials, in this case as officers of the courtmartial,
they could not permit the scruples of their private conscience to
intrude upon the duty prescribed to them by law. Vere asks:
But tell me whether or not, occupying the position we
do, private conscience should not yield to that imperial
one formulated by the code under which alone we offici-
ally proceed? (Billy Budd, p. 111)
This same principle of judicial restraint came up for a ruling in
Shaw's court. During the course of the slave trials, two landmark
decisions emerged, with the result that the issue was one long familiar
to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and to anyone who bothered
to read Shaw's published opinions. It is probably no coincidence
that the father-in-law of the man who wrote Billy Budd is the author
of the definitive American law of judicial restraint, law which re-
mains unaltered in its essential features to the present day.
There are two parts to the theory of judicial restrajnt as up-
held and practiced by the Shaw Court: one involves the attitude of the
bench, the other that of the jury. Shaw was adamant in upholding the
principle that the judiciary had no right to create new law. The
court had a duty to ascertain the law and to declare what the law
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was in the particular cases that camp betore it. The only situatIon
in which the courts might contra~Lct the legislature was in pronounc-
ing upon the constituticnality of a statute. because th~ constitution
was not alterable at the discretion of the legislature. but by se~lr-
ate mandate from the peopl.;. Shaw ~ent so far 3S to insist thnt t.he
court had no right to challenge the reasonableness of a statute because
(again upholding the police power of the state) the legislaturo had
the right to enact whatever it thought best to promote the gC'nC'Ti.ll
welfare; and no one, except itself or succeeding legislatures, had the
right to criticize ~hat it thought proper or reasonable in the exe-
cution of this duty (Levy. p. 309). Thus, despite charges thnt he wns
a "Cotton Whig," Shaw advocated a principle of judicial self-restraint
as firm as the most Jacksonian legislature could desire.
As we have already seen with respect to the f:ugitive slnve
cases, Shaw firmly believed in carrying through the principle. of the
separation of powers. Judges must decides cases in their otfic.1nl
capacity. They must not allow their opinions as private indiv.idunl~
to intrude. Nor were they permitted to pass judgment upon the morn}
righteousness of a statute or upon the constitution itself, but
merely to ascertain and declare the law in the matter. Vcre'H state-
ment to his court concerning the superiority of the "impcri111 codes'
over the private conscience might have come just as we.ll from Shnw
as from the captain of the Ballipotent.
The argument presented by the defense when the case cnnie bcf ore
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the Suprem~ Judicial Court had two basic points: first, the jury;
by vLrt.ueof the general verdict; had the power to pass judgment upon
the law and therefore must be presumed to have the right~ since the
law would not confer the power without the right. Second, that if
the judge denies "the moral right of the jury to decide the la~'1
according to their own notions and pleasure" and to give a verdict
against their own convictions, "then,!! said the defense, "the juror
[is 1 compelled to do morally wrong, and I even though the verdict be
right the jury give, yet they, not being assured it is so from their
own understanding, are forsworn, at least in foro conscientiae, ..13
To these arguments Shaw replied that the jury did not have the
right to deliver a verdict which was contrary to the law because the
basis of freedom was "laws .•. fixed and permanent, impartially
applied to all persons and cases alike, and not fluctuating and
14variable." He concluded that the prinCiple contended for would
undermine the precious certainty of the law. The result would be
a chaotic situation in the courts of justice where every Grand Jury
might indict as it pleased and every jurist might convict a man even
though he has committed no criminal act:
13Commonwealth v. Porter, 10 Metcalf.
14Commomvealth v . Porter, 10 Metcalf 278, 279.
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But the case supposes that the law may be right-
fully interpreted by a jury which may shift at every
trial. What then becames of the security which every
citizen is entitled to, by a steady and uniform, as
well as impartial interpretation of the laws and ad-
ministration of justice. by judges as free, impartial.
and independent as the lot of humanity will admit?
The purpose and intent of these provisions, we th1nk.
are indicated by the last article of the declaration
of rights, which, after having contemplated a diS-
tribution of the powers of sovereignty into legisla-
tive, executive and judicial departments. and declared
that neither should execute the powers assigned to the
other, points out the ultimate object, jn these emphatic
words: "to the end it may be a government of:laws nnd
not of men." 15
Here then is Vere's argument as well: the private conscience mU!:It
yield to that "imperial one formulated in the code under which alon
we officially proceed" (Billy Budd. p. 111). The court must com to
a verdict according to the law, because the security afford d by th.
certain ty of the law demands it. Vere' s "prejudgmen ttl' sensed by the
officers of his court, may have been intended as an expression of chis
inexorable "certainty". If the court would appear capricious or un-
lawful in its decision, then the deterring example prescribed by th
orthodox view of crimes and punishments would be set at uilught and th
people of the commonwealth, as well as the t'ship'speople" aboard t.he
Bellipotent, would feel at liberty to overturn all establLshod au t.ho r.l»
ty under the misapprehension that their superiors appr-oved a R,ov~rl"'1-
15Commonwealth v. Porter~ 10 Metcalf 280.
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ment rj men, rather than by law.
It is of some importance to note that principles of law argued
in Billy Budd were available to Melville through his father-in-lawts
published opinions, if not through Judge Shaw's conversation. Of
equal value, however, is the light such constructions of legal princi-
ples throw upon other elements in the tale, details which have been
teasing critics for decades.
For example, throughout the novella Melville created a dramatic
contrast between a government by men and a government by laws. In
the beginning the Handsome Sailor is characterized as a natural
leader. Then Billy is praised by the captain of the Ri~hts-of-Man
as "my peacemaker". He describes the way Billy settled the "rat-pit
of quarrels" in the forecastle like a "Catholic priest striking peace
in an Irish shindy" (Billy Budd, p. 47). The young sailor is a
natural leader, one who might govern the crew by the mere force of
his personality. Yet, when the Bellipotent arrives intent upon
staffing the fleet that must protect an entire nation, the government
by men, no matter how "handsome," must yield to a government by law.
Another appearance of the theme of a government by law, not by
men, can be seen in the comparison of Vere to Horatio Nelson. Nelson
was vainglorious and perhaps indiscreet, but he is spoken of in terms
of admtration. It was Nelson's custom to lead his men to naval victor-
ies and to maintain discipline in the fleet by force of personality
rather than by rule of law. Many critics have believed that Helville
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of f ere-i the example of Nelson's behavior as a suvIng n l.t erne t Lv to
tlu rather shabby role played by the legalistic Vc.re. Lt 19 P0891hl
that there is some justification for this theory. Nev'rthe]css, Vcre
stands for a government of laws; Nelson. for a government of men. One
may be certain that the inclusion of this material ~as nt len t in
part for the purpose of further illustrating the.thematic conflict
between these two opposing stances.
One minor intrusion of the same idea is found veiled in Mrlv!11 '
way of presenting Vere's remark:
With mankind •.• forms, measured forms are every-
thing; . .• And this he once applied to the dis-
ruption of forms going on across the Channel nnd
the consequences thereof. (Billy Budd,. p, 128)
Although the allusion may be to the French Revolution of 1788. It:
is possible that it also refers to the revolt of th('army under
Napoleon which occurred in 1796, that "red mctcor" which rt w inc0
the sky, says Melville, and ignited the BrltLsh flc.~t slee~{ns at
anchor a few miles away. It is intcres ting to note thnt 1.1.'1111.1 1 ~h.w
did a translation of a contemporary biography of Napolcnn. Th huok
was never published; but the manuscrjpt survives in th~ Boston Soc1.
Law Library. It deals with the rise of Napoleon's rollt lenl cnrcnr
in the political chaos that follo'-1cdthe French Revolutioll.
FinallYt we may evaluate Billy's famous last \o1tH'ds in. tll l1r,ht.
of what we have been saying about the drama tLacd contrns t b [\01(' n .1
government of laws and a government of men. Billy pronounc th
330
words~ "God bless Captain Vere!" and the narrator tells us that the
svj_lables had "a phenomenal effect, not unenhanced by the rare personal
beauty of the young sailor" (Billy Budd, p. 123). Billy's presence is
charismatic. He offers the possibility of a government by men. His
personality is so magnetic that it was "as if indeed the ship's popu-
lace were but the vehicles of some vocal current electric" as they
resonantly echo the words. The finishing touch to this paragraph is
the stroke of a master pen:
And yet at that instant Billy alone must have
been in their hearts, even as in their eyes.
(Billy Budd, p. 123)
Billy leads them "alone," by the sheer magnetic force of personality,
and it is this that Vere fears. The Captain touches them little in
their hearts, though their every daily move is rigidly controlled under
the naval laws he enforces by means of the ship's police. In the
scene at the hanging the men give lip service to the law, but the
fiction of the social contract was never more vulnerable to change
than when Billy's words run with electrifying force through the
untutored hearts of the simple tars. From these hearts might come
a mandate capable of overthrowing a government by law9< A pure
democracy is rank anathema to those like Vere who place a premium
upon historical continuity and the certainty of the law.
There is no "testament of resistance" in Billy Budd, nor one of
"acceptance" either. The sublime power in the work is the result of
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the perfect tension between the two. Dipping into a vast resource
of ~ateria1s---which included without a doubt some of his father-in-
law's experiences on the bench---Melvil1e constructed a piece of
narrative fiction, a microcosmic world in which the action, the
characters, and the scenery all conspire by symbolic embodiment to
summon forth those feelings of despair or rebellion which all persons
must have at some time toward the imposition of political and social
necessity. With consummate skill he clarified the undercurrents of
daily emotional life in the modern world. Billy Budd is a cry of
agony for the burden of compromise Melville carried all his life.
Conclusion
The training and approaches of l.1hatPerry MiJl(';rh. s styl d lithe
legal mind" formed a deep-running and respected school of thought in
mid-nineteenth century America. It has becn the purpos' of this sud)"
to find and demonstrate the pr esence of this legalism in Helvlll IS
work and to show the degree to which it became an f mpo rcaut, inClu nc
in the development of his craft of prose.
As was stated in Chaptcr II, I have been less cone rn d wi r h
cataloging the particular instances in which Mclvill(\;mode explicit
use of legal terminology, court scenes or legal charnel:'L'~---,uch 1.
lawyers and judges---than with exploring t he poas ibi1i ty that eh
lawyer's outlook upon the world formed a large part of Nrdvil If)
perspective. Thus, there exist several nr cns .....Lt.h Ln l ho gcne r
subj ec t of "Herman Melville and the Law" .....h f ch have been
either because they were not deemed relevant to the major th
OV t'.
this work, or because the points which they might 11 us!:!"Lc w ..
already sufficiently established. Undnr ehc Conn r hend In' f. 1 •
in my opinion, liThe Paradise of Batchelor8, II {) short ator)'whi h h
a legal setting and lawyers as :i ts main char: cters , but 'o1h1 h ncv t'_
theless contains no material exactly gcrmuin to th partlcul~1 con pt
of the legal mind under consideration. Likewise 11tc'r II
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]"t LI point
33)
the private legal affairs of the Mehrlllcs, Gansevoort s, and Sh WG
begin to affect Herman Melville',,;outlook less than carlier even
concerning these families. Therefore I decided that a ays ecmat ic
review of'all the cataloged and uncataloged pap·rs deposit: d In lh.
Gansevoort-Lansing Collection of the New York Public Library w 0 not
warranted, although some of these documents do touch
and other petty legal matters involving l-ialvillc or his l:xtlnd d
family. Under the second heading---material supcrfluouf'Ito til"
illustration of already established points---should h grouped (nmort
other subjects) all those minor instances in which Z.tclvUl
a legal term. It would be difficult to distinguish for each n6\
how Melville I S usage significantly differs from the cur r ncy wht h
this vocabulary enjoyed in general among the \oll"i tars of: his dny t ,nd
as early as 1965 Herbert F. Smith had definitively dcmonstrnt d
Melville's ability to make sophisticated usc of thnt kind of In t~ r,1I,
I see no reason to add to that pcrformance by listing nl.I t he bit s
and pieces that only provide extra examples of the same matt r. 10
addition, portions of White-Jacket deaJing with nllvol lnw h.v b n
mentioned only briefly because their polcmicn 1 naru ce mak S l hem
only superficially relevant to the deep. undo rly:t ng at t itud 1 h III
tried to define. (Most of the 1a\o1.~!£ in \.Jhitc-Jack~l h h til
analyzed sufficiently by others.) Among the poems cher w,' vur
which contain elements relevant to legalism. In her nrticla. 11M 1-
ville t s ClaSSicism: La\o1and Order in His Poetry t" Jnne Donahu l' pon
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that the evidence of the poems shows a tension ever-present in
Melville's mind between the impulse toward freedom and a coun~er-
desire for order. With respect to liTheHousetop," for example, she
explains that Melville recognized that social order depends on law,
1not on human nature; and others have seen that "Dupont's Round
Fight" is another piece in which Melville argues for the necessity
of form. Newton Arvin has noted that Melville's choice of language
in the poetry partakes less of the conventional romantic diction
than of terms suggestive of industry, business, mathematics, and
2the law. For the most part, though, the content of the poetry
supports the conclusions of this study without offering enough ad-
ditional insight to justify its inclusion in this discussion.
On the other hand, because Mardi is normally designated a minor
work, it may be necessary to explain why it appears so frequently,
especially in Chapters II and V of this study. Mardi is the first
of Melville's writings to reflect his explicit and extensive interest
in philosophy and current politics. It is also the first to depart
from the simple adventure-travelogue genre into an experimental form
1Jane Donahue, "Melville's Classicism: Law and Order in Hi.s
Poetry," Papers on Language and Literature, 5 (1969); 63-72.
2Newton Arvin, "Melville's Shorter Poems," Partisan Review,
16 (1949), 1034-1046.
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using multiple points of view. The book was composed under the
~~rect stimulation of an artistically and politically active group
of friends in New York City who were instrumental in developing
Melville's intellectual awareness. Many of these men---David Dudley
Field and Alexander Bradford, for example---were lawyers themselves
or, like Mathews and Bryant, had participated in law reform, speci-
fically in the partly abortive attempt of the 1850's to codify the
law and in the more successful overhaul of court procedure then in
progress in New York State. In many respects, Mardi is a record
of Melville's first journey into the world of the mind, and it con-
tains the seeds of thought which grew and flowered in later writings.
Since so much concern with the law existed in the atmosphere in which
Mardi was created, it should not be surprizing that it proved so
valuable a source in tracing the influence of the legal mind upon
Melville's philosophy.
As we have seen, Melville had special opportunity to become
acquainted with the law. Knowing as he did so many lawyers and judges
or persons with a law education, he was socially placed where he had
an excellent chance to understand and absorb even the most profound
insights of philosophy and methodology that the science of the law
had to offer. The works themselves show that Melville had a remark-
ably thorough grasp of legal matters. His facility is particularly
apparent in Pierre, a book which dramatizes the issues of the codifi-
cation controversy and displays a minute, technical knowledge of the
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rules of evidence. This same expertise is apparent in Bartleby.
Legal science is again visible LL Moby-Dick and in all other stories
which take up the problems of justifiable homicide and malice afore-
thought. "Finally the comparison of the figure of Vere in Billy Budd
with the character and work of Lemuel Shaw suggests strongly that
Melville was intensely conscious of the moral crises experienced
by a judge of any conscience or personal integrity.
It may be said in conclusion that there were two great ways
in which legalism influenced Melville as a writer. The first of
these is the impact it had upon his aesthetics. The second is the
way in which it guided selection of some characteristic content of
his work.
There are many elements of legal procedure which could have
informed his experiments with prose technique. It is certainly
possible that his attempt to find new forms was motivated by that
attitude of jurisprudence which teaches one to disdain or at least
to suspect ready formulations of the "truth". It is safe to say
that there were probably no more pat formulations of this kind about
in Melville's day than the conventional, sentimental fiction of the
ordinary novel. Perhaps the critical awareness provided by the
lawyer's inclination to doubt glib explanations prompted Melville
to reject ways of writing that offered inevitable and perfect para-
digms of life as it should be.
On the positive side, legal methodology could have suggested the
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advantage of the multiple point of view in any attempt to render the
"complete sphericity of things," and, further, along the same .Lines,
the need to avoid second hand narrations if veracity could be better
attained by a "separate citation of items". Both insights may account
for much of the so-called fragmentation in some of his works, for
example, changes in narrative voice in Mardi and Moby-Dick and a
certain cataloging effect most apparent in Moby-Dick, but present to
a certain degree in Billy Budd as well.
Beyond this influence on his aesthetics, there is ample evidence
that a knowledge of the law and of contemporary legal issues provided
Melville with the basic philosophic principles he chose to dramatize
again and again during his career. These principles may be described
under threee conventionally designated areas of any philosophy: meta-
physics, epistemology, and ethics. For Melville, as for most of those
within the pragmatic profession of the law, the world existed, both
undeniably and absolutely. He represented it as blindness and insanity
to think otherwise. He was neither an idealist who tried to live en-
tirely with a hypothetical "higher" reality nor the kind of mystic who
thought one could dispense with the things that common sense presented
to the mind. Rather he thought the nature of such "factsl1 had a mun-
dane character (that available to anyone of common sense) and an em-
blematic aspect as,well. The latter depended upon any individual's
need to believe that a particular significance indicative of moral
and spiritual value attaches to the elements of his world. No one
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is exer.lptfrom this striving after meaning, yet some ttl" mor~ SUl:.>-
ce~tible than others to its wild "nd often unreasoning promptin~B.
A person in either forced or voluntary isolation from his community
may soon lose touch with common sense. His single sighted perspccriv
becomes a poor judge of the lruth, while his peculiarit 6 and prc-
judicies must cause gross distortion in the apprehensions of hL9 mornl
sense. The best knowledge is the knowledge afforded by lIlult1plp (loin
of view, the more the better, and by a wisdom which has b en histori-
cally developed through the experience of many and made cohur mt
through the continuity of a soci~ty. Thus. although paSSion 1113), be
the source of all that is finest in human nature, it: ilOalso thnt whic:h
makes mankind liable to foolish I dangerous deeds. The hcar t eM1 L1 \1
prey to a lying spirit ,one likely to cause chaos and dl'S t rliet 10n.
These are ideas worked out repeatedly in Melville's stories. and they
are premises of the law as well. As such they dictate certain thl~ 1
conclusions; no one individual may decide all by himself what iA r1&i1C;
rather, he must be guided by the morals and conditions of his Aociety,
and in the case of a dispute or a d!lcnnna he must allow It SCI iaU)' con-
stituted authority to settle the matter. Me]vill~ insists upon the
same moral: in judging what one TIlUl'lt do, it 1s right for the !. k. or
others to follow time-tested wisdom and to ahjurc for 011 pr.clJcnl
purposes the ravings of the Ishmael withIn all of us.
